Study Groups

Dear Dave,

I thought that I would reply to John Cook's letter in First Empire No.25 regarding the formation of a Research Section and suggested activities for such a group. I would also like to take the opportunity of explaining the functions of the Study Groups, and what they achieve.

First, the idea of a Research Section. This already exists! In the Napoleonic Association there is a thriving Research Section, which I have headed in my position as Research Officer since 1990. As any reader of the Napoleonic Newsdesk will realise, this section involves Conferences, Study Days and Study Groups. What is not apparent is that this Section also involves the dissemination of information within the NA.

Throughout the year I receive many quenes from individuals, both members and non-members, regarding a variety of subjects. Examples are: Austrian Order-of-Battle at a particular action; where to find a certain regimental museum; information regarding particular swords; details of the French Dragoon regiments at Waterloo. The subjects covered are as broad as the period is itself. If I cannot answer a query myself using my own library I will pass it to someone I think can help. This may be a Study Group Co-ordinator or an individual with specialist knowledge that I have details of. If the former cannot help immediately, they publish the request in their Group's newsletter.

Having been in the post of Research Officer fbr a while now and having been studying the penod, and wnting and lecturing about it for 25 years now, I have accumulated iniormation on museums and collections around the world. This material is by no means 100% comprehensive. There are still many collections, libraries etc. that would be of interest to the Napoleonic student that I have not yet come across. Indeed, members do send me snippets of information about particular items they have seen in a museum, and these details I do keep on file for the benefit of others.

The facility of writing to me for help in research is open to anyone, not just NA members. All I stipulate is that the letters are legible, polite and enclose return postage (occasionally these criteria are not met!!). Often I feel that the query is best answered by one of the Study Groups.

This leads me on to the function of the Study Groups. When we first set up such Groups a few years ago, it was to form local points for particular subjects. The Co-ordinators agreed to act as a focus for like-minded people and to disseminate information on their topics. Most now produce a newsletter. These Groups are not Think Tanks that meet regularly to produce documents on their chosen areas. They are informal groups that send items of news, research and relevant museum details to a Co-ordinator, who keeps this information on file to help others and publishes for the benefit of the other members. There is no fee for joining such a Study Group, and they are open to all who want to take advantage of their specialist pool of knowledge.

Information from these Groups is disseminated outside their circle! Some of the articles published in this magazine are written by members of such Groups, and some members present papers at the NA Conferences. In addition, the Co-ordinators often have a display of their work at these meetings, for the benefit of all who attend. While their work is not published under the heading Study Group, they are still giving others the benefit of their research.

When I took over the job of Research Officer, I thought about the idea of a Members Directory, listing their names, addresses and interests. Not everyone in the NA Research Section sent me details of their areas of interest, and some individuals raised the valid point that members with a specialist interest in say swords of the period, who might be willing to answer an individual query, would not be happy to have their details published because they owned extensive collections that they would not want the world to know about, for security reasons. Others also objected to a list of names and addresses being published that could be used for unsolicited mailshots (Data Protection Act and all that). I thus felt that a combination of Study Groups, Conferences and personal knowledge would best serve those within the NA who require assistance with their research.

I agree with Mr Cook and his suggestion for more dissemination of information, and I believe the relationship between First Empire and the Napoleonic Association has vastly improved this aspect of the hobby. I would also state that impetus to the spreading of the word, as it were, has also come from the NA Spnng and Autumn Conferences, where members who do not wish to present a full-blown lecture can still have the opportunity to publicise their research either within the Newsdesk feature at the meetings, or by means of a small display at the back of the Lecture Theatre. Indeed, to further encourage members to stand up and broadcast their work to an audience, I have instigated one session at the Spring meeting next year which will consist of four short presentations, rather than one main Speaker. This idea has proved popular with our volunteers, if that is the right word, coming forward.

So what can be done in the future? If any reader of the magazine wishes to publicise his or her interest in a specific area, then they are tree to do so in the Newsdesk, as do people who begin the Study Groups. I am also willing to help answer any query from readers, by passing the letter on to either a Study Group Co-ordinator or any other specialist I know of. If you have a topic that you require help with, this can be publicised (either by yourself or read out by me) at the NA Conferences.

There are many ways of helping readers with their research. Please feel tree to make use of them.

Yours sincerely,

Paul Chamberlain, NA Research Officer

Waterloo discussed ...

Dear Dave,

Having read the thought-provoking letter by Stephen Brennan in Issue 26 of "FIRST EMPIRE" I decided to put pen to paper to answer some of his questions while asking some of my own.

As I understand, the Allied Cavalry kept well out of the way while the French Cavalry tried in vain to break the Intantry squares. This was apparently to stay out of range of the Artillery fire between charges and as a precaution against being shot at by their own side during them! I would imagine, however, that the Allied Cavalry would be ready to countercharge if the French swept past the Infantry and attacked them directly. Certainly their ill-fated charge against D'Erlon's Corps had proved costly - up to 25% becoming casualties - yet they managed to raise sufficient strength for an attack against the retreating squares of the Guard at the end of the day!

Wellington's position was based upon the promise that Blucher would support him early on in the battle and his flank at Papelotte held by Picton's Divisions was weaker because it was here where the Prussians would (hopefully) arrive. It so happened that they did not come when expected and D'Erlon's main attack was directed here, hence only a handful of troops standing in the way of massed French columns. Had Picton's Vth Division not been veteran, they may have broken allowing Milhaud's Cavalry Corps to punch through and roll up the Allied line as Napoleon had intended.

Yet Wellington's very position should have supported swift troop movements had he wished to implement them. The sunken road, for instance, was ideal for cavalry and artillery and had the added benefit that it was, like the majority of Wellington's forces, out of view of the French. Surely then, if troops had been needed and the Duke thought Picton could not hold his line, they could easily have marched to any danger spots and plugged the gaps!

I claim to be no expert on the Waterloo campaign and am the first to readily admit I am far ffrom. My own research has brought up many more questions than it has successfully answered. For example, what did the majority of the French infantry actually do while their cavalry was being butchered by the Allied squareed? I cannot believe they would sit back twiddling their thumbs! The Guard would stay in reserve sure and Reille was heavily engaged at Hougemont while Lobau marched to protect the flank for the imminent attack of Bulow.

This left the rallied divisions of D'Erlon's Corps, which despite its earlier losses was still a formidible fighting force! Did none of the French officers think to use their own initiative while their C-in-C was off the field and give their cavalry some desperately needed support? If this was too much for them, did any instead intend to march to the aid of either Lobau or Reille?

Wellington had believed that Napoleon might attempt to outflank him and cut his Army off from the coast, hence his insistence at placing 17,000 troops at Hal. Was faulty intelligence to blame at Waterloo, then, for did Wellington not realize he faced the whole Imperial Army excluding the 33,000 troops under Grouchy sent to "pursue" the Prussians? This would explain why he did not recall those troops at Hal to help defend Mont 5t Jean. Furthermore, was Wellington totally convinced that Blucher would stick to his word, or did he believe Grouchy might smash the old Prussian in battle and attempt to cut him off from the coast?

Finally where was the famous "hidden ravine" which apparently disordered the French cavalry charges and stopped them from sweeping the Allied Army off the ridge? Did it really exist or like the cannonade against the frozen lakes at Austerlitz -- has it been heavily embroded by French propaganda and legend?

I hope that some of your readers may be in a position to clarify some of these questions and assist me in the matter. Your sincerely, C.Burley Dronfield, Sheffiel

Hofschroer's Reviews

Dear sir,

I was disappointed yet again with Peter Hofschroer's review of Battle Tactics of Napoleon And His Enemies by Brent Nosworthy.

Although he gave the book a fair review, it again turned into a history of the Prussian army and an attack on "Anglo" authors.

When considering a book covering Napoleon and all his enemies, Peter should remember that chronologically, Prussia played a very small part in the Wars against Napoleon compared to the years of fighting seen by Austria, Great Britain, Russia and Spain.

I find Peter's ideas interesting but not new. Most "Anglo" writers take the year 1806 as a water shed for the Prussian Army, but Peter forgets that it is also applied to all the other European armies. After 1806, they all underwent massive reform and reorganisation. (The French army changed battalions from 9 companies to 6.)

I also find that most "Anglo" writers come to the same conclusions for Prussia's defeat in 1806 as Peter, which is surprising if they are unable to read German.

Peter forgets that we are now a European Community where the exchange of information is becoming easier by the day. In my own case although I do not speak German, my concubine does. Also, my cousin lives in Hanover and is married to a Hanoverian and I correspond with her father-in-law who is a very able military historian.

I would like to challenge Peter to write a series of articles for First Empire on Prussian and German tactics, to give "Anglo" readers a chance to study and learn from his ideas, possibly even discuss and criticise. This would enable him to get them "off his chest" so that in future when he reviews someone else's work, we get a review.

Also did not he not note that his articles were quoted by Nosworthy as a source of information, with regard to Prussian Tactics?

Hofschroer's reply

On Talavera

Dear Editor,

I read with interest John Salmon's article on Talavera in no. 26. The author gives a detailed and exciting picture of the battle. However, I disagree with his characterization of poorly handled French columns blundering helplessly into disciplined British lines, and recognizing that the mathematics were against them, turning tail and running downhill.

Mathematics has its place in the study of warfare, but it does not explain why the British consistently defeated the French in the Peninsula.

If it were true that the French column failed because it was outgunned, then the ratio of British muskets in line to French muskets in column ought to be an accurate predictor of casualties. However, the actual casualty ratios never come up to the presumed musket ratios.

In the night attack of July 27, for example, a French column of three battalions is said to have been driven off by a British line of three battalions. That is 1500 British muskets against at most 360 French muskets, and that is assuming that the French deployed from column of battalions into line of battalions. From the ratio of 1500 to 360 one would expect the ratio of casualties inflicted by the British to be in the neighborhood of 4.2 to 1.

Yet the actual casualty ratio cited in the article is 1000 to 800, or 1.25 to 1. Were the British such poor shots in the dark? I doubt it. Rather, the mathematics of casualties points to the unpopular conclusion that the French deployed successfully into line, and that the actual ratio of muskets during the decisive, latter part of the combat was closer to 1 to 1.

Again in the 5 a.m. attack of July 28, Ruffin's attack in column of battalions pitted, in one case, 200 French muskets against 1500 British (7.5 to 1), and in another case, 400 French against 1200 British (3 to 1). And again in the 1 p.m. attack 1300 French muskets are said to have popped off against 6000 British (4.6 to 1). From these musket ratios one would predict an overall casualty ratio of at least 3 to I in favor of the British.

However, the actual battle casualties were 7268 French to 5365 British, a ratio of 1.4 to 1.

The mathematics prove, not the superiority of British line to French column, but successful French deployment under fire. The British line's fire power would be supenor to the French column's fire power only for two or three volleys, the time it would take the French to deploy into line. That is enough time to establish the British edge in casualties inflicted. But once deployed, the two firing lines would cause casualties with rough parity.

The French did not lose because of some mathematical formula. They lost because they could not endure. Perhaps when their muskets began to foul and they could no longer fire as quickly as they liked, the French looked across the way at the unwavering red line and said, "Cash it." Or perhaps the French quit the field first simply because the British were more insensible to carnage and danger than the French.

If, as I suspect, the French successfully deployed into line under fire, there are ramifications for the miniatures wargamer who wishes to simulate history. In a game like Napoleon's Battles, for example, the attacker in column should be allowed to deploy into line after the first combat round, if he survives the initial roll of dice.

Davout . . .
Genius of Auerstadt?

Dear Dave,

Thanks for producing what is the best Napoleonic magazine on the market today, it is always good for a read. Controversy is always good for a magazine, and I would like to start the new year by throwing a spanner in the works.

Davout has always been held as Napoleon's greatest marshal, but wasn't he plain lucky to have won at Auerstadt? I have spent a lot of time researching the campaign of 1806, and some "New perspectives" spring to mind. When the wall came down in Germany I was there within days of the border opening. What came to mind when I visited the field of Auerstadt (actually it's at Hausen), was the flat terrain over which the battle was fought. Furthermore, the main part of the battle was fought in the dark, and in fog.

Is it not possible that had the Prussians been able to see that the troops in front of them were in fact only the third corps, that they may have reacted differently? They most certainly would not have held off with the reserve, or would they? Any thoughts on the matter either directly or through your pages would be of interest. Let's whip up some more hot discussion!

Sincerly,

Phil.Lawrence

Wassenberg, Germany

Constant de Rebeque

Hi Dave!

Can you put the following notice in the next issue of "FE":

I would like to obtain a copy of the following - Journal of Baron Jean Victor de Constant Rebeque Chief-of-Staff of the Prince of Orange, 1815.

Please contact me at either:

Postfach 3062, D - 33386 Rietberg, Germany or Email 101330,3007@compuserve.com

Thanks !

Peter Hofschroer,

Germany

Nice One!

Hi Dave!!

Happy New Year! !

Thanks you another great issue of First Empire! I'm half way through #26, lots of good information! I really liked reading "The Talavera Campaign of 1809" very interesting and a good read. Again thank you for your great magazine and have a very Merry Holiday! ! !

David K van Hoose,

Carmel, Indiana

Nice Reviews

Dear Dave:

Issue 26 arrived in yesterday's mail. I greatly appreciated the book reviews by Messrs. Hofschroer, Hollins, and Markham: useful consumer info, there. John Salmon's Talavera article, as well as being well-written and well-illustrated, certainly provided good press for Midas Battlefield Tours- I had been on their Agincourt/Crecy tour last year, and would certainly consider a Peninsular tour if they would only send me a current brochure!

Hopefully, they will be at the Napoleonic Fair in February, and I can harrass them about not keeping me on their mailing list.

Hopefully, you will also be able to make your way from the wild hills of Shropshire and attend the fair. I'm fortunately going to be over for a conference and subsequent visit, and plan to attend the fair before returning to the U.S. Hope to see you there; if not, I'm sure there will be a number of FE contributors present.

Cheers,

Allen E. Curtis

Barstow, CA

AECurtis @ aol .com

Editor. The FE Crew will be at the Napoleonic Fair, on February 4th and the editor will be available to gratefully accept beverages on the night of Saturday 3rd at The Royal National Hotel. See last issue for details.

Frankfurters required . . .

Dear Dave,

Help! Could anybody out there help me with the organisation; uniforms and standards (if any) of the Frankfurt Battalion of Levals' Division at Talavera. Here's hoping, David Bygrave, Harlow, Essex

Editor. Rally to the cause guys, lets see if we can flesh this out a little!

Editorial Notice

Please, please take note of the new First Empire address, its on page three and in the various First Empire adverts. I have just collected a load of mail from the old address which was to late for this issue.