The campaign of 1809 invariably brings to mind thoughts of Aspern-Essling and Wagram, with most of the great marshals doing what they did best. However there was an intriguing side-show, the result of which would prove pivotal to the climax of Wagram itself Italy.
In command of French forces in Italy was the Viceroy, Prince Eugene de Beauhamais, Napoleon's stepson and in theory at that time, his potential heir. With commitments in both Central Europe and Spain to tie up all the best and most experienced commanders, Eugene found himself thrown in at the deep end.
The Austrians, advised by Metternich, decided now was the time to strike against the Ogre.
Like most wars of that period Napoleon knew what was coming, yet the difficulties of communication and the needs of expediency made circumstances less than simple. Napoleon did not want to push the Austrians too soon, at least until he was fully mobilised. Accordingly he ordered Eugene not to mass his troops. This wasone of a long series of 'notes' sent by Napoleon to his stepson, through which he hoped to guide the inexpenenced prince in his conduct of the forthcoming campaign.
The Austrians meanwhile hoped that a surprise attack in Germany and Italy would start a chain reaction of revolts against France. Accordingly they planned five attacks. Primarily, a grand thrust through the Danube valley and into Bavaria. Supporting manoeuvres would see troops move against Italy, the Duchy of Warsaw, the Tyrol and Dalmatia. Without doubt the largest of these would be against Eugene's Italy.
In retrospect it was naive of the Austrians to think that Napoleon could be caught short. After all, it was little secret that factions in the Austrian government had never recovered from the humiliations of 1805. Revenge was always on the Austrian back burner. The Emperor had accordingly conceived of a defensive posture to suck in the Austrians, before vigorously counterattacking.
The Army of Italy
The Army of Italy was in a pretty poor shape, and as such was probably luckier to have an honest administrator at its head than an avaricious marshal. By April 1st, Eugene had an army of 70,000 men under his command. However a good proportion of these were French and Italian conscripts. A lot of work would be needed before they were combat ready. Interestingly, Eugene specifically asked Napoleon not to send any marshals to the theatre, except for Mortier, Moncey or Ney, with whom he felt he could work.
The Austrian offensive began on April 10th, and despite intelligence suggesting such a move, Eugene was so tied up with organisational matters that he was caught unawares. By April 14th, he had begun to get his act together, concentrating six divisions along the Livenza River. It was here that he expected to engage that leviathan of the Austrian military, the Archduke John. Broussier covered the left at Polcenigo, with Grenier in the centre at Sacile supported by Barbou. On the right was Serras supported by Severoli. The ten mile front was screened as best as possible by Sahuc's light cavalry. Seven miles east Sahuc was stationed as an advanced guard with a small combined arms force.
Further, Eugene does appear extremely confident at this juncture, writing to Napoleon an exaggerated letter of his readiness. He was so keen to impress his mighty stepfather, that he overstated his own strength, and clearly described a battle plan which showed no sign of considering 'what ifs'.
As so often happens, the Almighty threw a spanner into Eugene's meticulous works. It rained. It rained big time. Reinforcements stopped in their tracks and reconnaissance effectively died. It was a bad time for the Army of Italy to show its greenness.
The Austrians had no such problems. John's cavalry scouts capably located Eugene and the Austrian commander, in a rare moment of decisive action, decided to attack. The inept Sahuc's advance guard was decimated, conveniently coming into the open from the town of Pordenone to magnify the defeat. John then sent Frimont with a small force to seize Palse, Porcia and Talponedo, villages west of Pordenone, whilst the army concentrated. The VIII Corps was deployed in a double line between Pordenone and Maruzzi: Colloredo and Gajoli in front of Spleny and Fulda. The use of infantry in front of light cavalry as a screen seems odd, but Eugene was in no position to exploit it. IX Corps was deployed behind VIII Corps.
The total Austrian force now numbered over 40,000 troops, including nearly 5,000 horse. Eugene currently had mustered only 36,000 men, less than 2,000 of whom were mounted.
The terrain over which both armies now looked was entirely unsuitable to a tidy Napoleonic engagement, straddled as it was by ridges and streams. There is little doubt that the inexperienced Viceroy should have stayed on the defensive, awaiting reinforcements. Nevertheless he decided to attack.
Expectations
Eugene expected the Austrians to attack in strength north of the main road, where the area was more suited to cavalry. Accordingly, he would attack in the south with three infantry divisions whilst two others delayed the Austrians in the north. The woeful Sahuc would keep his remaining cavalry in reserve. The theory behind the south attack was that the broken ground would counter the Austrian cavalry supremacy. Porcia would be taken, and then when the reinforcements came up they would strengthen the northern flank whilst Eugene flanked the remaining Austrians. Simple, really.
Unfortunately, things did not quite go as the Viceroy had planned. Eugene had a healthy contempt for Austrian arms and the men who led them, and it was this belief that pretty much anybody could sort out a few whitecoats that got him into trouble. For this he should not be criticised. It was an opinion endemic within the French army, from Napoleon down. Losing to Austrians was like Belgium getting points in It's A Knockout. Not conceivable.
Dawn of April 16th saw Eugene's troops on the move. They rapidly crossed the Livenza and began deploying. Serras had been given command of the right wing, with Eugene himself in attendance. Serras' own division along with Severoli's would lead the attack, supported if required by Barbou. It began at 8:00 a.m. Serras led off with Severoli in echelon to his left.
Palse was the first target, held by a small garrison. Serras sent in the 53eme Ligne at about 9:00 a.m. to clear out the Austrians, who put up a spirited fight before being ejected. If that was the first French surprise of the day, it was not the last.
>Frimont quickly sent word to a breakfasting Archduke John that an attack was underway. John, however, adjudged this to be a feint. Part of VIII Corps was sent to support Frimont, but no more. John decided to sit back and wait for Eugene's masterstroke.
Attack on Porcia
Meanwhile Serras and Severoli were beginning their attack on Porcia, the crux, you will recall, of Eugene's plan. Frimont recognised that the creek which ran across the terrain would funnel the attack into two groups. He decided to use the VIII Corps troops to hold Serras whilst he counterattacked Severoli's inexperienced Italians. It worked a treat. A frontal bayonet charge supported by cavalry broke Severoli, and Serras was obliged to halt the attack to rally his troops. Eugene had wanted Barbou to be up in support, but the awful terrain had ruined any chance of this, although three battalions were obtained to freshen up the next attack, and the overextended Frimont was in turn thrown back, through Porcia and beyond, enabling Eugene to take the village. Albert Gyulai's two brigades from VIII Corps now attacked in turn, and a seesaw battle now developed around Porcia and Talponedo.
Eugene then detached Teste's brigade from Grenier to reinforce the fighting, although Teste himself was wounded retaking Porcia. All this manoeuvring had meant that Grenier had been obliged to advance to maintain communications and Broussier in turn found himself obliged to advance into the open plain. This was critical, because until now John had been convinced that Eugene outnumbered him and that the real attack was still to come. Broussier's exposure revealed this to be a miscalculation. For the first time John actually realised that he outnumbered his opponent. He decided that the remainder of VIII Corps and all of IX Corps bar Kleinmayer's Brigade would hit Broussier's exposed position.
Typically Austrian, it was 3.30 p.m. before the attack got underway and with it went any hope Eugene had of succeeding in breaking Frimont's position. Grenier was first to be attacked and Eugene had to deplete his own wing to support him. Accordingly Eugene decided to withdraw on Palse, abandoning the hard-fought Porcia. This manoeuvre was carried out comfortably. Indeed Frimont's exhausted troops were glad to see the back of them. Nevertheless if Eugene thought that his own battle-weary wing was in any condition to fight fresh troops then he was sadly mistaken.
Luckily for the Viceroy, Austrian drill now came to his rescue. Not noted for their speed, IX Corps toiled into position, and it was not until 5.00 p.m. that they were ready. It gave the French more than enough time to prepare. Ignatius Gyulai compounded the delays by misplacing his cavalry, putting them on the interior flank, rather than the exterior. This meant that instead of a comfortable infantry flank, Hager's cavalry were looking down bayonets.
Defeat
Eugene had by now realised that he had been defeated, and Ignatius Gyulai's delayed attack was the final nail in the coffin. He ordered a withdrawal.
The right wing got away with little trouble, but on the left, the Austrian cavalry made repeated charges, forcing Broussier and Grenier into square. These retired slowly, beating off the repeated charges, joined by Eugene who was determined to be in the place of greatest danger.
For John it was an amazing victory. Actually, for the Archduke, any victory would be likely to be amazing. For Eugene, it was an unmitigated disaster. He had lost 3,000 killed and wounded, and another 3,500 captured, along with 15 guns. The Austrians had lost about 4,000 all told.
The Battle of Sacile is a fascinating study of how a soon-to-be-good commander can make untold errors before he has some experience under his belt. He had failed to fully concentrate his troops before attacking, and he had grossly underestimated his opponent. That was further compounded by his poor reading of the terrain, crucial to any commander. The plan was too poor, and imagining Porcia to be the key that would unlock the Austrian defense was wholly wrong.
As for his opponent, this was Archduke John's zenith. Of all the Austrian generals you might put your shirt on to beat the French, John certainly would not have been it. Probably it is fair to say that Eugene lost the battle than John won it, yet nonetheless it was he who stood on the field that day, and not his opponent. However, he did have the opportunity to effectively destroy Eugene and he missed it. That mistake would come back to haunt the Austrians when Eugene led the Army of Italy to victory first on the Piave, then at Raab, before taking up the position in the center of Napoleon's deployment at Wagram.
Eugene learnt from his mistakes and certainly in the long run he deserved a marshal's baton far more than some who received it on the field.
Wargaming Sacile: Order of Battle, including morale and training grades.
The "Eugene Trilogy"
Part 2: Battle of Piave
Part 3: Battle of Raab
Related article:
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