by Leon Parte
General Gouvon Saint-Cyr and his
VII Corp, had been designated the task of subduing Catalonia during the
1808 Campaign in Spain. Following the French humiliation at Baylen, Saint-
Cyr and his comrades had successful engaged the Spanish field armies to
redress the balance of martial pride, culminating in December 1808 with the
battle of Molins de Rey seeing the Spanish Captain General Vives displaced
from the command of the Catalonian armies by General Teodore Reding, a
man of proven bravery even if not a military genius. January 1809 was to
pass with out major incident whilst the protagonists reorgamsed and
regrouped their forces.
The campaign opened when Saint-Cyr began to
concentrate his divisions from the positions they had assumed
following Molins de Rey. The troops of VII Corps had denuded the
Catalonian country side as they foraged and were being harassed by
guerrilla bands. The latter were posing some threat to the line of
communications with Barcelona and despite numerous flying columns and
because of the wide dispersal of his divisions, Saint-Cyr was unable to do
more than disperse the irregular forces that gathered in his rear. Saint-Cyr
calculated that in all of these operations his men had expended some
2,000,000 in petty skirmished during the six weeks that had elapsed since
the new year. He judged that all of this effort had been of little use to Ihis
cause and as a consequence concentrating his divisions would shorten his
lines of communication and make life easier all round.
Since Molins de Rey, Reding had been reorganising and training
the remaining troops that had been beaten at the battles of Cardadeau and
Molins de Rey, in Tarragona. His forces had been reinforced from the
south by the Santa Fe Regiment (2 battalions - 2,000 men) and the 1st
Regiment of Antequera (1 bn - 1,000 men) and from the Balearic
Isles by the Swiss Regiment of Beschard (2 bns - 2,000 men) and the
Majorca Militia (1 bn - 600 men). Morale was returning rapidly as Saint-
Cyr remained inactive, Reding also benefited from the fertile plains of the
Lower Ebro and northern Valencia, in both food and munitions. The
British and Spanish navies shipped in large quantities of corn from
around the eastern Mediterranean and arms and ammunition from
England. Meanwhile VII Corps were scratching out an existence through
the Spanish winter.
Reding took advantage of French inactivity by redeploying his
forces not only to cover Tarragona but to throw out a screen to surround
Saint-Cyr's position. Dividing his army into two wings Reding with the Ist
Division remained at Tarragona, whilst General Castro with the 2nd
Division was to set up a head quarters at Igualada. Reding's lines of
communications ran through Santa Coloma, Sarreal and Montblanch.
Saint-Cyr's forces were, being north west of Molins de Rey, now
at the centre of a semi-circle of Reding's army. The fact that each wing of
the army was not able to unit with its other quicker than three days, and
that Reding had to operate on outer lines sixty miles long, and that at any
moment Saint-Cyr might suddenly shake launch himself at either wing and
have the benefit of vastly superior numbers was lost on Reding and his
supporters.
In fact with the Catalans baying for blood and the glory that was
Baylen, at which he had played no small part, foremost in his mind Reding
decided to resume the offensive with Castro attempting to outflank the
northern wing of the French Army. Then both wings would mop up the
scattered French Divisions of course Saint-Cyr would have to oblige by not
doing anything to counter the threat, would not concentrate his forces and
that the Spanish columns would deliver their attacks with perfect timing!
The alternative was to garrison Tarragon and march 20,000 or
so troops to relieve the siege of Sarragossa. This latter course would have
been a greater contribution to the war effort, but the Catalonians insisted
that he should at least rid them of Saint-Cyr first.
Saint-Cyr had of course noted with some considerable interest
that his opponent had generously spread himself thinly across a front of
some 60 miles. Even though he couldn't quite figure out what Reding was
up to, (and who could blame him), Saint-Cyr lay like a lion amongst a
flock of sheep. It was only a matter of where the Imperial claw was to fall
not when. Saint-Cyr decided that Castro on the northern extremity of the
Spanish line offered him the best chance of delivering a crushing blow
before it could scurry back to the safety of Tarragona.
On 15 February Castro began to concentrate at Igualada, with
the intention of advancing against the French Divisions at San Sadumi and
Martorel. Word was sent to Alvarez, the Governor of Gerona, to detach
all his available troops to demonstrate against thereby pinning Genereal
Duhesme and the Garrison of Barcelona. Reding ready to march against
Souham, awaited news that his subordinates were ready to strike.
The 15th also saw Saint-Cyr take Pino's Italian Division from
Villafranca on an expedition against Igualada, Villafranca was occupied by
Lecchi's division from Barcelona. Chabot and Chabran were order to join
Saint-Cyr at Capellades, some 7 to 8 miles south-east of Castro's H.Q.
Saint-Cyr's route, whilst without a major road, not only avoided crossing to
the north bank of the Noya and the mountainous defiles around Bruch, but
also allowed him to easily cut off any reinforcements from Tarragona.
The union of Saint-Cyr's three division was unfortunately
somewhat disjointed, Pino and Chabran found their routes somewhat more
difficult to traverse than did the unfortunate Chabot. He arrived at
Capellades, on 17 February, several hours before his fellows. Chabot, whose
division was a division in name only - it only had three Neapolitan
battalions - was seen to arrive by Castro's outposts. Castro sensing an easy
victory sent 4,000 men down the valley into the attack. To their credit
the Neapolitans, despite the loss of the Neapolitan Colonel Carascosa, and
being outnumbered by 3 to I did not rout but were driven back onto the
head of Pino's Division.
The Spaniards were then driven back and retired to Pobla de
Claramunt (show on the map as Pobla) and took position on the banks of
the Noya, where Castro's reserves joined them.
On 18 February, his three divisions united Saint-Cyr deployed in
front of Castro's waiting divisions, Mazzuchelli's Brigade from Pino's
Division was sent to turn the Spanish right flank. Being in a good defensive
position behind a ravine through which the Noya flowed, the Spaniards
skirmished with the French main body for several hours. A golden
opportunity to alter the course of history was lost when Saint-Cyr and his
staff on a forward reconnoitring mission stumbled into an ambush of
miqueletes. Despite one of Pino's aides-de-camp receiving a wound the
party spurred their way clear. The successful escape being attributed to
their speedy horses.
by nature with strong knees" By late afternoon, Castro was informed of the flanking Italian brigade was already in his rear and marching hard and fast for Igualada. This unexpected news certainly removed all will to fight from Castro, and with the realisation that isolation defeat, death and capture were all imminent, and not necessarily in that order, the Spanish position was abandoned with indecent haste with Saint-Cyr pushing hard in pursuit. The main body of the Spaniards and their artillery burst through Igualad before the Italians could take possession and fled along the road to Cervera. The Spanish rearguard such as it was, or perhaps one should say those at the back, were cut off and had to escape via a path to Manresa. Despite close pressure both Spanish columns managed to retain considerable order and outmarched their pursuers and although some men were captured by the French, this was not the crushing disaster that was previously common in Spanish defeats. Perhaps Castro, who could have detached troops to intercept Mazzuchelli and make a fighting withdrawal, did the right thing by running for the closing door. The lack of prisoners was to cause Saint-Cyr to later comment "... the Catalans are endowed by nature with strong knees" Saint-Cyr could be well pleased with the days events. Although Castro had escaped with a viable force, he had captured Igualada in which he discovered vast quantities of supplies that had been accumulated for the use of Castro's divisions. Such was the quantity that he was able to provision his field army but also was able to send supplies back to Barcelona! Saint-Cyr moves on RedingHis purpose achieved, he had beaten the Spanish left wing, broken their line and seized their supplies. Saint-Cyr was of the opinion that Castro's troops would be out of action for several days and leaving Chabot and Chabran and all the artillery of his three divisions to hold Igualada. and guard the captured supplies against an attack by Castro, on 19 February he set off with Pino's division to tackle Reding. Orders were sent to Souham that he was to move off from Vendrell and to unite with Pino at Villarodona, unless he was attacked and forced to do otherwise. Saint-Cyr marched his men along the foothills of the mountains intending to descend the Gaya valley via San Magin and the abbey at San Magin, where the northern most elements of Reding's command had been reported. On the 19th Saint-Cyr reached San Magin, which was defended by the Spanish brigadier Iranzo with 12,000 men and 2 guns. Iranzo was unable to offer much resistance in the face of such numbers and retired down the valley and took refuge in the fortified abbey at Santas Cruces. The barren terrain and totally inadequate maps meant that Saint-Cyr had great difficulty in keeping contact with Iranzo. However, when they were unable to find the road, they released a wounded Spanish officer telling him to return to Tarragona. Discreetly followed by scouts, he inadvertently led Saint-Cyr to Santas Cruces. Iranzo was firmly ensconced within the abbey which proved impregnable to infantry assault. Saint-Cyr no doubt regretting leaving all his artillery settled down and blockaded Santas Cruces until 21 February when, following Irzano's escape (see below), he moved down the valley onto the plain to unite with Souham, who by anticipating and therefore leaving Vendrell before he received Saint-Cyr's orders had arrived earlier than expected. Reding ReactsUpon hearing of the news of the combat at Igualada, Reding on 20 February moved of to unite with and aid Castro, thus abandoning the idea of attacking Souham. He left Tarragona with a small escort comprised of 300 cavalry, two battalions of miqueletes - provisional levies - (namely the Lerida Battalion and the 1st of Tarragona) I battalion of Reding's Swiss Regiment and a foot battery, some 2,100 men. He intended to collect on his travels the brigades deployed to the north, those that joined him included Iranzo's command still at Santas Cruces, who on hearing of Reding's approach burst out of the blockade and without any appreciable loss joined their Captain-General on 21 February. Reding then moved to Santa Coloma where he was reunited with Castro and his rallied command. With an impressive 17,000 or so men to hand, Reding's subordinates pressured him to march on Igualada and destroy Chabot and Chabran and recover the captured provisions. However, fully aware of the threat to his base of operations at Tarragona and following a lengthy council of war, he decided to leave 4,000 - 5,000 men of Castro's command with the Swiss General Wimpffen to observe the French at Igualada and set off to Tarragona with 10,000 infantry, 700 cavalry and 2 batteries of foot artillery (8 guns in total). He also decided to return via Momblanch and Valls rather than Pla which was a little to close for comfort to Saint-Cyr's position, even so this route was likely to provoke some fighting. An alternative that would have avoided any possibility of combat was available via Selva and Reus, but with artillery and baggage in tow Reding felt that he would have to stay on the good roads where possible, and thus he selected that which ran through Valls, even though he knew it to be occupied by the enemy. Reding obviously hoped for an easy victory over a smaller force, thereby cancelling out the defeats of recent months and restoring the glory that was Baylen. He set off on the evening of 24 February and by dawn of the 25th his exhausted troops were approaching the bridge of Goy, where the road crossed the river Francoli, two miles north of Valls. Saint-Cyr's ResponseThe troops occupying Valls were those of Souham. Saint-Cyr, displaying a not inconsiderable killer instinct, had discarded the idea of taking Tarragona and engaging in a lengthy siege and had elected the more attractive destroy "your enemy's army in the field" option instead. Accordingly he had sent Pino's Division to Pla and Souham's at Valls. These two places covered the two most likely routes back into Tarragona and being only 8 or 9 miles apart meant that whichever was attacked the other could easily march to its aide. Saint-Cyr's plan was sound, his only error was to expect Reding not to march through the night and this almost cost Saint-Cyr Souham's Division. More Valls
The Battle of Valls: 25 Feb 1809 The Battle of Valls: Order of Battle The Battle of Valls: Large Map 1 (slow: 143K) The Battle of Valls: Jumbo Map 1 (very slow: 288K) The Battle of Valls: Large Map 2 (slow: 137K) The Battle of Valls: Jumbo Map 2 (very slow: 259K) Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #22 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |