Battle of Valls

Introduction

by Leon Parte


General Gouvon Saint-Cyr and his VII Corp, had been designated the task of subduing Catalonia during the 1808 Campaign in Spain. Following the French humiliation at Baylen, Saint- Cyr and his comrades had successful engaged the Spanish field armies to redress the balance of martial pride, culminating in December 1808 with the battle of Molins de Rey seeing the Spanish Captain General Vives displaced from the command of the Catalonian armies by General Teodore Reding, a man of proven bravery even if not a military genius. January 1809 was to pass with out major incident whilst the protagonists reorgamsed and regrouped their forces.

The Campaign of February 1809

The campaign opened when Saint-Cyr began to concentrate his divisions from the positions they had assumed following Molins de Rey. The troops of VII Corps had denuded the Catalonian country side as they foraged and were being harassed by guerrilla bands. The latter were posing some threat to the line of communications with Barcelona and despite numerous flying columns and because of the wide dispersal of his divisions, Saint-Cyr was unable to do more than disperse the irregular forces that gathered in his rear. Saint-Cyr calculated that in all of these operations his men had expended some 2,000,000 in petty skirmished during the six weeks that had elapsed since the new year. He judged that all of this effort had been of little use to Ihis cause and as a consequence concentrating his divisions would shorten his lines of communication and make life easier all round.

Since Molins de Rey, Reding had been reorganising and training the remaining troops that had been beaten at the battles of Cardadeau and Molins de Rey, in Tarragona. His forces had been reinforced from the south by the Santa Fe Regiment (2 battalions - 2,000 men) and the 1st Regiment of Antequera (1 bn - 1,000 men) and from the Balearic Isles by the Swiss Regiment of Beschard (2 bns - 2,000 men) and the Majorca Militia (1 bn - 600 men). Morale was returning rapidly as Saint- Cyr remained inactive, Reding also benefited from the fertile plains of the Lower Ebro and northern Valencia, in both food and munitions. The British and Spanish navies shipped in large quantities of corn from around the eastern Mediterranean and arms and ammunition from England. Meanwhile VII Corps were scratching out an existence through the Spanish winter.

Reding took advantage of French inactivity by redeploying his forces not only to cover Tarragona but to throw out a screen to surround Saint-Cyr's position. Dividing his army into two wings Reding with the Ist Division remained at Tarragona, whilst General Castro with the 2nd Division was to set up a head quarters at Igualada. Reding's lines of communications ran through Santa Coloma, Sarreal and Montblanch.

Saint-Cyr's forces were, being north west of Molins de Rey, now at the centre of a semi-circle of Reding's army. The fact that each wing of the army was not able to unit with its other quicker than three days, and that Reding had to operate on outer lines sixty miles long, and that at any moment Saint-Cyr might suddenly shake launch himself at either wing and have the benefit of vastly superior numbers was lost on Reding and his supporters.

Reding's Plan

In fact with the Catalans baying for blood and the glory that was Baylen, at which he had played no small part, foremost in his mind Reding decided to resume the offensive with Castro attempting to outflank the northern wing of the French Army. Then both wings would mop up the scattered French Divisions of course Saint-Cyr would have to oblige by not doing anything to counter the threat, would not concentrate his forces and that the Spanish columns would deliver their attacks with perfect timing!

The alternative was to garrison Tarragon and march 20,000 or so troops to relieve the siege of Sarragossa. This latter course would have been a greater contribution to the war effort, but the Catalonians insisted that he should at least rid them of Saint-Cyr first.

Saint-Cyr Stirs

Saint-Cyr had of course noted with some considerable interest that his opponent had generously spread himself thinly across a front of some 60 miles. Even though he couldn't quite figure out what Reding was up to, (and who could blame him), Saint-Cyr lay like a lion amongst a flock of sheep. It was only a matter of where the Imperial claw was to fall not when. Saint-Cyr decided that Castro on the northern extremity of the Spanish line offered him the best chance of delivering a crushing blow before it could scurry back to the safety of Tarragona.

On 15 February Castro began to concentrate at Igualada, with the intention of advancing against the French Divisions at San Sadumi and Martorel. Word was sent to Alvarez, the Governor of Gerona, to detach all his available troops to demonstrate against thereby pinning Genereal Duhesme and the Garrison of Barcelona. Reding ready to march against Souham, awaited news that his subordinates were ready to strike.

The 15th also saw Saint-Cyr take Pino's Italian Division from Villafranca on an expedition against Igualada, Villafranca was occupied by Lecchi's division from Barcelona. Chabot and Chabran were order to join Saint-Cyr at Capellades, some 7 to 8 miles south-east of Castro's H.Q. Saint-Cyr's route, whilst without a major road, not only avoided crossing to the north bank of the Noya and the mountainous defiles around Bruch, but also allowed him to easily cut off any reinforcements from Tarragona.

Castro's Brief Triumph

The union of Saint-Cyr's three division was unfortunately somewhat disjointed, Pino and Chabran found their routes somewhat more difficult to traverse than did the unfortunate Chabot. He arrived at Capellades, on 17 February, several hours before his fellows. Chabot, whose division was a division in name only - it only had three Neapolitan battalions - was seen to arrive by Castro's outposts. Castro sensing an easy victory sent 4,000 men down the valley into the attack. To their credit the Neapolitans, despite the loss of the Neapolitan Colonel Carascosa, and being outnumbered by 3 to I did not rout but were driven back onto the head of Pino's Division.

The Spaniards were then driven back and retired to Pobla de Claramunt (show on the map as Pobla) and took position on the banks of the Noya, where Castro's reserves joined them.

On 18 February, his three divisions united Saint-Cyr deployed in front of Castro's waiting divisions, Mazzuchelli's Brigade from Pino's Division was sent to turn the Spanish right flank. Being in a good defensive position behind a ravine through which the Noya flowed, the Spaniards skirmished with the French main body for several hours. A golden opportunity to alter the course of history was lost when Saint-Cyr and his staff on a forward reconnoitring mission stumbled into an ambush of miqueletes. Despite one of Pino's aides-de-camp receiving a wound the party spurred their way clear. The successful escape being attributed to their speedy horses.

"...the Catalans are endowed
by nature with strong knees"

By late afternoon, Castro was informed of the flanking Italian brigade was already in his rear and marching hard and fast for Igualada. This unexpected news certainly removed all will to fight from Castro, and with the realisation that isolation defeat, death and capture were all imminent, and not necessarily in that order, the Spanish position was abandoned with indecent haste with Saint-Cyr pushing hard in pursuit.

The main body of the Spaniards and their artillery burst through Igualad before the Italians could take possession and fled along the road to Cervera. The Spanish rearguard such as it was, or perhaps one should say those at the back, were cut off and had to escape via a path to Manresa. Despite close pressure both Spanish columns managed to retain considerable order and outmarched their pursuers and although some men were captured by the French, this was not the crushing disaster that was previously common in Spanish defeats. Perhaps Castro, who could have detached troops to intercept Mazzuchelli and make a fighting withdrawal, did the right thing by running for the closing door. The lack of prisoners was to cause Saint-Cyr to later comment "... the Catalans are endowed by nature with strong knees"

Saint-Cyr could be well pleased with the days events. Although Castro had escaped with a viable force, he had captured Igualada in which he discovered vast quantities of supplies that had been accumulated for the use of Castro's divisions. Such was the quantity that he was able to provision his field army but also was able to send supplies back to Barcelona!

Saint-Cyr moves on Reding

His purpose achieved, he had beaten the Spanish left wing, broken their line and seized their supplies. Saint-Cyr was of the opinion that Castro's troops would be out of action for several days and leaving Chabot and Chabran and all the artillery of his three divisions to hold Igualada. and guard the captured supplies against an attack by Castro, on 19 February he set off with Pino's division to tackle Reding. Orders were sent to Souham that he was to move off from Vendrell and to unite with Pino at Villarodona, unless he was attacked and forced to do otherwise.

Saint-Cyr marched his men along the foothills of the mountains intending to descend the Gaya valley via San Magin and the abbey at San Magin, where the northern most elements of Reding's command had been reported.

On the 19th Saint-Cyr reached San Magin, which was defended by the Spanish brigadier Iranzo with 12,000 men and 2 guns. Iranzo was unable to offer much resistance in the face of such numbers and retired down the valley and took refuge in the fortified abbey at Santas Cruces. The barren terrain and totally inadequate maps meant that Saint-Cyr had great difficulty in keeping contact with Iranzo. However, when they were unable to find the road, they released a wounded Spanish officer telling him to return to Tarragona. Discreetly followed by scouts, he inadvertently led Saint-Cyr to Santas Cruces.

Iranzo was firmly ensconced within the abbey which proved impregnable to infantry assault. Saint-Cyr no doubt regretting leaving all his artillery settled down and blockaded Santas Cruces until 21 February when, following Irzano's escape (see below), he moved down the valley onto the plain to unite with Souham, who by anticipating and therefore leaving Vendrell before he received Saint-Cyr's orders had arrived earlier than expected.

Reding Reacts

Upon hearing of the news of the combat at Igualada, Reding on 20 February moved of to unite with and aid Castro, thus abandoning the idea of attacking Souham. He left Tarragona with a small escort comprised of 300 cavalry, two battalions of miqueletes - provisional levies - (namely the Lerida Battalion and the 1st of Tarragona) I battalion of Reding's Swiss Regiment and a foot battery, some 2,100 men. He intended to collect on his travels the brigades deployed to the north, those that joined him included Iranzo's command still at Santas Cruces, who on hearing of Reding's approach burst out of the blockade and without any appreciable loss joined their Captain-General on 21 February.

Reding then moved to Santa Coloma where he was reunited with Castro and his rallied command. With an impressive 17,000 or so men to hand, Reding's subordinates pressured him to march on Igualada and destroy Chabot and Chabran and recover the captured provisions. However, fully aware of the threat to his base of operations at Tarragona and following a lengthy council of war, he decided to leave 4,000 - 5,000 men of Castro's command with the Swiss General Wimpffen to observe the French at Igualada and set off to Tarragona with 10,000 infantry, 700 cavalry and 2 batteries of foot artillery (8 guns in total).

He also decided to return via Momblanch and Valls rather than Pla which was a little to close for comfort to Saint-Cyr's position, even so this route was likely to provoke some fighting. An alternative that would have avoided any possibility of combat was available via Selva and Reus, but with artillery and baggage in tow Reding felt that he would have to stay on the good roads where possible, and thus he selected that which ran through Valls, even though he knew it to be occupied by the enemy.

Reding obviously hoped for an easy victory over a smaller force, thereby cancelling out the defeats of recent months and restoring the glory that was Baylen. He set off on the evening of 24 February and by dawn of the 25th his exhausted troops were approaching the bridge of Goy, where the road crossed the river Francoli, two miles north of Valls.

Saint-Cyr's Response

The troops occupying Valls were those of Souham. Saint-Cyr, displaying a not inconsiderable killer instinct, had discarded the idea of taking Tarragona and engaging in a lengthy siege and had elected the more attractive destroy "your enemy's army in the field" option instead.

Accordingly he had sent Pino's Division to Pla and Souham's at Valls. These two places covered the two most likely routes back into Tarragona and being only 8 or 9 miles apart meant that whichever was attacked the other could easily march to its aide. Saint-Cyr's plan was sound, his only error was to expect Reding not to march through the night and this almost cost Saint-Cyr Souham's Division.

More Valls


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