Introduction:
The 9th Corps, numbering 30,000 men under Marshal Victor, left Tilsit on the 1st September and crossed the Niémen at Kowno on the 4th September. At this time, Napoleon was on the road to Borodino with the Corps which formed the main body of his army. He wanted to use the 9th Corps as a reserve which could support his right wing (Austrian auxiliary Corps and Saxon 8th Corps, under Prince Schwartzenberg), his left wing (French 2nd Corps and Bavarian 6th Corps, under General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Marshal Oudinot having been wounded on the 16th of August), or even enter deeper in Russia, following the main army.
As a consequence, it was directed to Smolensk by Vilna, Minsk, Borisov and Orsza. It reached Smolensk on the 29th September and waited for new events in this central position. The town had been destroyed when taken by the French and thus it was very difficult to forage, but the Corps was still in good condition and the spirit was good.
Admiral Cziczakov's army of Moldavia were now threatening Minsk and Schwartzenberg wasn't able or didn't want to stop him. Thus, Victor directed his Corps to the south on the 12th October. Twelve days latter, he was at Kislawiezi when he learned of the evacuation of Polotsk by Gouvion Saint-Cyr, he immediately decided to turn northwest to try to rescue the French left wing.
Napoleon had began his retreat from Moscow on the 19th October and his line of communication was now directly threatened by Count Wittgenstein. This General, detached with the 1st Corps of Barclay de Tolly's 1st army of the west to cover St Petersburg during the Russian retreat, had fought around Polotsk against Oudinot's 2nd Corps, later reinforced by Gouvion Saint-Cyr's 6th Corps. He had himself been reinforced by several 'cohorts' (bat-talions) of St Petersburg 'opolchenie' (militia) and by Steingell's army of Finland; thus he had now more than 40,000 men under his command.
After the evacuation of Polotsk, General Legrand (now commanding the 2nd and 6th Corps, Gouvin Saint Cyr having been wounded) had retreated to Lepel, loosing the 6th Corps which took the direc-tion of Vilna with Corbineau's Cavalry Brigade followed by Gener-al Wlastov's detachment [1] ; then he turned left and took the direction of Czaszniki. Victor had crossed the Dniepr at Orsza on the 26th October, reaching Senno on the 28th. There he sent the 28th division to Beszenkoviczi to cover Vitebsk. Two days latter he was on the right bank of the Lukomlia with the 12th division and Fournier's cavalry, the 2nd Corps was facing the Russians at Czaszniki.
On 30th October the Russian advance guard under Prince Jachwill reached Czaszniki to find the 2nd Corps of General Legrand ready to resist. Wittgenstein resumed all attack until the arrival of the rest of his army.
On the 31st October, Wittgenstein attacked Legrand with all his army. At seven o'clock, Prince Jachwill attacked Czaszniki with 5 battalions of Chasseurs but was repulsed. Wittgenstein sent Steingell on the right and Jachwill renewed his attack; this time Legrand was forced back and he had to take a new position between Czaszniki and the Lukomlia river, his right being covered by the Ula river and his left by a wood. The first Russian attempt to take this wood failed but Steingell persisted, attacking it frontally with Tenguisk, Tula and Esthonia regiments, whilst turning it on one side with the regiment of consolidated hussars and on the other side with the 26th Chasseurs and the regiment of consolidated dragoons. The wood was taken, forcing Legrand to retreat behind the Lukomlia river.
During the rest of the day the Russians tried to cross the Lukom-lia but were always repulsed by Victor who had been joined by the 26th division coming back from Beszenkowiczi.Victor's withdrawal:
On the 1st November, Victor moved back to Senno with his two Corps to reorganise them.
Wittgenstein was at Czaszniki, his army being near this town on the left bank of the Ula. His advance guard on the right bank of the Lukomlia was divided in 3 parts:
On the right General Alekseief with, 7 squadrons, 3 battalions, 1 cohort, 1 regiment of Cossacks and 6 guns, was at Aksiantsy.
On the left General Helfreich, with 3 squadrons, 4 battalions, 1 regiment of Cossacks and 6 guns, was at Boiare.
Those two detachments could fall back on a third (2 battalions, 2 squadrons and 6 guns) posted at Smoliany.
The regiment of consolidated hussars were at Lepel, to observe De Wrede, and General Harpé at Beszenkowiczi with the regiment of Nawaguinsk, 2 squadrons and 2 guns.
On 4th November, Victor moved from Senno to Czereia, his advance guard being at Lukoml to cover the movement. Wittgenstein, seeing an opportunity to take Vitebsk, sent General Harpé reinforced with 2 battalions, 2 squadrons, 4 guns and a few Cossacks. Harpé, who had previously captured a Berg battalion left by the 26th division, took Vitebsk and its governor, General Pouget on 5th November. Harpé left Colonel Pahlen with 2 battalions, 2 guns and a few Cossacks at Vitebsk and came back to Beszenkowiczi.
On 10th November, Marshal Oudinot who came from Vilna by Borisov arrived at Czereia where he took command of the 2nd Corps. [2]
Since their union, the 2 Corps had been reorganised by Victor, putting every weak division of the 2nd Corps with a strong one of the 9th. The disposition was:
With the arrival of Oudinot, the 2nd Corps regained its independ-ence, even if, following the rules of seniority, Oudinot had to obey Victor (but the history of Napoleonic wars teaches us that it was never so simple between two French Marshals).
Victor had sent a report to Berthier on 2nd November to explain the reasons for his withdrawal. The report arrived on 7th November at the French Quartier General. Napoleon responded with an order - to attack the Russians, push them north of the Ula and retake Polotsk - that arrived on the 10th.
Subsequently, the two Marshals had to join forces to attack Wittgenstein, but each had his own plan: Oudinot wanted to attack by the left in the direction of Lepel while Victor wanted to attack by the right, to take the bridge on the Ula at Boczeikowo and to go on that outflanking manoeuvre by Kamen and Berezino. Oudinot protested against this plan but he had to follow the 9th Corps.
On 11th November, the 9th Corps concentrated itself at Lukoml while the 2nd was doing the same at Czereia.
There were two different roads to go to Czaszniki: A direct one from Lukoml and another from Czereia which passed by Smoliany. It would have been logical to use one road for each Corps, and it had been Victor's first idea, but following his plan of an out-flanking manoeuvre by the right, he crossed the Lukomlia and took the right road from Czereia, jamming it for the 2nd Corps.
On 12th November, the 9th Corps reached the village of Miclenzkowicz, on the road from Smoliany to Senno. The two detachments of Generals Alekseief and Helfreich which tried to join at this point were repulsed with heavy losses.
The 9th Corps arrived near the village of Smoliany by the road from Senno on the evening of the 13th, the Russian advance guard were in front of them, the 2nd Corps had just reached Miclenzkowicz. On the same day, the Cavalry Brigade of General Delaitre, which had been left at Lukoml to cover the movement, left this town to join the rest of the army. Colonel Ridiguer took Lukoml with the Grodno hussars, the 4 battalions of consolidated grenadiers and 4 guns, but learning of the position of the French, he realised he was about to be turned and moved back in the direc-tion of Czaszniki, stopping between Poczawiczi and Slidzi.
Count Wittgenstein made his dispositions for defence: The 1st line of Steingell Corps plus one regiment of the second were on the right bank of the Lukomlia, behind the hills which border that river. On those hills, behind the village of Smoliany, were a battery of 12 guns and the village were full of skirmishers. The cavalry were on the left and the rest of the front were covered by some pools. On the left bank of the Lukomlia were 2 batteries to cover each flank of Steingell's position. Between Czaszniki and the left bank of the Lukomlia were Berg's Corps and behind the Ula, in front of Czaszniki, were the reserve of Fock with 4 bridges to ensure the crossing of the river. The Lithuania regiment were on the road to Czereia to maintain communications with Colonel Ridiguer. Prince Jachwill was on the road to Senno, as an advance guard, with only 2 regiments of infantry, the Mittau dragoons and 6 guns of horse artillery.
On 14th November, at 10 o'clock, Partouneaux's division attacked in column with the cavalry division formed in 2 lines on his right. Jachwill were forced back behind Steingell's lines except for his 6 guns which placed themselves right to Steingell's artillery.
Daendels' division placed itself right to the cavalry and Girard's division was forming the French left wing. All the attempts to break the Russian right wing failed, so Victor decided to push his cavalry on the Russian left but it was also repulsed by the Russian artillery. After all those movements, the French Corps was now occupying a position parallel to Steingell's Corps, in front of Smoliany. Victor launched his columns of infantry which took Smoliany. The Russian sent the Tenguinsk, Neva, Tula, Esthonia and Voronege infantry regiments to recapture the village which changed hands 5 times in the day. The Sewsk infantry regiment finally retook it on the evening and the French moved back 1 verste (1 verste = 1.067 kilometres = aprox. 1,168 yards) of Smoliany, on the road to Beszenkoviczi. They latter moved back to the battle site and passed in front of the Russian army without receiving a single roundshot.
By this time, Oudinot had detached a few battalions and the 5th Cavalry Brigade to watch over Colonel Ridiguer's detachment near Poczawiczi without attacking the castle occupied by the Russians. At the end of the day he had sent Legrand's division in front of Smoliany to replace Girard's one. The 2nd Corps only fired off a few roundshot during the day and one cannot say that it
participated to the battle other than as a reserve.
The losses since the beginning of the French offensive had been around 3,000 men for each side. The major part of the Russian casualities has been suffered by Jachwill's advance-guard when forced back into Russian lines while the French mostly suffered from a great artillery fire in the battle of the 14th.
Many French officers present on 30th October at Czaszniki have thought Victor missed the opportunity to beat Wittgenstein that day. General Delaitre, later taken at Borisow met Wittgenstein who told him that he had been very surprised not to be attacked because he hadn't known anything about the presence of the 9th Corps and thus the surprise would have been complete. Victor had shown a great sense of initiative deciding on 24th October to join the 2nd Corps without having received orders to do so, but he didn't want to risk a defeat that would have compromised Napoleon's line of communications. He realised he had made a great mistake when Napoleon ordered him to attack: he had to deliver the same battle he had refused on the 30th of October, but this time Wittgenstein knew everything about his presence and the 2nd Corps wasn't directly under his command.
We've seen that Victor and Oudinot each had their own opinion about the way Wittgenstein had to be attacked:
Oudinot wanted to attack in the direction of Lepel: from there the two French Corps would have been able to cover Borisow and to avoid the junction of Wittgenstein's and Cziczakow's armies and there is no doubt that Wittgenstein would have hesitated to take the road of Czereia or Senno, putting himself between Napoleon's and Victor's armies.
Victor preferred an outflanking movement to Boczeikowo and Kamen with the 9th Corps while the 2nd Corps would have stayed in front of the Russian army. If successful, this movement would have at least obliged Wittgenstein to move back to Boczeikowo but it had the great disadvantage to let the road from Lepel to Borisow opened. But as General Lorencz of the 2nd Corps will realise later, this road was not practicable for artillery and this is why it had never been taken by the Russians or by the French. This fact, always ignored by 2nd Corps officers' accounts, explains why Oudinot's plan was very dangerous; if beaten around Lepel, the French Corps could not retreat directly to Borisov.
Wittgenstein had been one of the more successful Russian Generals of this campaign. Until mid November he had achieved all the goals given to him by the Russian head-quarter: he had taken Polotsk, later Vitebsk and was controlling the upper Ula, ready to make his junction with Cziczakow's army behind the Berezina. Let's just say that this was possible mainly because the French forces opposed to him were always numerically inferior since the beginning of his offensive. He now had to cross the Berezina, take Vilna and join with Cziczakow; we'll see that none of these 3 goals will be achieved.
Even if victorious in the battle of Smoliany, I think that Wittgenstein did not manage things well; putting Jachwill's and Steingell's Corps on the right bank of the Lukomlia exposed them to be totally destroyed if forced to retreat; Bennigsen at Friedland and later De Wrede at Hanau proved the difficulty of such a disposition. The only reason to put troops around Smoliany instead of waiting for the French behind the Lukomlia was to prepare for the pursuit of the French Corps in case of victory, but Wittgenstein didn't do it and Victor's troops were able to pass in front of the Russian troops after the battle without receiving any fire.
[1] There were no marshals present so De Wrede, the oldest in the grade of General of division, should have been commander in chief, but French Generals wouldn't agree to serve under a German one! This could explain De Wrede's attitude that we shall analyse later.
The Battle of Czaszniki
The 6th and 26th divisions with Fournier's cavalry under General Daendels at Lukoml.
The 8th and 12th divisions under General Partouneau at Boluta, behind Czereia.
The 9th and 28th divisions under General Merle at Taupin, on the road to Senno.
The 3rd Cuirassier division at Ghoroui.
The 23rd Chasseurs at Kanievo, the 24th at Krasnogura.The Battle of Smoliany
A few Remarks About Victor
About Wittgenstein
Notes:
[1] Baron Marbot claims he has saved Oudinot with his 23rd Chasseurs á Cheval on the 28th of October at Rasna. In fact Oudinot was joined on the 9th of November by the 24th Chasseurs á Cheval of Colonel Ameil (the 'Colonel A.' in the Memoirs). Junot and his Westphalians saved him from the Cossacks on the 29th of November at Plesznitzoui, that could be the event which inspired Marbot.
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