Dispatches
Letters to the Editor
by the readers
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Letters on: Map Construction; Massed Batteries; Russian Regt Names; Use of Howitzers; More Brit Lines and Columns; French Officer Casualties; Italy 1815 and Russian Fusiliers; Constructive Advice on Map Construction... Dear Sir, As you invite comments on the magazine I hope you don't mind one or two observations from me! Firstly I think the magazine suffers from a common problem in wargames publications - poor quality maps. Some of the computer generated ones are frustratingly unhelpful, crude heavy lines make it hard to comprehend the scene and all-important details of combat. Some hand-drawn maps suffer from a distinct lack of clarity. I found maps accompanying the feature on the Helder 1799 in issue 12 very difficult to follow, the author in attempting to show everything actually explaining little. Ok, so contributors are wargamers not cartographers, and I'm a professional illustrator so it's the kind of thing that bothers me, but there are some basic points I feel it would be worth thinking about. There is an art to battle maps - they need to reach a fine balance between presenting accurate detail and illustrating clearly several hours of combat. The best way is to firstly ignore terrain features which are irrelevant to the narrative, or depict them in a semi-abstract way. Secondly standardise types of terrain - anyone with access to a photocopier can churn out copies of the symbols need from a single original sheet, cut and paste them down for a neat uniform appearance. Better still use Letraset symbols available from design shops. Thirdly don't struggle with hand-lettering, simply take a copy of the artwork, indicate the script to be included on an overlay, then get the editor to lay out typography during production. Finally, save all the strongest lines to depict the forces involved. I'd suggest putting these on an overlay too and utilising half tone during production, so the units stand out even in monochrome and you can reuse the terrain map for different phases in an action. All in all it's amazing what can be done with a bit of thought. For a good example of clear maps produced on limited means try James Arnold's Crisis On The Danube or N.P. Marsh's features on the Pultusk and Gorodetschna in First Empire 1 & 2. Finally one big request is please print scales with maps - not everyone uses the same ground scale and it seems pointless to go to all the trouble of describing an action only to deny wargamers the means to transfer it to the table accurately. Other than the maps the quality of the magazine is high, though I'd prefer writers to give a little more thought to actually wargaming the battles they describe. Presumably they've already refought the actions, so why don't they share with the readers any special rules or problems raised? I hope you don't mind what are intended to be constructive points on the magazine. I'd like to contribute something myself when I have the time, in the meantime thank you. On Massed batteries... Dear Sir, "Enough books have been written on Napoleon's system of making war to stock several libraries. At least half of them are a serious misuse of good paper and printer's ink." This quote from Swords Around the Throne, chapter XXVI Strategy and Tactics (first paragraph, p.529) should certainly be born in mind when considering French Napoleonic tactics. The first use of massed batteries in a land engagement (not counting sieges) by Napoleon was at Lodi on 10th May 1796. To move on to the matter of howitzers; true much of the literature on the Napoleonic Wars does give the impression that they were so much useless impedimenta. What were they used for? First, the exploding shells among packed formations could wreak havoc. Second, the above mentioned shells could further alarm unsteady troops (the moral effect of artillery seems to be much undervalued in wargaming circles). Finally, howitzers can be used against field fortifications and to set buildings on fire. I fear that T.R.Calderbank will have to concoct his own rules for howitzers. To turn to Geert van Uythoven's mysterious "chasseurs" of the 5eme Demi-brigade. I trawled through the excellent O.B.'s included in his articles, but no 5eme Demi-brigade could I find. Perhaps this unit was stationed elsewhere in the low-countries or in Northern France, but I theorise. The chasseurs are more easily explained: these are presumably the men drawn from each company to act as skirmishers much as the grenadiers of the previous area had been drawn from various companies to form an ad hoc grenadier company (which may explain the smaller size of the French grenadier company.) I am pleased to note that the more obscure Napoleonic armies are being catered for (any hope of some information on the other army of the Two Sicilies); and that some information on Paul's army might be coming to light in further issues. Russian Regimental Names... Dear Sir, I thought I would submit the following for consideration. This is in part to "do my bit" as regards the exchange of information (although admittedly incomplete in this instance), and partly to show that I don't just whinge about things - it is quite perturbing how seemingly reasonable comments can look rather aggressive when they appear in print! First, a short note about Russian regiments c.1799. In "European Armies 1789-1803" by C.A. Sapherson (Leeds:Raider Books, 1991) there is a list of the regimental titles. This seems to be incomplete, however, as only the following can be ascertained: Regt.Fersen was the Tobolsk regt.; Regt. Zedmoradsky seems to have been either the Riask or Bieloserk regt., as both had colonel's given as "Sedmoratzki" at some time during 1799; there was a Petersburg Grenadier Regt., but this should also have been known by it's colonel's name (Golitzin II in 1799); the nearest thing to Regt. Emme in the list is a Grenadier Regt. Amme, a.k.a. the Pavlov Grenadiers. There is no mention of any names resembling those of the other regiments in the article. Moving on to the Salzburg Regt. at Austerlitz, whilst the mystery of the 6 battalions prevent me making a solution, perhaps the following can be offered for consideration by those in a better position than myself to research it. 1) Sapherson says this about the Archbishopric of Salzburg's sole infantry regiment: "This served in the Netherlands, as part of the Austrian forces there. Later, in 1806, the unit became part of the Austrian army." 2) In 1802, Salzburg was secularised and given as an Electorate of the Holy Roman Empire to the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, as compensation for the loss of Tuscany (of which he was formerly the Grand Duke). Salzburg was ceded to Austria when Ferdinand was made Elector of Wurzburg in 1805. There were very close military and political ties, then. 3) The aforementioned Ferdinand was also, I believe, Inhaber of the Austrian Infantry Regt. No.23. Although the Osprey book lists only Tuscany and Wurzburg, it is more than reasonable to assume that the regiment bore the title "Salzburg" whilst Ferdinand ruled there, as he did at the time of Austerlitz. It is therefore possible that there were two "Salzburg " regiments at Austerlitz; the answer may be that they were mistaken for a single unit by a researcher or translator of the order of battle? I hope some of this is of use, all the best On the Use of Howitzers... Dear Sir, Mr Calderbank's letter in issue 13 spurred me on to comment on the use of howitzers during the Napoleonic Wars. His question "Why did French and other "Continental" artillery batteries have howitzers" seems to suggest that Britain did not employ howitzers. They certainly did, and at a ratio of one to five in both Field and Horse Batteries. Britain and Prussia also had specialist howitzer batteries. The often cited Waterloo Campaign provides proof of this; in that the Prussian 7-pounder battery #1, commanded by Captain Voitus, contained eight 7-pounder howitzers and Major Robert Bull's troop RHA contained six heavy 5.5" howitzers. This aside it was common to find one or two howitzers in a battery of nearly all major Napoleonic Armies. The ballistics involved with projectiles is complex and certainly to lengthy for a "dispatch". There were many points in the original letter to which I will attempt a less than technocrat answer. When one considers Mr. Calderbank's comment on firing canister he is quite correct in his analogy to "sawn-off shotguns". Howitzers could fire canister and a 5.5" howitzer could fire 14 to 15 pounds of "heavy" canister to quite some distance. French 12pdr cannon are quoted as engaging with canister up to 800 yards and certainly by 600 yards it would be "effective". This is where the sawn-off comment becomes useful in that the howitzer was on average 6 calibres long compared to the 18 or so calibres of a cannon. This in turn produced a more marked spread of the cone of canister balls and a significant reduction in effect. Mathematics might help but I feel that 350 yards or less may be an appropriate figure for "effective" canister range for a howitzer. Any takers? Now to the howitzers "Raison d'Etre", the shell. The shell accounted for upwards of 75% of a howitzers ammunition (from which we gleam that canister was only for use in emergencies). It was a hollow iron sphere containing powder which was ignited by a fuse. The fuse was a simple reed affair and needed a certain length to stand proud of the shell so that it was ignited on firing. This fact alone would mean that the minimum range for a shell would be the 650 or 750 yards quoted if the shell was desired to explode at or near impact. Obviously targets at a closer range could be engaged but the shell would spend some time fizzling on the ground before it went off. How any prospective enemy would regard this is open to question, but I certainly would not wish to attempt kicking a 15lb football. Senarmont's Howitzers could therefore have engaged with shell at 450 yards and produced casualties. The key to howitzers comes in Mr. Calderbank's next comment about firing being done by "line of sight". Unlike cannon where it was unusual to elevate beyond 3 degrees, howitzers were designed to fire around 30 degrees. Howitzers heavier carriages reflected this fact. This means that howitzers could fire over the heads of intervening friendly troops if required to do so, but it was more likely that they were used to get at the areas where the cannon ball could not reach. David Chandler suggests buildings, but let us not forget that the countryside that we represent with model trees and building is not 2 dimensional. Small ripples in the ground, hardly considered as dead ground in the strictest sense could all but negate the effect of cannon balls, where as the howitzer shell could produce casualties. Walls, woods, reverse slopes, buildings you name it the howitzer could get at it. if you accept this argument then why have cannon at all. The answer is that although you may be able to produce casualties they were not that great, a lucky shell might kill or wound 2 or 3 men where a cannon ball could do the same to 6 or 7 men at effective range. But that is not the whole story, effects such as ground conditions, crew experience and the fact that visibility was often greatly obscured all serve to reduce this universal method of killing. As to rules, who knows? I use an abstract version of Bruce Quarrie's Napoleonic Wargames in miniature, on my IBM Computer. I know this may produce howls of derision and laughter, but having read around the subject and indeed tested the rules against things as mathematical as Binomial Distributions and perceived historical fact, I feel as though they are about right. There are plenty of examples of artillery effects, some good some bad its only an interpretation of what could result. If you ask me, reduce the casualties produced by your set of rules by 50% and you won't be far wrong. Failing that remember what Clauswitz said about the "Fog of War" or forget about the minor difficulties and get back to the wargaming. If you want to read more I can recom mend reading the excellent "Artillery Equipments of the Napoleonic Wars" published by Osprey, or Otto Von Pivka's "Armies of the Napoleonic Era" which contains a good although rather "heavy" discussion of artillery effects and tactics. Further Lines and Columns... Dear Dave, I'd like to respond to some of the points made by Dave Kilburn in issue 12. To begin with the vexed question of melee modifiers David has misquoted me. I did not say that a defending line had to stop an attacking column with it's fire or be "be broken by the sheer weight and mass of the advancing column", I said they would run which is not the same thing. Napoleon once told General Foy that "columns do not break through unless they are supported by a superior artillery fire which prepares the attack." Wellington's assertion that the French system was "a false one against steady troops" is famous, the key word being steady. Most readers will be familiar with General Bugeaud's description of a French attack on a British line (printed in full in Chandler: The campaigns of Napoleon, p 348) which illustrates the point perfectly. The real battle is not of powder and ball but of moral force - the, who blinks first syndrome. The advantage will always lie with a steady defensive line, the very act of standing silently is enough to overawe an attacker as Bugeaud says. The scales can be tipped to the offensive by the disruption of the defender's cohesion using skirmishers and/ or artillery fire, or by a lack of confidence in their officers on the part of the defenders. These and other factors, principally training will decide at what range fire is opened, whether that fire takes the form of steady volleying or is scattered and uneven etc. Troops that fire at longer ranges will generally break before a determined assault, the act of firing showing that they are windy. Conversely those that hold their fire until close range will unnerve their opponents. The "plus 1" to columns should be scrapped immediately as it is based on false ideas of French tactical doctrine. The debate over this has raged for years and doubtless will continue to do so, but the French drill book stated that the column should be used as a vehicle for manoeuvre on the battlefield, but that the line should be used for the final attack due to it's superiority in a firefight. During the revolutionary wars the mass of volunteer battalions were incapable of carrying out the evolutions or presumably of maintaining cohesion in linear formations. The massed clouds of skirmishers were found to be the best way of delivering fire against the Allies who had no troops able to match them. In this situation the defending troops, their formations broken and weakened by the Voltigeurs would fall back before the columns. During Napoleon's campaign of 1805-1807 the same still generally held true as the Continentals had not learned the lesson and indeed never did. They continued to deploy in view of the enemy, exposed to the superior French artillery, and their light troops although increased were always inferior to the Voltigeurs. Only Wellington saw the answer, to use the ground to neutralise the French artillery, and his own skirmishers to hold off and indeed to drive back the Voltigeurs on their own columns; in effect a reversal of the French tactics. The answer to this problem in wargame terms must be a reworking of the morale rules. Perhaps defenders could take a test when attacking infantry reach long musket range (say 200-250 yards). If they pass then fire opens at close range (60-80 yards) and the attackers receive a negative modifier to reflect growing nervousness. If the defenders fail, then fire opens at long or medium range decided by a dice roll which can be modified according to the extent of the failure (at mid-range it can also be decided whether fire is steady or scattered), and they suffer a morale penalty if the attackers close. The effects of artillery and skirmishers can also be taken into account. Moving to Cavalry versus infantry, David has again misquoted me. I did not say lines were not vulnerable but not so vulnerable as is made out. It is true that there are many instances of infantry in line being ridden down. Probably the most notorious examples being Colborne's brigade at Albuera, and the 69th foot and 2 German battalions in 1815. The latter 3 were all due to the mismanagement of Fortescue's "mischievous encumbrance" the Prince of Orange. In both of these cases the infantry concerned were taken by surprise in the flank. William Napier was of the opinion that Colbourne's brigade would have been saved if the right wing of the Buffs had been refused. To set against these I can cite the 28th at Alexandria and the 44th at Quatre Bras, both "right about faced" their rear rank to fend off the French Horse. The C.O. of the 53rd foot wrote of Salamanca, "unsupported, we were attacked by the enemy's heavy Dragoons; we retired in good order, in line, and twice stopped their advance by halting and firing". At Albuera during the crisis of the battle, the French dragoons charged Harvey's Portuguese brigade (drawn up in line on the right of the fusiliers) and were driven off by steady volleys. Steady infantry charged in front by cavalry had nothing to fear provided their flanks were secure. I'd suggest the reason for the square coming off the parade ground and onto the battlefield is more to do with the increased fluidity of Napoleon's warfare than anything else, the heyday of battle cavalry was long past even then. Finally to return to the subject of British infantry formations, the quarter column should be mentioned. As the name implies this was similar to the open column but with only a quarter of deploying distance between each company. On this subject I came across an interesting quote from James Cooper's " Rough notes of seven campaigns in Portugal, Spain, France and America" in an article on the combat of Redinha (12th March 1811) Cooper was a sergeant in the 7th foot, " ....we debauched into the open plain, and pre pared to attack. "form close column"; "prime and load"; "fix bayonets"; "shoulder"; "slope"; "silence"; "steady"; "deploy into line"; "forward". We moved across the plain in three or four parallel lines towards the French battalions, which now opened upon us briskly.....the balls flew from both combatants like hail, but this duel did not last long; the enemy gave way....." This would indicate that quarter column was used as an intermediary phase between march column and line. Unfortunately Cooper gives no indication of whether the formation was used to advanced to a position where line was formed. The close formation obviously makes it more suitable for a deployment to the front whereas an open column is ideal for a Frederickian style attack on a flank. Mr Palmer might gain some ideas from examining the actions during Massena's retreat from Portugal, and also from British colonial campaigns up to the Crimean war, in particular the Sikh wars which featured several hard fought battles against a brave foe. In regard to David Kilburn's comment on the relative speeds of column and line, I'm not wholly convinced. I'm happy to accept the difficult ground argument, indeed I referred to that in my previous letter. David seems to have ignored two crucial factors in his reenactment experience; firstly that he is not a soldier, merely a civilian in uniform, and secondly that a battalion is divided into companies which in the British case even at full strength will be no wider than 50 men. The order within each company would have been maintained by it's sergeants and subalterns, and David implies that such a frontage is not too difficult to control; the senior company officers would doubtless have maintained the alignment between companies in the battalion as a whole. It should be remembered that a column is merely a series of shorter lines drawn up behind one another. A French column of divisions at full strength would have a frontage approximately 90 men wide. David's mention of the French ordre mixte raises the question; if there was a natural difference in rates of advance then such a formation should, all thing being equal, fall apart of it's own accord. To avoid such, would necessitate the columns moving at a slower pace? Article: British Columns and Lines (FE16) Napoleon my part in his downfall and French retreat without fighting!... Dear Sir, I have just discovered your magazine (issue no. 12). I find it very interesting and regret that we do not have something similar in France. I am a wargamer mainly interested by Napoleonic Wars. I have some armies in 25mm plastic, using ESCI miniatures, many of which are conversions, and use "Les Aigles 3" rules from J. J. PETIT. I am interested by historical events and have a book giving the list of French and allied officers killed or wounded in action from 1805 to 1815, chronologically by unit and battle. This allows me to see how any particular unit was engaged in any action. This brings me to your last issue (11) and the engagement at Gefrees. I checked on the 19th, 25th, 50th, 36th, 28th, and 75th infantry regiments and found that not one officer was killed or injured. For the dragoons I found that one sous lieutenant was wounded. This seems to confirm that the French forces retreated without really fighting, with the exception of the dragoons when counter attacking. Concerning Maida, this is a very different matter and I present a list of the casualties [of officers]:
1st Regt: nobody. 4th Swiss: three killed three wounded. The Poles: one wounded 23rd Regt: nobody. 9th Chasseurs: one killed. This book allowed me to trace an ancestor of my wife, Lieutenant De Pannevert from the 22nd chasseurs a cheval. He was killed in action at the battle of Warren on November 1st 1806 during the pursuit of the Prussian army. May I take this opportunity to ask if anyone has any information on this Warren engagement which seems bloody since the 22nd Chasseur … cheval had two officers killed and four injured including the colonel? It may be apparent to you that I am also interested in genealogical searches. I found that one of my ancestors was a "grognard". He was born in 1780, married in 1800 (possibly to avoid army service) but unfortunately his wife died in 1805 and he was enrolled into the 95th Infantry Regiment (ours, not yours!) and he became a poor "troupier" walking all around Europe. By chance his travels were not to include Russia. He walked from 1805 to 1815, I am a good walker too but...... I was surprised that he survived so many battles, but found (always in my Officers casualty book) that this regiment suffered few casualties compared to others and I don't know why? For instance:-
Friedland 1 k. 5 w. Wagram 2 k. 6 w. Cadix 1 k. 6 w. Dresde 2 k. 4 w. Bayonne 2 k. 3 w. Waterloo 2 k. 16 w. I suppose he was also injured at Waterloo since when he married (a second time) in 1816 he was reported as provisionally exempt from service and he died five years later, probably exhausted by his campaigns. I also read that at Waterloo the 95th Regiment was part of the poor 1st Corps that got into some trouble with your dragoons. However, since this regiment was a lucky one, it was part of Durutte's division that took Papelotte and it was the only regiment to leave the field of battle in good order according to a very well known painting. I suppose this is due to most of this regiment being veterans like my ancestor. Since they were not to heavily engaged over the previous ten years they probaly had very few "Marie Louises"! Italian Campaign of 1815, anyone?... Dear Dave, Keep up the good work. I love the articles on the less well known actions - Poland 1809, Holland 1799 and Saxony 1809. The OBs are just what the wargamer ordered. Is there anyone out there that has info on the Italian campaign of 1815? I have read that Marshal Suchet beat a large Austrian army - what forces composed the two sides? The binders are a great idea to protect the world's greatest Napoleonic mag. Russian fusilier assistance required... Dear Sir, Can anybody help? I have just started to organise a 15mm Napoleonic Russian army. However although I have consulted quite a few books (Uniforms of 1812. Ospreys Russian Infantry & Napoleonic Source book all by Philip Haythornthwaite) there are a few questions they have not answered. Did Fusiliers in [Russian] Grenadier battalions have Plumes and did Tirailleurs wear the same uniforms as Grenadiers? Also in Uniforms of 1812 a Sergeant Major is shown in the pre Bardin regulation uniform. He is from the 2nd line Regt but has red collar and cuffs. Should he not have Dark green cuffs? P.S. Does anybody know where the drummer stands in a French line? Alone in Annan... Dear Sir, Please include the following in your magazine. ANNAN AREA anyone playing 15mm Napoleonic or other period. Regular game/campaign wanted. I have permanent table etc. Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #14 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |