Dispatches
Letters to the Editor
by the readers
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Letters on: Columns, Lines, and Maida; SWARG; Why Howitzers; Columns, Lines and Maida Dear Dave, Thanks for printing my somewhat rambling missive in First Empire 11. Shame about the glitches (eg. capitals printed as lower case etc), which I'll put down to the pain of deciphering my handwriting! and before anyone complains, I do know how to spell Bossu - don't know where the rogue "a" came from. Reading it again, plus your own comments after set me to thinking more upon the subject. I don't agree with your idea that the British used "correct" 18th century tactics. The classic linear tactics used from the days of Marlborough treated an infantry line as one tactical unit. As a wargaming aside this may be the reason behind the move rate discrepancy discussed in my last letter. While individual battalions in line could theoretically manoeuvre as fast as a column, the problem in controlling a line of 20 or more battalions were immense. Frederick partially solved this by reintroducing a tactic which had it's roots as far back as ancient Greece, Epaminondas of Thebes using it to defeat the Spartans - the oblique order. This enabled the Prussian Brigades to gain some measure of independence in movement, whilst conforming to their neighbours rather than being utterly tied to each other. The other benefit being that pressure can be applied at one point whilst maintaining a threat elsewhere. The French managed to achieve the same effect whilst searching for solutions to another problem, how to match the Prussian speed of manoeuvre. In the mid-18th century the French were, to be blunt, poor at drill. Much of the blame for which can be laid at the door of the officers, and the resistance of French soldiers to Prussian style discipline. The Prussians were able to march their infantry onto the battlefield in two columns and deploy speedily. The French found they could not match this and eventually worked out a way of deploying from six to eight columns of approach. This was to form their army into divisions which were fixed for a campaign. Due to their nature each Division became self-contained and capable of some degree of independence. It is this capability of independence of manoeuvre which separates Fredrickian tactics from those of the Napoleonic era more than anything else. Compare Frederick's army with Wellington's. Although the Peninsular army fought in line it's Divisions were not tied to each other. Frederick's Prussians I suggest, could not have fought a battle such as Vitoria. As to the French use of columns, the column of attack first made it's appearance in the regulations of 1755. At that time a column comprised two battalions side by side, and drawn up six deep. It was in effect a doubled line. THe formation does not seem to have been used in the field (probably due to it's newness, compare with Mack's reforms in 1805) although there is evidence that some units in the rear of the French columns at Rossbach employed it, there not being time enough to form line. Sadly during the Seven Years War the French were frequently on the defensive, and the standard British sources (Fortesque and Savory) don't enter into the minutiae of tactics, but the use of columns of manoeuvre would seem to be justified in Wargames. By the American War of Independence the French had perfected the concept of attack columns, and Rochambeau's corps was keen to try the new tactic against the British. When the revolutionary wars erupted in 1792 the mass of volunteer battalions did not have the training to either deploy or manoeuvre in line. The old regulars of the Royal Army could do both of course, but as they became thinned out from casualties and amalgamations so the use of columns became standard. The prime defect of the column is it's lack of firepower of course, the importance of which was taught by the English long-bowmen at Crecy and Agincourt. Forgotten when continental fashion embraced the Swiss pike blocks, and reestablished by Gustavas Adolphus. The French revolutionary armies tackled this problem by employing massed skirmishes deployed nit on the flanks as was 18th century custom, but in front of the attacking troops. Their task being by a harassing fire to upset and disorder that part of the enemy line where the blow was to fall, in conjunction with a daring use of artillery. This state of affairs continued until the battle of Friedland in 1807 when importantly, it was massed artillery that broke the Russian line. Napoleon, a gunner himself, was impressed by this and it's worth noting that grand batteries were employed at most of his major battles afterwards as the prime instrument for cracking open the enemy's centre. Of all Napoleon's enemies, only the British seem to have recognised the importance of skirmishers in the French system. The Duke of York and Sir John Moor being amongst the proponents of special light infantry, with the result that the Shornecliffe camp was set up in 1803 along with the experimental corps of riflemen. Doubtless officers with experience in the American War lent their voices. The use of Americans in Southern campaigns of successive lines of riflemen and militia to draw the British sting presaged the offensive use of marksmen by the French ( and incidentally recalls Hannibal's tactics at Zama, although Scipio had the measure of him.) The Continentals on the contrary kept their eyes fixed on the columns with the result that they aped the surface of the French system without comprehending it's substance, just as all Europe had copied Frederick fifty years before. Military fashion can be a deadly thing, and Napoleon's dominance led to a tactical cul-de-sac. The Germans were still using columns to attack in 1914. Only the British (and Americans?) stayed aloof. To deal briefly with Mark Ashby's question of the Prussian 28th and 29th Regiments; these were the old Berg infantry. The first was formed from the remnants of the troops who went to Russia in 1812, the second was newly raised in 1813. At the congress in Vienna Berg was absorbed by Prussia and her infantry entered the Prussian Army. During the 1815 campaign it is likely that the old Berg uniforms were worn by some, if not all of the men, there being several paintings of soldiers dressed as such during the subsequent occupation of France. A plate of a grenadier can be found in MAA 192, and details of Berg uniforms are fairly readily available. At least the white makes a change from all that blue! Des Darkin's article on Maida was interesting, and I hope to be able to add certain details. Mr. Darkin expresses uncertainty over his French orbat. In an article which appeared in "Practical Wargamer" (Summer 1989) Arthur Harman gives forces as follows:
Brigade (Peyri): 1st Swiss (1 Bn), Polish (2 Bns) Brigade (Diganet): 23rd Leger (2 Bns) Cavalry: 9th Chasseurs a Cheval (3 Sqns) Artillery: 1 Btty a pied (6 Guns), 1 section a Cheval (2 Guns) British (Stuart)
1st Brigade (Cole): 1/27th Foot, Grenadier coys of 20th, 1/27th, 1/36th, 1/58th, 1/81st Foot and De Watteville's 2nd Brigade (Acland): 2/78th Foot, 1/81st Foot 3rd Brigade (Oswald): 1/58th Foot, 4 coys De Watteville's Artillery: 8 4pdr Mountain guns (2 attached to each Brigade), 6 Field guns Detached (Ross): 20th Foot Where Mr. Harman obtained this I'm not sure but expect it was either Fortesque vol 5 or Oman's essay (in studies in the Napoleonic Wars). In the article it is stated that 3 Field guns and 4 coys of the Swiss were left in camp, and that the mountain guns, which were carried on horses were unable to keep up due to the time taken to unload them. The other 3 Field pieces are not mentioned in his account. Reynier it would appear was attempting to outflank the British right and drive them back into the marsh and thickets they had just emerged from. The British volley which broke the 1st Leger was delivered at point blank range. Oman (in Wellington's army) puts this down to the superiority of 2 ranks over 3 yet Kempt's troops were an assorted bundle of light coys and flankers so it would appear to be more a question of timing (in this case at least) and superior fire-discipline. British Volleys had been renowned for their power throughout the 18th century. Upon the destruction of the 1st Leger, the 42nd de Ligne halted and opened fire upon Acland's Brigade but was driven off by two volleys, taking the Poles with them. The 1/81st was confused by the appearance of the red-coated Swiss but drove them back after an exchange of fire. At this time Cole's Brigade had been forced into square by the threat of the French cavalry. Reynier then proceeded to throw Voltigeurs onto the left of the Brigade whilst the 23rd Leger opened a fire in front. It was only when Ross brought up the 20th Foot and drove off the French skirmishers before wheeling to fire into the flank of the 23 Leger that Reynier withdrew. The staff officer mentioned in Mr. Darkin's account was Sir Henry Bunbury (the Deputy Quartermaster General) whose "Narrative of some passages in the great war with France" would be very welcome as a reprint if any publishers are reading! The Battle is notable for proving, not the superiority of line over column, but of British firepower over French. The bulk of Stuart's army were inexperienced, whilst Reynier's men were for the most part veterans. As an aside the campaign ended with the capture of Scylla, a town on the straits of Messina which was held until February 1808. For those wishing to know more of tactical developments in the 18th century I urgently recommend buying "The Anatomy of Victory" by Brent Nosworthy and, if you can find it "The Background of Napoleonic Warfare" by R.S. Quimby (another candidate for reprinting, how about it Greenhill?) Article: British Columns and Lines (FE16) Plug for SWARG, British Columns and snippets Please can I notify you of our newly formed wargames club. "The South Bucks WAR Game (SWARG) club, which has in its aims the simulation of battles and campaigns from Ancient to Modern times now meets at the Widmer End Village Hall near High Wycombe in Buckinghamshire on the 2nd Tuesday evening of the month from 1900 to 2300 hours. The club has a strong Napoleonic following. Dates of the rest of the years meetings are 14 Sep, 12 Oct, 9 Nov and 14 Dec." In view of the interest shown in your correspondence columns about the British moving in columns I enclose the following "tactical snippets" from my data base:- THE LETTERS OF PRIVATE WHEELER 1809 - 1828. Edited by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. Michael Joseph 1951.
The 43rd " " 1st Bn, " " " " 1803 The 68th " " 1st Bn, Durham L. I. made 1808 The 85th " " 2nd Bn, King's Shropshire L.I. " 1808 The 71st " " 1st Highland L.I. made 1809 The 51st " " 1st Bn, Kings Own Yorkshire L. I. 1809 (Not until 1813, however, does the army list refer to any of these regiments as "Light Infantry".) p.29. AUG 1809. WALCHEREN. "At length we marched out on the great road to Flushing. Colonel Mainwaring with one of our Comps, and the Light Company of the 82nd. Regiment formed the advanced guard. The 82nd was in front this day, we had taken the front the day before. Before the rear of our Brigade had cleared the city, we received a volley of musketry on our pivot flank (we were marching in column of subdivisions* right in front). The word was now given "Wheel into line", "Prime and Load"."
But in the eighteenth century platoon (derived from the French word pelote - a ball or pellet) was a tactical term applied to the fire unit. Each of the eight divisions, or platoons, of the battalion fired in turn - so as to avoid a pause in the fire whilst reloading. From this arose the vivid terms rolling platoon fire or rolling volleys which are often found in battle-narratives. Under new Regulations issued in 1811 companies were divided into two platoons apiece. When on War establishment, and thus the term acquired it's modern meaning as a sub-unit of the company. Instead of it's former meaning as the tactical equivalent of the company). p.87. 22 AUG 1812. SALAMANCA. "In the afternoon we broke into open column of divisions right in front* and marched up the rear of our enemy. This was not a very agreeable job as the enemy were cannonading the whole length of their line, and our rout lay within range of their guns. The fire at length became so furious that it were expedient to form grand division, thus leaving an interval of double the space for their shot to pass through." p.88. *. When the battalion paraded on line, three ranks deep, and the eight companies were equalised as divisions, each pair of them formed a grand division. If the battalion advanced in column or grand division, one behind the other, it would thus have twice as broad a front as in column of divisions, while comprising four successive lines instead of eight. But when moving right in front (i.e from the right flank) there would be twice as wide a space between each of these end on lines - an advantage in diminishing the effect of the enemies fire. On Why Howitzers? Dear Sir, In the hope of provoking discussion about the behaviour of Napoleonic armies and rule mechanisms, here is a question for your readers; why did French and other "continental" artillery batteries have howitzers? David Chandler, in "The Campaigns of Napoleon" suggests that howitzers fired shell "for destroying buildings". If this were the case, why not concentrate the howitzers in specialist batteries rather than scattering them out in ones and twos? Also, in the 30 guns of Senarmont's battery at Friedland there were 6 howitzers. It seems unlikely that they would have been chosen in that situation if their main purpose was to destroy buildings. Many sources seem to assume that howitzers had maximum and minimum shell ranges, and fired canister at very short range "like giant sawn-off shotguns". Again, considering the Friedland example where Senarmont commenced firing at about 450 yards (less than most minimum ranges I have seen proposed), was a fifth of the battery useless? Most sources also assume that howitzers could not fire over intervening friendly forces. This is normally justified on the basis that all firing was line of sight, so the gunners could not see their target. However, if the howitzers had already "registered" fire on the enemy, could they maintain fire if the friendly forces subsequently moved between the howitzers and their target? I conclude that I do not really understand the purpose of howitzers. The simpler sets of rules ignore the fact that a third or a quarter of most batteries were howitzers. Complex rules give separate fire effects for howitzers and ordinary guns, and suggest that the two should be considered separately when determining the fire effect of the battery. In between are those rules which say that the effect of the howitzers is "factored" into the effect of the battery. I can see that an exploding shell may set a building on fire when round shot will not. However, is that the only effect that needs to be considered when determining the firing of a battery containing howitzers? If the purpose of the howitzers is not fully understood, how can the factors be determined? Have your readers any answers, or can they justify the rule mechanism they use? My own view is that, within maximum and minimum ranges, howitzers firing shell caused more casualties than ordinary guns firing round shot. Thus, for ranges of about 600 to 1400 yards, a battery with howitzers would be more effective than one without. This would explain why nearly all batteries had howitzers. There would then be a sudden drop-off in battery effectiveness above the maximum howitzer range. The implication of Friedland is that, when firing canister, howitzers were as effective as ordinary guns and had the same sort of range. However, I then have to assume that canister had a range of about 600 yards, which is much further than in most rules. At that sort of range, I feel round shot would be more effective. This conclusion leads to an effectiveness profile which first decreases with distance (all guns firing canister), then stays approximately level (ordinary guns firing round shot, howitzers firing canister to little effect), then increases (ordinary guns firing round shot, howitzers firing shell), then drops suddenly (howitzers out of range), and finally decreases slowly as round shot ricochets become less likely. Is this to complicated? Ed: Can you lob a star shell on this question? If so write in today. Apologies to all who have written and not made this issue, space limitations have meant a shortened dispatches section this time. Keep `em coming we do use as many as we possibly can, sooner or later! Letters to the Editor Response (FE14) Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #13 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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