The Battle of Staffarda
August 1690

The March, and order of battle of our army, held M. de Catinat in a continual uneasiness, and he was all the while on horseback till the action began. He discovered the exellent disposition of his Royal Highnesses army, as soon as he could approach it, which he could not do without making all the horse and dragoons of his right wing advance.

He could not help thinking this disposition to be apprehended: for where our infantry not covered with hedges, they had before them a rampart of chevauz-de-frise, after the manner of the Germans, and had he not been sensible to the fact that he was much the strongest, since he had 18 battalions, and 43 squadrons; whereas his Royal Highness had no more than 12 battalions, and 30 squadrons, he would never have dared to venture to attack him.

The onset began on our left. Count Madevi advanced with two battalions, which were immediately sustained by two others, to drive away the infantry, and the peasants we had in the marshy ground. They were received with a terrible fire, which was what they had expected and while these four battalions kept our infantry employed their main body advanced without fear of being set upon in the flank. The enemy observed the same conduct towards our left in the cassines.

The action there was very hot and obstinate for near two hours, before they could make themselves masters of the foremost cassines. During this, his Highness Prince Eugene was continually seen giving orders, and making those battalions advance in time, that were to support the foremost; in short, he was everywhere.

If the enemy had obstinately persisted any longer in attacking the left, the affair would soon have been decided in our favour; but observing the mistake they had committed, they immediately retrieved it, by making the whole second line advance, with design to render the action more general, because their cannon, posted on the right, and on the left, so that their shot crosses each other, having very much annoyed our cavalry, had obliged us to retire toe larger spot of ground, prossessed by our infantry.

As the enemy were the most numerous, fresh troops continually succeeded the others, and though our fire did not slacken, it was necessary to give way to the numbers, who had taken possession of the hedges.

The enemy then made their cannon advance to the very place where ours had been posted before, and their battalions succeeded each other, charged with such fury, after they had no longer anything to apprehend on their flanks, that our generals could not rally our infamy; part of which saved themselves in woods on the left, whilst those on the right threw themselves into the morasses near the abbey of Staffarde, and our cavalry were driven beyond the Po.

However, the infantry which retired to the woods, assisted Prince Eugene in securing the retreat of the army. His Highness placed himself at the head of the Duke of Savoys Guards and Gendarmes, with whom he (supported by the foot in the woods and marsh) who made continual firin. The enemy's squadrons durst not pursue, much less attack them.

Masters of the Field

The enemy being masters of the field of battle, passed the night there. Never the less the victory cost them dear, since they lost there as many men as we. It was reckoned we lost about 3000 men both killed and prisoners.

Amongst the first were the Marquis de Beuil, and the son of the viceroy of Naples; amongst the last were the Marquis de Louvigny, with Messieurs de Monasterol and de Fouville.

His Royal Highness, who was taken off by a cannon ball during the retreat. Prince Eugene gathered together the remains of the army of Moret, from whence he marched by Carmagnole to Carignan.

The loss of this battle, where never the less Prince Eugene acquired so much glory, was followed by that of Savoy, and the Marquisate of Suza; however the garrison of the castle of Suza obliged M. de Catinat to grant them an honourable capitulation, and the count de Loze, who commanded therein, gained some reputation by it. Whilst he was defending himself there, the enemy had the boldness, to send some 400 horse from Pignerol, with each of them a foot soldier behind him, who advanced to Rivoli near Turin.

The peasants having informed the Duke of Savoy of this, Prince Eugene put himself at the head of a detachment of German horse, with some Piedmonteze foot, had posted himself in a place by which the French detachment were to pass in their return. He charged them with so much order and courage, that he obliged them to abandon the booty they had carried off from the pillage of Rivoli, and to betake themselves to flight through the woods, after having left above 200 dead upon the spot, without reckoning the prisoners and deserters, in so much that very few of them got back to Pignerol.

THE 1691 CAMPAIGN

The success of the next campaign was pretty various: At the beginning the French could not fail of deriving some advantage from their success in the former campaign; but the scene changed on a sudden, and after having taken Suza, Veillane, and Carmagnole, and having plundered Rivoli, they miscarried before Coni, by the address and fine conduct of his Highness Prince Eugene.

M. de Catinat has commanded M. de Feuquieres, with a detachment of 10,000 men, both horse, foot, and dragoons, to invest Coni, a rich trading town, distant 25 miles from Carmagnole, between the Sture and the Gesso, a situation which renders it pretty strong. The Count de Rouere commanded a garrison therein of 500 of the Militia of Mondovi, and about 700 Vaudois, or French refugees.

An attempt was made, as soon as the French general's design upon that place was know, to throw some regular troops into it, but it could not be affected; nevertheless the governor sustained the siege with courage. M. de Catinat sent fresh troops from time to time to Feuquieres, who battered the town with fourteen pieces of cannon, and four mortar pieces, so that he might have had it at an early rate, the garrison being hardly sufficient to man all the works.

For although the fortification is simple, consisting but of one wall, a fosse, and a covered way; this wall is defended by seven bastions, three raveling, and a horn work, without reckoning the castle which is at the end, and on that side where the Sture and Gasso meet.

Defending the Works

It is easy judging that with but 1200 men, it is hardly possible to do any more then guard so many works; never the less they husbanded the garrison so well, that they were able to make some sallies, wherein M. de Julien, at the head of the French emigres, distinguished himself very much.

But these efforts were fruitless enough against the enemy, who were already masters of the covered way, where they had raised a battery, from whence they made a large breach. By good fortune the Marquis de Crenan, happening to discover at that time, that the Marquis de Frassati held a correspondence with a German general, with intent to deliver up Casal to him, had him arrested, and demanded a reinforcement of the M. de Catinat.

Hereupon he ordered M. de Feuquieres to carry the Marquis de Crenan four battalions, and a regiment of dragoons; wherefore that general intructed M. de Bulonde with the care of the siege, and he stormed the town in hopes of carrying it by open force, but was repulsed with the loss of above 800 men.

However this advantage would not have prevented the taking of this important place, had it not been for a stratagem, which was thought on by Prince Eugene, whom the Duke of Savoy had sent with 4000 men, to throw into the town a supply of 100 mules laden with ammunition and provision, and some troops. The Marquis de Parelle was to support Prince Eugene. De Catinat was acquainted with his Serene Highness's design, at the same time that the Count de Rouere was informed thereof likewise.

The French general immediately gave advice of all to M. de Bulonde, whom he ordered not to stir out of his lines, assuring him of assistance. The governer of the place, with intent to facilitate Prince Eugene's design, being persuaded that the french were fatigued with the assault, and with the rains which had fallen afterwards, made three sallies successively, one in the morning, the other at noon, and the third at night, with more success than he hoped for, since he ruined part of the besiegers works.

It was after this action that a peasant, prepared for that purpose by Prince Eugene, was brought to the Marquis de Bulonde: He had about him a letter to the Count de Rouere, to whom his highness sent word, that in two days at farthest, he would attack the enemy with 5000 horse, and 6000 foot; he informed him also how he should behave himself during the action, to fall upon the rear, whilst he would charge them from the front. The countryman, well instructed, acquainted the Marquis de Bulonde, that the governor had already received a message of the same nature from another, and that he had given notice of it to Prince Eugene by firing a cannon.

The parties Bulonde had sent out for intelligence, bringing him all word, about the same time, that Prince Eugene was actually on full march; heheld a council of war; and his own opinion, which was, that it would be better to retire, than to stay till they should be forced to it, was followed; upon which he raised the siege with so much precipitation anddisorder, that he left behind in his camp 400 sick and wounded soldiers, with 50 officers, (whom the peasants knocked on the head) some pieces of cannon, two mortars, 300 bombs, 700 hand grenades, 1500 bullets, with some powder, tents, mules, and wagons.

This siege cost the French 4000 men in ten days, and Prince Eugene had the glory of making them raiseit, without endangering one single man. Louis XIV is said to have laughed at the inconsolable Louvois, telling him "You are mightily dejected for a very small matter; one may plainly see you have been too much used to good success, as for me, who remember having seen the Spaniards in Paris, I am not so easily cast down".

Never the less he caused the Marquis de Bulonde to be arrested, in order to give an account of this shameful and precipitated retreat, and never employed him afterwards.

Enter Eugene

Prince Eugene then entered the town, who acknowledged him for their deliverer; and after liberally rewarding the garrison, returned victorious to rejoin the body of the army. It was about this time that reinforcements arrived in Piedmont, which Prince Eugene had been at Vienna to solicit during the army's last being in winter quarters, and which the Emperor had promised.

They consisted of 15,000 Imperial troops, both horse and foot, commanded by General Caraffa, the Counts Taff, and Palfi, and the Princes of Savoy and Commerci, and 5000 Bavarians led by the Elector of Bavaria, who was to be Commander in Chief. On making a general review of the whole army, it was found to amount to 47,000 men, which divided into three bodies.

The first of 20000 men, mostly Germans, was commanded by the Elector of Bavaria, Count Caraffa, and Prince Eugene.
The Second, composed of the Piedmontese and Spanish troops, with some Swiss and Germans, were under the conduct of the Duke of Savoy, and the Marquis de Parelle.
The brave Duke of Schomberg led the Vaudois, and the French emigres.

On the first motion made by this army, when they left Carignan, where they had been reviewed, M. de Catinat, who was apprehensive for Saluces, maintained a running fight; and Prince Eugene, ever active, fell upon his rear with 500 Imperial dragoons, who cut to pieces three squadrons, so that scarce a man escaped: He even struck terror into the main body who sought their safty in a precipitated march.

Advance

Our army advanced to Ville-Franche; and as M. de Catinat had retired under the cannon of Saluces two leagues and a half from thence, where he intrenched himself to the very teeth, (if we may use the expression.) We were posted between him and Carmagnole; where, since he had taken it, he has lodged his magazines; after having the fortifications repaired and augmented, and having built a sluice upon the Po, to convey the water round the town.

On its having been proposed by Prince Eugene, it was resolved in a council of war, held at Ville-Franche, to beseige Carmagnole, the taking of which would either deliver Turin, and all the places adjacent, from the troublesome neighbourhood of that hostile garrison, or the siege give an opportunity of engaging de Catinat in an action if he should attempt to relieve it. The Prince himself had charge of this expedition, all being persuaded that no body could execute it better than he who had proposed it.

INVESTMENT OF CARMAGNOLE

Eugene took with him only 1500 cavalry, with which he invested Carmagnole on the 27th of September; and all the army passed the Po to cover the siege, andpost themselves between that place and Saluces. The Elector of Bavaria, and the Duke of Savoy, came then before the town with the troops appointed to carry on the siege, and after having taken a view of it, they began by ruining the sluice of the Po.

On the 31st the trenches were opened, and three attacks prepared; one carried on by the Germans, a second by the Piemonteze, and the third by the Spaniards. As soon as the Artillery that, consisting of 26 Cannon, and 8 Mortar pieces, had been received from Turin, the batteries were erected, and were ready on the 7th of October.

On the 6th the Spainards had carried a redoubt near the counterscarp, where they had made a lodgement. On the 8th the Artillery began to play on all sides, but not much powder was spent; for about noon the enemy beat a parley, and sent hostages in order to capitulate.

The rest of the day passed in regulating the conditions, and the next morning the capitulation was signed; by virtue of which the garrison commanded by M. du Plessis Relliev, were to go out with arms and baggaage, and all the men to be conducted to Pignerol; whither M. de Catinat had retired abandoning Saluces, Sassano; and Savigliano, for fear of our army, between Pignerol and Saluces, should entirely cut off his retreat on that side.

There was found in Carmagnole, which cost but 80 men killed, and 150 wounded, 20 cannon, some Mortar pieces, a great number of bombs and carcasses, 13,000 sacks of corn, and a prodigious quantity of ammunition and provision. This conquest facilitated that of Riuol and Veillane, which returned to their subjection to their former master, so that the allies were able to take their winter quarters in Piedmont, having thus obliged the French to repass the mountains.

Carry the War

The Duke of Savoy, weary of seeing his new dominions a prey to the enemy, formed the design, in order to deliver himself from their troublesome company, to carry the war into French territories. His Royal Highness concerted this great enterprize with Prince Eugene; and engaged his Highness to carrythe plan himself to Vienna, to get the Emperors approbation of it, and obtain some additional succours, with such orders as might prevent a misunderstanding like that of the campaign; which would have been yet more successful, if the German, Spanish, and Savoyard Generals had agreed better together.

It was not at all difficult for Prince Eugene to get the Emperors Approbation to a design of such importance, and one from whence the common cause could not fail of deriving a considerable advantage, by the diversion it would cause: For it was not to be doubted, that France would immediately weaken her other armies, either to reinforce that in Savory, or to form a new one in Dauphine, and Provence, which might secure her frontiers from any invasion.

Never the less this did not happen, because M. de Catinat either did not dive into, or pretended not to have dived into this design of the Duke of Savoy, and Prince Eugene.

More Prince Eugene of Savoy

Part I (#7)
Part II (#8)
Part III (#9)
Part V (#11)
Part VI (#12)