Organisation and Strength of
Regular Infantry Regiments of the
British Army in North America

American War of Independence 1775-1783

by P. C. Mankin


This article examines the organisation and strength of Regular Infantry Regiments of the British Army serving in North America during the War of Independence. In researching this article I have used a number of secondary sources and also, where they are available to me, contemporary sources. These are all listed in the bibliography.

I do not claim this article is the definitive study of the subject or that it answers every question. If readers have any comments or information on the subject, especially which clarifies, corrects or adds to the contents of the article, I would be pleased to hear from them. I am still researching the subject and plan to write a supplementary article it further information becomes available.

Despite these limitations I hope that the article will provide useful information to those interested in the period and the subject.

Outbreak of War

At the outbreak of the AWI the total land forces of Great Britain, excluding militia, numbered on paper about 48,500 men of whom 39,000 were infantry, 7,000 cavalry and 2,500 artillerymen. These troops were divided unequally between two separate military establishments. The English Establishment comprised 32,000 men including 26,000 infantry, the Irish Establishment comprised 16,500, including 13,500 infantry. The Scottish Establishment had been abolished in 1707. In addition there were 6 Household Regiments: 3 Foot Guards (3,750 men), 2 Horse Guards (700 men) and Horse Grenadier Guards (350 men).

The average strength of in Infantry Regiment on the English Establishment in 1775 was 477. Most regiments comprised out battalion organised into 8 battalion companies, a grenadier company and a light infantry company. The 1st Foot and the 60th Foot however each had two battalions.

A War Office paper details the internal organisation of the 23rd Foot (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), an English Establishment Regiment, in 1775, as follows.

1. Field and Staff Officers Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Chaplain, Adjutant, Surgeon and Mate (total 6).

2. Battalion Companies (8)

Each comprised a Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, I Drummer and 38 Privates (total 47).

3. Grenadier Company Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 1 Drummer, 2 Fifers and 38 Privates (total 49).

4. Light Infantry Company Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 1 Drummer, 38 Privates (total 47).

This totals 478. Furthermore, but not included in the orgenisation, there were a Major, Ensigns, Supernumerary Officers and a Sergeant Major.

The average strength of an Irish Establishment Regiment was 474. How its internal organisation differed precisely from an English regiment is not clear but it must have been virtually identical.

The 23rd Foot was part of the Boston Garrison at the start of hostilities in 1775 together with the 4th, 5th, 38th, 43rd, 47th, 52nd, 59th, 64th and detachments of the 18th and 65th. All were on the English Establishment. The Boston Garrison also contained 2 battalions of marines which appear each to have comprised 8 battalion companies, a grenadier company and a light infantry company.

Following the outbreak of the AWI more units including Irish Establishment Regiments were sent to America and the British Army was expanded: new regiments were formed, including 4 Scottish Fencible Regiments for home defence in 1778 and 1779 (each of 1,120 men); battalions were added to existing regiments; and the establishment of regiments was increased.

On 20th November 1775 General Sir William Howe, Commander in Chief of the British forces in America, issued an order which began as follows:

"in consequence of the augmentation His Majesty has been pleased to make in his Regiments of Foot serving in North America, the following establishment is to take place from 25th August 1775..."

The order goes on to detail an establishment of 12 companies totalling 811 all ranks: a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a major, nine captains, 14 lieutenants, 10 ensigns, one chaplain, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a surgeon, a surgeon's mate, 36 sergeants, 36 corporals, 24 drummers, 2 fifers, and 672 privates. rne last included 36 "contingenV' men (3 per company) who were simply names added to the muster rolls and whose pay was used as the colonel felt fit The organisation does not include a sergeant major.

No distinction is made between battalion and flank companies but the mention of the 2 fifers proves that the flank companies are included. The organisation suggests that 3 companies were commanded directly by the colonel, lieutenant colonel and major and that in 2 companies the colours were carried by lieutenants (perhaps they carried the Kings Colour and the Regimental Colour). However, it does also suggest that the organisation and paper strength of a typical company was a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 drummers and 56 privates (including 3 contingent men) giving a total of 67. The Grenadier Company would also have 2 fifers. Incidentally, whilst on the subject of musicians, Xavier Gatta's watercolour paintings showing light infantry in action at Germantown in October 1777 depict a musician with a bugle shaped like a French Horn. Buglers are not included in the organisations we have been examining but these do predate the battle.

The wording of Howe's order suggest that the new organisation applied only to regiments serving in North America. The reason for the increase in the number of battalion companies from 8 to 10, apart from simply being a means of expanding the Army, probably ties in the practice of detaching the flank companies into composite battalions of varying strengths depending on the companies available. This practice was very common in the AWI and it seems that it was one which was not altogether popular with regimental commanders. An order issued by Howe on 12th December 1775 required "the grenadier and light infantry companies to be completed by their respective corps to 36 rank and File (ie privates) and to give no men but such as proper for these services."

This suggests that commanders had not been giving their best men to the flank companies. By increasing the total number of companies to 12, regimental commanders would still have 10 companies during the periods, which were often very lengthy, when their flank companies were detached. An order of 1st July 1777 suggests however that flank companies were not kept up to strength by their parent regiments: "The flank companies to be immediately completed to the some numbers of the battalions they belong to, the Regiments on this occasion may give recruits that have some knowledge of these arms."

Howe's orders give some other insights into the organisation of flank battalions. On 14th May 1776 he ordered the creation of two battalions each of light infantry and grenadiers for his New York expedition. 'ne parent regiments of the flank companies were as follows.

    1 LI
      4th, 5th 10th 17th 22nd 23rd 27th 35th 38th

    2 LI
      40th 43rd 44th 45th 49th 52nd 55th 63rd 64th

    1 GDR
      4th 5th 10th 17th 22nd 23rd 27th 35th 38th 40th

    2 GDR
      43rd 44th 45th 46th 49th 52nd 55th 63rd 64th Marines (2 Bns)

The light companies of the 2 marine battalions were ordered to remain in garrison in Halifax. An order of 19th May 1776 says "the grenadier and light infantry companies being formed into battalions are to do no duty with their Regiments till further orders." By October 1776 a third battalion of each had been formed (the constituent companies are not known) but by June 1777 there were again only two of each. Finally, an order of 1st July 1777 suggests that flank battalions had their own artillery. "the field pieces of the British Light Infantry and Grenadiers are to remain with them; all the other guns, Hessian and British, are to be embarked." On 5th July their guns too were embarked in readiness for the Pennsylvania Campaign.

Lt. Hadden tells us that the Light Infantry Battalion and the Grenadier Battalion in Burgoyne's Saratoga force each comprised 10 companies. This together with the evidence from Howe's orders suggests that the ideal composition of a flank battalion was 10 companies, at least in large armies.

If the August 1775 ("811 Regiment") establishment was the norm, then regiments were under strength. As we have seen Howe had to order the flank companies to be made up to 36 privates in Dectinber 1775, an establishment very close to that of the "477 Regiment". Lt Hadden, RA, tells as in his journal that the 62nd Foot started the Battle of Freeman's Form in September 1777 during the Saratoga campaign with 300-400 men and lost 187 killed and wounded and 25 taken prisoner. Another Officer, Lt-Col. Stephen Kemble, relates in his journal that the 52nd and 57th Regiments in October 1777 together totalled 500 men. The 33rd Foot at Guilford Court house on 15th March 1781 numbered 322 and the composite battalion of the 6 flank companies from 3 Regiments (3rd, 19(h, 30th) which fought at Camden in August 1781, was 300 strong. In January 1781 the 7th Foot numbered 167.

Howe's orders for 18th May 1776 contain the strengths of 20 units to be embarked for his New York campaign.

UnitStrengthUnitStrength
1 LI93938th344
2 LI87940th368
1 GDR101943rd326
2 GDR99844th369
4th35645th375
5th35549th369
10th35752nd347
17th39355th402
22nd36163rd352
35th36864th362

These returns suggests that the average strength of a company in a flank battalion was 100 which exceeds any known establishment and is remarkable given Howe's orders of 12th December 1775 which refer to bringing them up to 36 rank and file. They also suggest that the average strength of a line regiment (less flank companies) was 362 (range 326 to 402) giving an average battalion company strength of 36.

P Katcher in his book "King George's Army 1775-1783" lists a number of other troop returns. In October 1778 the New York Garrison included the following units:

UnitStrengthUnitStrength
1 LI38533rd411
2 LI43037th378
1 GDR43542nd732
2 GDR34744th341
7th33757th464
17th36863rd336
23rd42364th420
26th312--

These returns give a flank battalion an average strength of 400 and a line regiment (less flank companies) 380 (assuming the 42nd comprised two battalions) or 410 (if the 42nd had only one battalion).

Major General Grant's 1778 Florida expedition comprised 10 regiments with the following strengths.

UnitStrengthUnitStrength
4th50835th525
5th52440th517
15th43446th524
27th55349th521
28th52155th520

The returns give an average strength of 515. It is not clear if the regiments included their flank companies.

The Rhode Island Garrison (date not specified) included the following units.

UnitStrength
22nd389
38th335
43rd455
54th480
2 Flank Co's.221

These returns give an average strength of 415 for the regiments and 110 for the flank companies. The last again exceeds any known establishment.

In conclusion, we have details of two establishments. At the outbreak of the AWI English Establishment Regiments averaged 477 and War Office Papers describe the organisation of the 23rd Foot which intriguingly totals 478 and excludes a number of posts. From 25th August 1775, a new establishment was ordered for regiments in North America. Two additional battalion companies were established and the total strength increased to 811. However, once again, the organisation described by Howe excludes at least one post and raises questions about the command of three companies and the number of ensigns. Other evidence of flank companies of 100 men and of light infantry buglers suggests that there may have been subsequent establishment changes of either a formal or informal nature.

With regard to actual strengths, the evidence suggests, if the "811 Regiment" was the formal establishment that regiments were generally and significantly under strength. Typically a line regiment less its flank companies numbered 300-400 all ranks. Flank companies were usually detached, a practice which helps to explain why a 12 company organisation was felt necessary. The evidence concerning the strength of flank companies is contradictory and strengths were anything between less than 36 up to 110 with perhaps a typical strength of about 50.

Bibliography

1. Contemporary Sources
H Rogers (ed) (1972)
Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books.
Gregg Press, Boston. New York Historical Society (1972)
Journals of Lt-Col. Stephen Kemble 1773-1789 and British Army Orders - Gem. Sir W. Howe 1775-1778, Gen. Sir H. Clinton 1778; and Gen. D Jones 1778.
Gregg Press, Boston.

2. Secondary Sources
F. P. Curtis (1926) The Organisation of the British Army in the American Revelation. New Haven and London. (Republished PP Publishers Ltd, Wakefield 1972).
J. W. Fortescue (1911) A History of the British Army. Vol. III, Macmillan, London.
P.R.N. Katcher (1973) King George's Army 1775-1783. Osprey, Reading.
J. Pancake (1985) This Destructive War -- The British Campaign in the Carolinas 1780- 1797 University of Alabama Press.


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