Winfield Scott
and the War of 1812

Battle of Lundy's Lane

by Rich Barbuto

In the weeks following the Battle of Chippawa, Jacob Brown sought an opportunity to fight and defeat Major General Sir Gordon Drummond's forces on the Niagara Peninsula. For his part, Drummond refused battle until, on 25 July, he saw an opportunity to block Brown's most likely moves. The low hill near the junction of Lundy's Lane and the Portage Road (which connected Chippawa to Fort George) was an ideal location to protect both Fort George and the supplies and fortifications at Burlington Heights. Drummond ordered a concentration of forces atop the hill and along Lundy's Lane. To the south was a level and open field, a perfect place to give battle.

Jacob Brown lost contact with the bulk of Drummond's army. He incorrectly assumed that Drummond was on the New York side of the Niagara River, making a move on the American supply point at Fort Schlosser. Brown concluded that he could best defend Schlosser by making a strong move himself on Queenston. For this mission he sent Scott and his veteran First Brigade. Brown told Scott to report if he came up against the British. By implication, he was not to give battle until Brown could assist. The ever bold Scott understood that he was free to find and fight the enemy.

Scott's force consisted of 1100 troops comprised of four infantry regiments, a company of artillery, and a company of dragoons. He learned that about 800 British troops were posted along Lundy's Lane and he sent a report to this effect back to Brown behind (south of) the Chippawa River. Scott issued movement orders without verifying this dated information. As the Americans moved through the woods and into the open fields immediately south of the British position, Scott realized that he was facing a force much, much stronger than expected. He pushed Thomas Jesup's regiment into the woods on the far right where they could approach the British along a concealed route. However, the rest of his men he ordered to form a long thin firing line. His men did so under the fire of five British guns sitting atop the hill. Shot from Scott's three cannon, fired up hill, plunged down on their targets rather than achieving the more advantageous low shot which ricocheted across the ground.

It was late and the sun was setting. Scott's Brigade suffered badly. The infantry fired their muskets at extreme range and achieved little but to cover the battlefield with smoke. But the British guns exacted a heavy toll as shot after shot drove through the American ranks. As the officers and men were wounded, they were carried to the rear by their comrades. Scott's Brigade all but melted away. The only bright spot was Jesup. This officer, ideally suited to independent command, brought his troops right up to the far left flank of the British line. A powerful attack delivered in the dark broke into the British lines, scattering the defenders. Over the next hours, hundreds of British soldiers, unaware of the presence of Jesup's men in their position, wandered into the hands of the Americans who captured and disarmed them. This fate befell Major General Riall himself who had been wounded and thought he was going to the rear for medical attention.

Brown heard the gunfire before he received Scot's report. Losing no time, he sent his two remaining brigades forward. Arriving to find the First Brigade shot up and in no condition to advance, Brown placed Ripley's Second Brigade forward of Scott's men. Eventually Porter's Third Brigade arrived and joined the line as well. Ripley's men attacked the British position in the dark, captured the British guns, and drove the red coats off of the hill. The next several hours saw six brave yet futile attempts by the British to recapture the hill.

Time after time, the British lines tramped forward, stopped and formed a long firing line, and traded volleys in the dark with the Americans. The lines of the outnumbered Americans were thinning rapidly and Brown ordered Scott back in to action. Scott formed the remnants of his once proud brigade, now reduced to about 250 men still on their feet, into a column. Henry Leavenworth was the only unwounded regimental commander and he led the column under Scott's orders. Scott brought his column through friendly lines but as it approached the British lines, the column veered to the left. It's route now took it between the two opposing lines and Scott's men received fire in the dark from friend and foe alike. Scott brought his men back into friendly lines and reformed them.

After about 45 minutes, Drummond launched his last attack against the exceedingly thin American lines. Scott led his command, now reduced to 200 men, once again into a counterattack. But this time he asked too much of his troops. Taken under fire immediately, the troops in the rear withdrew while those in front would not advance. Scott brought his men back into American lines and he left them with Leavenworth while he sought out Thomas Jesup. Scott had managed to remain unscathed until a musket ball caught him in the shoulder, knocking him unconscious. Scott was out of the battle and for all practical purposes, out of the war. His conduct at Lundy's Lane was questionable at best. No one could deny his fighting spirit but mistakes such as failing to reconnoiter the battlefield or ordering forlorn assaults aren't so easily forgiven.

As Scott was recovering from his wounds, he was ordered to Washington. Once there, the president gave him command of the 10th Military District which included Washington and Baltimore. He was writing a drill manual when the news arrived that a treaty had been negotiated. He retained his reputation as a war hero as few were willing to criticize his conduct at Lundy's Lane. But it is also clear that Winfield Scott derived much from his experiences along the Niagara River. His career continued on and Scott deservedly won a sterling reputation in Mexico. His "anaconda" plan to win the Civil War was prescient. Among pre-Civil War commanders, Winfield Scott clearly deserves to be included among the very best.

Winfield Scott and the War of 1812

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© Copyright 2005 by Rich Barbuto.
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