To skirmish or not to skirmish . . . I have often played around with the idea of adding skirmishers to Fire & Fury. The thing that intrigued me the most was the organizational side of things and the creation of neat-looking skirmisher stands. After getting into some realistic rules, I realized that I might be raising the rather mundane aspects of skirmishing that were unwarranted in a brigade-level game. This is okay if the goal is a study of skirmish battle, but if I wanted to retain many of the "clean" features of Fire & Fury, I had to be satisfied in some other fashion.
The first consideration that encouraged me was that the firing ranges had always seemed a bit too long for actual combat conditions in the Civil War. Paddy Griffith's initial study of firing ranges in Battle Tactics of the American Civil War argues that we should expect to see fire combat at 200 yards range or less during the Civil War. My empirical studies of firefights at Antietam and Gettysburg tend to support his conclusions, so I would be in favor of cutting the effective fire range in half. Of course there will be those who object to reducing the firing distance since they want to fire at ranges further than colonels thought prudent for combat situations involving lots of battlefield friction.
I suppose this is acceptable as long as we allow troops to only take in sixty rounds of ammunition before they are out (not low on, but out!) of ammunition and have to automatically retreat or charge to be effective. (Perhaps we should increase the chance of running low on ammo by one, every turn a unit fires, regardless of the range issue.)
Justify Ranges
On the other hand, I can justify the current ranges in Fire & Fury with some satisfaction by arguing that what we are really seeing at 400 yards range is the effect of skirmish fire which, in effect, broadcasts the fire of the parent unit beyond the regular combat range of 100 to 200 yards. This seems to be the approach of Napoleon's Battles where units fire over hills out to eight inches to simulate skirmishers operating hundreds of yards in front of their parent units.
If we take this approach, then we should allow the skirmishers to operate 400 yards away from their parent units and to fire out 600 yards from their parents units. A simple change of range would put this rule into effect. Skirmish stands could act colorfully as range markers.
What about full fire power at such ranges? Typical late nineteenth century analysis (i.e. Ardant du Pict and others) shows again and again that skirmishers, though less numerous, have better accuracy at longer ranges than the lines of battle. Without getting too minutely tactical about it, we could fudge and say that the accurate long-range fire is produced by skirmishers, even though we have not taken opposing skirmishers into account.
Of course, we have spent all our time focusing on the casualty-producing effects of skirmishers as the sole criterion of whether or not to incorporate them on the battlefield. This kind of myopia over firepower ("If I kint kill it, it's not important.") to which we constantly fall prey, often prevents us from viewing the wargaming problem from another angle. Rather than judge the effects of skirmishers on their ability to produce casualties, perhaps they had other significant battlefield missions that we could simulate in Fire & Fury.
One skirmisher mission I propose here is to have brigades exert a "battlefield friction" or "combat zone" to their fronts that creates problems for the enemy beyond mere casualties. Others, like George Jeffrey, have developed this before. Perhaps it would work for us here.
If we use a fiction zone, what factors would come into play? Which would be appropriate for use with Fire & Fury? Any of the following come to mind:
Point numbers 5 and 6 already seem accounted for in Fire & Fury. Units often retreat out of enemy musket range when they are forced back from a close action. One must also be out of enemy musket range to resupply with ammunition. Point number 3 is a consequence dealt with during the musket-cannonade phase.
However, a new wrinkle might be to increase the chances of a leader getting hit by sniper fire even if he isn't attached to a brigade, but is within the friction zone. For any leader attached, or detached within the enemy musket range, there is a five percent chance of being hit by a sniper. Of course, when hit, one rolls on the Fallen Leader Table so the actual chance of an adverse result is two and a half percent.
To these I would add that movement, point number 2, should be cut in half when in the "friction zone" of an enemy. This might seem harsh to use as is, but if taken with a doubled, non-combat move, the effects are not so bad (I argue for this approach in another article.)
In addition, the friction zone should affect the enemy's ability to command and control his troops (point number 4) to make the command radius pro-rated in half when it travels through an enemy friction zone.
This leaves only point number 1, fatigue. Although I have more complex rules dealing with fatigue that I use to connect Fire & Fury with a campaign game, one does not need very complex rules here. For every turn beyond a reasonable length of engagement time within an enemy friction zone (say two to three hours, or four to six turns), add a negative modifier to all Maneuver, Firing and Charge die rolls. Have units rest outside the enemy friction zone to recover from the ill effects. Either have units rest only one turn, or pro-rate the number of turns needed according to the degree of fatigue.
We have seen that by taking the morale-effect approach and using friction zones, we can account for the presence of skirmishers without having to create a large sub-game within the brigade game. One might still consider the relative strengths of opposing friction zones; however, keep it simple and elegant!
The simulation of intermittent artillery fire may also be accounted for by the friction zone concept. Consider the following points (again):
It seems to me that artillery would affect point numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4, but not 5 and 6.
Intermittent shelling (some guns firing for a short time on a target) could not demoralize troops; point number 5 would not apply.
Perhaps at the micro level, shelling made resupply difficult, but intermittent fire would not affect resupply at the macro level.
Fatigue, movement, and command/control could all be affected just like being in musket range, so treat these situations the same as being in the musket range friction zones. For leader casualties, make it a one percent chance of being hit when a leader is within an artillery friction zone (one half of one percent final chance: slim, but still there; no immunity at the front.)
By adding these artillery intermittent shelling rules, artillery will take on an appropriate wargaming role that will match one of its battlefield missions: to annoy and harass the enemy at long range. These rules will allow one to simulate the significance of artillery without letting casualty production be the sole criterion for whether or not artillery should have any effect. Note that the silencing of enemy guns will allow one to coordinate and develop one's attacks better; the absence of artillery support will be felt more keenly by the infantry.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.The Friction Zone
And what about the Shelling?
Conclusion
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