Following the wounding of Confederate commander Joe Johnston during the battle of Seven Pines, Confederate States President Jefferson Davis had appointed his military advisor Robert E. Lee to the command of the military forces opposing McClellan on the Peninsula. Lee's army was thereafter known as The Army of Northern Virginia.

Lee's reputation to date could hardly have been described as glowing. The Richmond Press referred to him as "Evacuating Lee." When McClellan heard of the appointment, he commented, "I prefer Lee to Johnston. The former is too cautious and weak under grave responsibility. Personally brave and energetic to a fault, he yet is wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility, and is likely to be timid and irresolute in action."

On the evidence provided by General Lee's first battle, Beaver Dam Creek, such comments may not have appeared too harsh a judgement.

McClellan had one thing right about General Lee: he was energetic. Lee went quickly to work organizing an assault on the Union force threatening Richmond. Deciding against a repetition of Johnston's attack against the Federal left, he switched Confederate attentions to the other flank, and planned victory.

Large Strategic Scenario Map (very slow: 75K)

North of the Chickahominy River, the Union had only FitzJohn Porter's Fifth Corps guarding its right flank. This unit held a strong fortified position along Beaver Dam Creek, but the Fifth Corps was somewhat advanced from the Federal main body and had its right flank in the air. It was this flank, which according to Lee's plan, General "Stonewall" Jackson would assail, flushing Porter from his entrenchments and forcing the Union Fifth Corps to fight in the open against superior numbers. The two Hills and Longstreet were to occupy Porter's attention along Beaver Dam Creek, but no assault was to be delivered until Jackson's movement had compromised Porter's position.

On the evening of the 25th, A.P. Hill had his division camp some two miles northwest of Mechanicsville, in anticipation of Jackson's movement against the Federal right scheduled for dawn the following day.

Patience was not one of Major General Ambrose Powell Hill's virtues. As time wore on and still no word had arrived from Jackson, nor sound of gunfire reached him, "Little Powell" became more and more fretful. With his division lined up before Meadow Bridge and the day draining away, " . . . rather than hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it" Hill " . . .determined to cross at once."

The Battle

At 3:00 pm, June 26th, Confederate troops of Hill's Light Division, led by the brigade of Brigadier General James J. Archer, crossed Meadow Bridge and began to push Federal pickets back towards Mechanicsville.

On hearing the skirmishing between Hill and a Union detachment contesting the Confederate advance into Mechanicsville, the other Hill and Longstreet put their commands onto the road. A damaged bridge, their planned role as supports, and the mistaken belief that Jackson's flanking movement would unhinge the Yankee defense, prevented D.H.Hill and Longstreet from marching with the urgency A.P. Hill would have wished for, had he been aware of what awaited him on the banks of Beaver Dam Creek. As it was, only one brigade from these supporting divisions was up in time to take part in the assault on the Federal battle line, which A.P. Hill was about to make, alone and unsupported.

As Federal forces evacuated Mechanicsville in the face of pressure from the advancing Confederate Light Division, Lee (present on the field with Longstreet's command) sent a courier to Hill with word not to press the attack too closely until Jackson came up.

"Little Powell" wore his red battle shirt that day, and despite Lee's instructions, once again took matters into his own impulsive hands. Holding the brigades of Gregg and Branch in reserve (they remained unengaged all day), Hill threw the rest of his Light Division against the line of Beaver Dam Creek, in an effort to secure the two bridges across the watercourse by means of frontal attack.

The Union troops had prepared their position well. Earthworks protected both the infantry and artillery formations drawn up along the eastern bank of the creek. Having taken the utmost advantage of the favorable terrain, they proceeded to wreak havoc on the reckless Confederate attempt to dislodge them.

At only one point, at the extreme right of the Federal line, did the Rebels succeed in obtaining a foothold on the eastern bank of the creek. They were unable to exploit their position and withdrew under cover of darkness.

Aftermath

Overall Federal commander General McClellan joined Porter during the afternoon of the 26th and was witness to the repulse of the Rebel attack on Beaver Dam Creek that afternoon and evening. In discussions with Porter during the night, McClellan, true to form, sought security rather than opportunity. Despite his 9:00 pm wire to Washington stating "The firing has nearly ceased . . . Victory of today complete against great odds. I almost begin to think we are invincible," Porter was instructed to retire to a new position east of Powhite creek.

What of General Jackson? Stonewall had moved cautiously all day against feeble resistance from Federal cavalry patrols. On reaching his jump-off point at Hundley's Corner, some ten hours behind schedule and within hearing of the guns along Beaver Dam Creek, his troops went into bivouac. The famous Confederate fighting man was apparently debilitated by four nights of extreme sleep deprivation.

The entire episode was something of a Confederate fiasco. Disobedience to orders, a failure of reconnaissance, and the lack of drive displayed by a key-task commander, all contributed to the debacle. Writing after the war, Lieutenant-General Daniel Harvey Hill commented on the action at Beaver Creek Dam:

"We were lavish of blood in those days, and it was thought to be a great thing to charge a battery of artillery or an earthwork lined with infantry . . . The attacks on the Beaver Dam entrenchments, on the heights of Malvern Hill, at Gettysburg, etc., were all grand, but of exactly the kind of grandeur the South could not afford . . . It was unfortunate for the Confederates that the crossing was begun before Jackson got in the rear of Mechanicsville. The loss of that position would have necessitated the abandonment of the line of Beaver Dam Creek, as in fact the next day, it did."

Beaver Dam Creek Order of Battle and Scenario

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