The latest "wrinkle" in A.C.W. wargame rules is to assign values to historical commanders' abilities as battlefield commanders. These values are factored into combat results computations. Most of them are positive values; the last thing needed is a general officer exerting a negative influence on his forces. But how accurate is such a rating system? It is far more complicated than liking the system simply because your favorite general is rated highly or disliking the syslem because the guy who wrote the rules rated your favorite general at the bottom of the list. Paul Stevenson's Wargaming in History: The American Civil War (Sterling Publishing Co., NY, NY; 1990) includes such a listing. Dr. Grady McWhinney compiled such a rating system and Stevenson uses Dr. McWhinney's Attack and Die as a reference. Shortly after Stevenson's book came out I had coffee with Dr. McWhinney. Among the things discussed was his Generalship Rating System. Dr. McWhinney based his rating system, and the values he assigned to each of the commanders listed, on the U.S. Army's Principles of War list. Each of the listed commander's abilities to implement those principles are based on readings from primary and secondary sources of these commander's actions in the field. The principles of war are a listing of ideals for conducting military operations at any level of command. They include the ideals of unity of command, security, surprise, etc. Based on his research, each of the selected commanders were rated on a scale of l to 10, with 10 being the highest va1ue, on each of the princip1es of war. With all of this explanation, Dr. McWhinney put the subject of quantifying the abilities of a general officer into perspective: "Remember that Lee was suffering from a touch of dysentery during the battle of Gettysburg. His effectiveness as a general had to have been affected then. Yet, overall he rates very high. It is not just the man; it is everything about him on that day. Lee had three bad days in Pennsylvania" I asked him of the validity of his rating system. Dr. McWhinney explained that the rating system was a measure; the performances of a given general officer varied from day to day and that whatever the general's rating is for that day is the assigned value for the day, but that such values are in no way fixed. In Stevenson's book he lists three traits; charisma, reliability and aggression. These have some usefulness. "Charisma" deals with the commander's relationship with the rank and file of his command. The higher the value, the greater the influence the commander has over the rank and file to follow orders, to be rallied by him and to absorb casualties. "Reliability" has to do with the commander as a subordinate general. Can he be trusted to carry out orders?, etc. "Aggression": Will he attack or not? Will his presence inspire the rank and file to either attack or hold? The question now is how to quantify these abilities. They need to be relative one to the other and not overly influential upon combat results. That, of course is dependent on the individua1 set of rules. Let's face facts: The actual commanders at a wargames table are the players. In simulating an historically based scenario, the more experienced player should take the side with the greater forces; the more aggressive player should take the side that attacks; tbe more tenacious player should take the defensive position. Unless rules incorporate an order obedience test, all of us rate 10s across the board for the traits of "charisma" (wargame figures do not refuse to obey orders), "reliability" (not to do so is a terrible faux pau) and "aggression" (what, me worry?). Besides, if players are commanding brigades in a simulation of put of an historically based battle, the chances of a corps commander being actual1y present for any length of time are fairly slim. If a corps commander is actually present, that brigade is either the point of the attack and needs encouraging or is on the verge of collapse and needs rallying. The latter is not a very often used starting point for a miniatures wargame scenario. It must be how Jonathan Wainwright felt when MacArthur left Corregedor, if I may mix my metaphors. To accurately portray any given A.C.W. general officer is almost impossible. All we have to go by is what they wrote and, more importantly, what others wrote about them. Even that is sketchy. I know that one of Nathan Bedford Forrest's troopers left no written record on General Forrest. On the application for the widow's pension, that trooper's widow wrote of his experiences in the war, "He was a very intense man. He did not speak about the war." That trooper was my paternal great grandfather. I wonder at what r.p.m. he rotates in his grave every time I smile and say, "He rode with Forrest" Had he left either an oral or written record, I wonder what he would have said and if it would have had any effect on scholars' opinion of Forrest. Rules with a figure scale of 1/20 or 1/25 are too limited in scope to include any use of corps commanders to any degree unless circumstances dictate a higher level commander be present for a specific purpose. Rules with a figure scale of 1/50 need to very careful when dealing with historical commanders. Even Lee was brilliant at Chancellorsville and much less so a few weeks later in Pennsylvania. Back to The Zouave Vol VII No. 2 Table of Contents Back to The Zouave List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 The American Civil War Society This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com