As the Spring campaign of 1864 approached, General U.S. Grant proposed a Federal strategy in the eastern theatre that would threaten more areas than the Confederacy could protect at one time. The Army of the Potomac would engage the Army of Northern Virginia, pinning it down so that it could not send detachments to counter other Federal offensives. These offensives consisted of Franz Sigel's abortive invasion of the Shenandoah Valley (which came to grief at New Market) and the landing of the newly constituted Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred. The Army of the James was under the command of General Benjamin Butler, called 'The Beast" by the Confederacy because of his ungallant treatment of the ladies of New Orleans while serving as military governor there. Butler, like Sigel, was given command because of his political connections. His objectives were to threaten Richmond from the south, taking the city if possible, and to cut the railroad between Richmond and Petersburg. After establishing the Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred, Butler became timid. He worried that an advance toward Richmond would bring Lee and his army down upon him. He therefore decided to undertake the more limited objective of cutting the rail line, advancing from his fortified lines on May 9th, 1864. General William F. "Baldy" Smith's XVIII Corps was to demonstrate toward Petersburg and wreck the rail line there, while Quincy Gilmore's X Corps would tear up the tracks closer to Richmond. As this operation developed, Butler received a message From Secretary of War Stanton. This message stated that Grant had won a great victory and would be advancing to the vicinity of Richmond. Butler was to cross to the north bank of the James to effect a link-up of the two armies. While history has shown Stanton's message to be overly optimistic, Butler complied with his orders by ordering his army back to Bermuda Hundred, preparatory to crossing the river. At this time the Confederates were desperately flying to scrape together a force to counter Butler's threat to the capitol. General P.G.T. Beauregard arrived in Petersburg on May 10th to take command of all forces south of Richmond. Reinforcements were rushed to Petersburg from the Carolinas. Meanwhile, General Robert Ransom covered the southern approaches to Richmond from the fortified position at Drewry's Bluff. When Butler's forces moved out to attack the railroad on May 9th, Ransom saw an opportunity to impose himself between them and their base at Bermuda Hundred. This plan was personally approved by Jefferson Davis. Two brigades were sent south along the Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike to probe the Union right. These forces skirmished with a small Union blocking force late on the afternoon of May 9th. Ransom was not satisfied with the aggressiveness shown by his brigade commanders and decided to personally lead a push forward on the morning of May 10th. Ransom's force moved south between the railroad and the James at the same time that the Union forces began their withdrawal to Bermuda Hundred. As the morning fog lifted, Barton's brigade of Virginians encountered a Union blocking force under the command of Colonel Voris of the 69th Ohio near Chester Station. The Confederates began the battle with a drive down the Richmond Turnpike. A charge by two Virginia regiments very nearly broke Voris' right at the crossroads, capturing the two guns of the 4th New Jersey Light Artillery and routing four companies of the 169th New York. However, they were stopped by confusion resulting from the inter-mixing of the two regiments, a fire in the woods, and long range fire from Howell's artillery at Ware Bottom Church. By the lime the Confederate drive got going again Hawley's brigade had shown up to save the day and recapture the guns. Gracie's brigade, meanwhile, had spent the day ineffectually skirmishing with Howell's men at the church. The battle ended in the early afternoon, when both sides agreed to a truce so wounded men could be pulled from the now-burning woods. Ransom later sacked Barton (many said unfairly) for his performance at this action. THE FORCES Confederate: General Robert Ransom (2) Barton's Brigade (1945 effectives): Brig. Genl. Seth Barton (1) 9th; 14th; 38th (300); 53rd; and 57th Virginia. Gracie's Brigade (2197 effectives): Brig. Genl. Archibald Gracie (1) 41st, 43rd, 59th and 60th Alabama, plus the 23rd Alabama battalion. Artillery Battery (Average): 1 section 12 pdr. Howitzers and 1 section 10 pdr. Parrotts. NOTES: 1. All of the previous troops are considered Average morale and armed with rifled muskets. 2. The artillery battery is conjectural. Ransom's report mentions a battery present between the railroad and the James River on May 10th. I have been unable to determine the identity, much less the composition, of this battery. It may be excluded, or its composition changed at the player's discretion. DEPLOYMENT: Barton's brigade enters on Turn 1 along the north edge of the board in squares Al - A4. Gracie's brigade enters on Turn 2 along the northern edge of squares AS - A8. Units may enter in any formation they wish. Ransom and the artillery (if used) enter with either brigade at the discretion of the Confederate player. UNION General Alfred Terry (1) Voris' Brigade: Col. Alvin Voris (1) 13th Indiana (400); 169th New York; 67th Ohio (565); 1 section 4th New Jersey Light Artillery (Napoleons); 1 section 1st Connecticut Light Artillery (type unknown). Howell's Brigade: Col. Joshua Howell (1) 39th Illinois (550); 11th Maine; 85th Pennsylvania; Battery M, 1st U.S. Artillery. Hawley's Brigade: Col. Joshua Abbot (1) 6th Connecticut; 7th Connecticut (631); 7th New Hampshire (275); 2 sections 1st Connecticut Light Artillery. Unattached Forces:2nd U.S. Colored Cavalry; Artillery section, New York Mounted Rifles (12 pdr. Mountain Howitzers). Notes: 1. All troops are considered Average except the 7th New Hampshire and the 2nd U.S. Colored Cavalry, which are Green. 2. All infantry have rifled muskets except the 7th Connecticut, which is aimed with Spencer repeating carbines, and the 2nd U.S. Colored Cavalry, which is armed with Sharps carbines. 3. The composition of most of the artillery batteries are unknown. Those for which data are available are indicated above. Since they are regular artillery, the 1st U.S. probably have 3" Rifles or Napoleons. DEPLOYMENT: Voris' and Howell's brigades begin the scenario deployed. Voris' brigade may deploy in squares C2, C3, and B4. Howell's brigade may deploy in squares C6, C7, C8 and B8. Howell's infantry can begin with Hasty Works if desired. General Terry and 2 sections of the Connecticut Light Artillery enter on the Richmond Turnpike on Turn 7. Hawley's brigade enters on the same road on Turn 8. Colonel Abbot may enter either with General Terry or with his brigade. The 2nd U.S. Colored Cavalry and the howitzer section of the New York Mounted Rifles enter on the Turnpike on Turn 10. Random entry rules may be used for these units if one really wants to make the Union commander sweat. TERRAIN: All woods are considered to be Light (Broken in JR) with some patches of denser woods (Rough), particularly around the creeks. I believe that the ground rises gradually from west to east because the guns at War Bottom Church were able to provide some long-range fire support to Voris' men at the crossroads. I usually simulate this by putting the church on top of a bill. VICTORY CONDITIONS: Victory is determined by total points. The Union player receives points for the destruction of Confederate units. The Southern player receives points for the destruction of Union units, the crossroads in squares C3-C4 (3 points), the southern exit of the Richmond Turnpike (3 points), and the road exit in square D7 (5 points). Victory determination is calculated as the difference between Confederate and Union victory points. Difference Result less than 0 Union victory 1-3 Draw 4-6 Confederate marginal victory 7 Confederate major victory GAME NOTES This scenario is best played with some sort of hidden movement system, since the Confederates' initial advantages in terms of numbers and position tend to be overwhelming. These advantages can be offset somewhat by making them hunt for the Union positions. The Union player starts outnumbered by a force that can interpose itself between his two brigades. Howell's force has a better position, but Voris' will be more quickly reinforced. The Union player must use hidden movement to play cat and mouse with the Confederate. His reinforcements are substantial, but he may be forced to sacrifice a brigade to stall the Confederates until a counter-attack can be mounted. The Confederate starts in an admirable position, but must move quickly to exploit it before the Union reinforcements arrive. He must decide upon which road he will concentrate his attack and then stick to his plan. While he cannot ignore either Union force, he can mask one and shift regiments between his brigades to bring an overwhelming force to bear at one point. However, time and the terrain are against him. Being too cautious can easily lose him the game. BIBLIOGRAPHY Robertson, William G. Back Door To Richmond. Univ. of Delaware Press, Newark, DE 1987. Official Records, Vol. 36, part 2; Vol. 51, part 2. Schiller, Herbert M., "Beast in a Bottle: The Bermuda Hundred Campaign, May 1864." Blue & Gray Magazine. Vol. 7, Issue #1. Back to The Zouave Vol IV No. 4 Table of Contents Back to The Zouave List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1990 The American Civil War Society This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com