This article will serve only to briefly touch upon the life, character and military achievements of General Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson, who many consider to have been the best of the Confederate leaders. Many historians and students of the conflict often ask themselves, "What if Jackson had not been killed at Chancellorsville?" We will of course never know the answer to this question, but it seems within the realm of possibility that the South could have won at Gettysburg if Jackson had been there. If this had happened, a great deal of the post-Gettysburg history of the war could have been drastically altered. Let us now take a brief look at General Jackson's life and military career.
Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born on 21 January 1824. His parents died when he was very young; his father when he was three and his mother when he was seven. He was subsequently raised by some of his father's relatives. Young Jackson proved to be a hard working lad on the family farm. His early life was demanding and tough, but a good one for the future soldier. It was during his early childhood that he began complaining of some mysterious stomach ailment for which the physicians could find no cause. His health became and would continue to concern him for the rest of his life and be the source of some of his strangest habits. By the time of the Valley Campaign, his diet would consist primarily of plain bread or corn bread, raspberries milk and a seemingly endless supply of lemons which he was often seen sucking on. The source of all those lemons seems to be one of the unsolved mysteries of the war.
Young Jackson was described by those who knew him as thoughtful, polite, exceedingly affectionate, generous, cheerful, truthful, of indomitable will and undoubted courage. He was a tireless, matter of fact type of person. He was not brilliant, but a rather slow learner, although what he got into his head he thoroughly absorbed and never forgot. At the age of 19, he sought and obtained an appointment to the Military Academy at West Point.
Jackson's tenure at West Point began in July of 1842 and he initially had a great deal of difficulty due to his poor educational background. His hard work and determination enabled him to steadily improve his grades and impressed his instructors as well. He was so thorough in his efforts to fully understand his lessons that he was often several days behind the rest of the class.
At the end of the first year he ranked 51st in his class of 72, but steadily climbed upward in the ranks and graduated 17th in the class. Some of his fellow classmates felt that if Jackson had had another year left until graduation, he could have finished at the top of his class. During his stay at the Academy, he was observed to be very serious, relatively unsociable, quiet, dedicated to his duty, and while indifferent of the opinions of others he was quick to offer sympathy to a fellow cadet in need. He was also noted to be absolutely merciless in his condemnation of those who had been found guilty of dishonorable conduct.
On 30 June 1846 Jackson received the brevet rank of Second Lieutenant of Artillery and was ordered to join the First Artillery Regiment in Mexico. Here he performed well at the battles of Vera Cruz, Contreras and Chapultepec, and within eighteen months of joining the First Artillery he was breveted Major. He spent nine months in Mexico while the slow peace talks dragged on, and it is during this time that he developed his profoundly strong religious beliefs. After peace with Mexico was declared, Jackson's battery returned to the United States, taking up garrison duty at Fort Hamilton on Long Island.
VMI
In March of 1851, Jackson resigned his commission in the U. S. Army to accept a position as Professor of Artillery Tactics and Natural Philosophy at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia. Bored with peacetime garrison duty, he was eager to get started in his new profession. His main subjects of instruction were optics, mechanics and astronomy. He used his spare time at VMI wisely, and was often found in the library studying about the Napoleonic Wars, one of his favorite subjects. During his tenure at VMI he joined the Presbyterian Church and married twice (his first wife died only 14 months after the wedding). By this point in his life, religion influenced every facet of his life and he began to follow Biblical guidelines to a point that many would consider fanaticism. He was not a popular instructor with his students, being too stern and serious for their liking.
After ten years of instructing the cadets at VMI, secession and impending war ended the last peaceful period of Jackson's life. On 21 April, 1861 he was ordered to Richmond, made a Colonel of Confederate infantry, and sent to Harper's Ferry where he was given a brigade of Virginia militia to drill and prepare for battle. Under Jackson's guidance, this unit of militia would soon prove to be one of the most elite formations of the entire war.
On 17 June, 1861 Jackson was promoted to Brigadier General in Gen. Joe Johnston's Army. This occured the day after Jackson made an impressive showing against a Union force much larger than his own at Falling Waters. On 18 June, Johnston ordered Jackson to march to Manassas Junction to engage Gen. McDowell's advancing Federal force of 31,000 men.
In the ensuing battle, the First Battle of Bull Run, the Federals executed a slowly developing envelopment of the Confederate left flank which initially drove the Rebels back to Henry House Hill, where Jackson was just now timely deploying his arriving brigade. Jackson and his men put up a stubborn resistance and the Federal advance was slowed. It is at this moment that Confederate Gen. Barnard Bee, seeing Jackson's defensive line as well as his own routing troops, pointed towards Jackson's position and said, "Look at Jackson's Brigade; it stands like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!"
Thus two nicknames were instantly born: "Stonewall" Jackson and his "Stonewall" Brigade. Jackson not only held his ground but launched a savage counterattack that helped nudge the Federals into headlong retreat towards Washington. The Confederate forces were too exhausted and disorganized to pursue.
Jackson was promoted to Major General on 7 October, 1861 and sent to the the Shenandoah Valley to direct operations in this critical area. His subsequent campaign here, from October 1861 to 9 June 1862, ranks as one of the most brilliant in the annals of military history. The campaign was one of strategic diversion intended to draw troops from General George B. McClellan's Army, currently advancing towards the Confederate capital of Richmond.
During the period up through April of 1862, Jackson conducted an undistinguished winter campaign in the bitterly cold mountains of West Virginia. Jackson failed to capture the isolated Federal garrisons at Romney and Bath, but succeeding in capturing a considerable amount of enemy supplies.
The Valley
Early in March the activity increased as Union General Banks advanced up the Valley and occupied Winchester, which Jackson evacuated on 11 March. The Federal Divisions of Shields, Williams and Sedgwick now occupied Strasburg, Winchester and Harper's Ferry respectively. In accordance with Gen. McClellan's plans, Banks began withdrawing from the Valley to reinforce McClellan. Jackson, learning of Banks' impending departure, force marched to Kernstown to attack him. Jackson, outnumbered by over two to one, was repulsed, but the agressiveness in which he had conducted the attack convinced the Union leaders that Jackson either had a larger force nearby or he was to be receiving reinforcements very shortly.
So, as a result, Banks was sent back to the Valley along with Blencker's Division as well. In addition, McDowell's entire corps of 40,000 men was withheld from McClellan in order to defend Washington from a possible Rebel attack. The Federals now established three separate and independent commands under Generals McDowell, Banks and Fremont.
Jackson withdrew up the Valley, unable to cope with the superior numbers of his enemy. By 26 April, Banks was in possession of New Market and Harrisburg. Jackson force marched to Swift Run Gap, which placed him in a position to outflank Banks' forces and therefore forced Banks to deal with him before he could advance any further. Jackson's forces were increased to a total of 17,000 men at this time by the addition of the Divisions of Ewell and Johnson.
Milroy's Federal Division advanced toward Staunton and Jackson, aware of how disasterous a junction of the forces of Fremont and Banks would be, left Ewell's Division to pin Banks and attacked and defeated Milroy at McDowell on 8 May, 1862. On 14 May, Jackson was enroute back to Harrisburg. After the transfer of some of his troops to McDowell, Banks was left in the Valley with only 8,000 men at Strasburg. Jackson advanced to Front Royal and crushed the 1,000 man garrison there on 23 May. Jackson now advanced towards Middletown but was slowed by Gordon's rearguard, which allowed Banks' force to reach Winchester on the night of 24 May. Banks' force was defeated here the next day and he retreated through Martinsburg and crossed the Potomac on 26 May. Jackson continued towards Harper's Ferry and concentrated his force at Halltown, three miles away from Harper's Ferry.
At this point, the authorities in Washington were infuriated by Jackson's success and became obsessed with the idea of trapping and severely defeating him. Thus, Lincoln and Stanton began personally directing the military operations of the Union forces in the field.
McDowell's Corps was ordered to link up with Fremont's forces at Strasburg while Banks was to press Jackson from the rear. Jackson, leaving the Stonewall Brigade to check Banks, began to withdraw on 30 May. Enroute by train to Winchester, Jackson was stopped by a courier who advised him that McDowell had just captured Front Royal. By noon of 1 June, Jackson's force of 15,000 men had moved through Strasburg and therefore avoided the Federal trap. The three Federal generals pursued Jackson up the Valley and valuable time was bought for his swiftly retreating troops by a series of critical rearguard actions conducted by the forces of his cavalry leader, Gen. Turner Ashby, who was killed in one such action on 6 June. Jackson clashed with Shields' advanced guard at Port Republic and was almost captured.
On the night of 7 June, Jackson, situated dangerously between two enemy columns, decided to strike a final blow. He elected to pin Fremont's 15,000 men with Ewell's 6,500 men and attempt to overwhelm Shields' 5,000 men with the balance of his forces at Port Republic. His plan worked perfectly, and after this brilliant victory the Federal forces were withdrawn from the Valley, and Jackson was ordered to march his forces to join those of Gen. Robert E. Lee on the Peninsula for the impending Seven Days' Battles.
Peninsula
On 10 June Jackson's troops occupied Swift Run Gap and Lee envisioned a plan for using Jackson's force with those near Richmond to destroy Gen. Porter's relatively isolated corps at Mechanicsville. Jackson was to march his forces in such a way as to come in on Porter's right flank while A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill and Longstreet attacked Porter's front. A. P. Hill's Division was to launch his attack simultaneously with that of Jackson. Jackson, very uncharacteristically, was late arriving on Porter's flank (due to felled trees and burned bridges left in his path by the Federals, opposition by enemy skirmishers at every position which afforded them favorable cover, and Jackson's unfamiliarity with the terrain), and A. P. Hill, growing more impatient as time dragged on, went ahead and ordered his men to attack. Hill's Division suffered about 2,000 casualties in this bloody assault.
Jackson finally arrived at Hundley's Corner at about 4:30 P. M. and ordered his men to bivouac, even though the sound of discharging cannons could clearly be heard in the distance three miles away. Some have since been critical of Jackson for not marching to the sound of the guns, but Jackson knew that the position he now held rendered Porter's untenable and that the Federals would have to retreat during the night. Jackson and his men were exhausted upon reaching Hundley's Corner, and perhaps he felt that his men could accomplish nothing more this day. One of Jackson's aides said that Jackson had gotten only 10 hours of sleep in the last 4 days. It must be noted that it was nearing dark and a dense forest lay between his position and Mechanicsville with no roads running in the desired direction, so Jackson must have reasoned that he could not possibly be in position to attack Porter until morning at the earliest. Thus Porter, having learned of Jackson's position on his flank, and true to Jackson's prediction, withdrew to Gaines' Mill during the night.
Porter's new position at Gaines' Mill was a formidable one. Lee recognized that Porter's line of retreat was open to attack from Cold Harbor and Jackson was soon on his way there. Once again the Confederate assaults suffered from a lack of coordination. Jackson's march to Cold Harbor was delayed by felled trees, enemy sharpshooters and his use of a roundabout route toward his destination.
After Jackson's arrival and deployment, the Confederates attacked but, due to an error by a young staff officer, many of Jackson's troops did not initially take part in the assault. However, the attack was quite strong nonetheless, and the enemy were repulsed from their defensive positions. Porter retreated and McClellan shifted his base of operations from the York River to the James River. Some called this a strategic withdrawal and others called it a "grand skedaddle".
Gen. Lee at this point planned a set of strategic maneuvers designed to destroy McClellan's army in detail. But once again he saw his plans go awry due to faulty staff work and lack of coordination between his attacking divisions, especially at White Oak Swamp on 30 June. McClellan withdrew to a very strong position at Malvern Hill where Lee attacked him on 1 July. This ill-advised battle added another 5,500 men to Lee's casualty lists and in effect brought the campaign on the Peninsula to a close.
Jackson's performance during the campaign must have no doubt disappointed Lee, and his poor showing has been blamed on his exhaustion resulting from the rigorous Valley campaign. Jackson on several occasions was called on to march to and attack the enemy's flank and it seems evident that in this he was not his usual model of efficiency and agressiveness. One must, however, remember the previously mentioned difficulties which he encountered on these marches and realize that any officer would have had problems complying with his orders under similar adverse circumstances.
Cedar Mountain
In early August, the scattered Federal Corps of Gen. John Pope's 50,000 strong U. S. Army of Virginia began advancing towards Gordonsville and Lee sent Jackson with 24,000 men rapidly to this area in hopes of destroying the first enemy corps to arrive. This led to a meeting engagement at Cedar Mountain on 9 August, in which Jackson once again fought his old Valley adversary Gen. Banks, who had only 9,000 men. Banks attacked before Jackson had all his forces up and deployed, and Jackson was in serious jeopardy until the arrival and attack of A. P. Hill's Light Division, which sent Banks' tired forces into headlong retreat.
In late August, with Pope's Army at Manassas, Lee and Jackson met to plan an offensive against him. Jackson, with 20,000 men marched 62 miles in two days to destroy Pope's supply base at Manassas and positioned his force astride of Pope's supply line. Pope ordered his forces northward and he met Jackson in fierce fighting on 28 and 29 August near Groveton. Jackson skillfully pinned Pope's force until Longstreet arrived with his 30,000 men and the stage was set for the 2nd Battle of Bull Run. Pope attacked piecemeal followed by vicious counterattacks from the Rebels, which broke the Federal line and Pope retreated towards Centreville. The way was now clear for a Confederate invasion of the North.
On 4 September 1862 the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River and invaded Maryland. In order to open a supply line to the Shenandoah Valley, Lee sent Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry. After the nearly disasterous battle at South Mountain, Lee was preparing to withdraw back into Virginia. Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry gave Lee renewed hope, so he ordered the army to concentrate at Sharpsburg.
Here the opposing armies slugged it out for 12 hours on 17 September in what would become the bloodiest day of the war. Jackson's forces held the left portion of the line and chocked the uncoordinated assaults of Hooker's, Mansfield's and Sumner's Corps, then launched a counterattack which was repulsed with great loss. Jackson's tenacious defense, McClellan's lack of initiative and the timely arrival of A. P. Hill's Light Division late in the afternoon saved Lee's Army from almost certain defeat. Lee retreated into Virginia on the night of 18-19 September. McClellan sent a pursuit force out on the 20th, but Jackson defeated it. This brought the Antietam campaign to a close.
In November of 1862, the Army of the Potomac, now under the command of Gen. Burnside, was advancing southward cautiously. Lee decided to use the excellent defensive terrain on the south bank of the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg to contest the crossing. Jackson was still in the Shenandoah Valley at this time and did not join Lee until 30 November. It is interesting to note that Jackson was opposed to defending the Rappahannock and was instead in favor of withdrawing to the line of the North Anna, which would have allowed the Confederate forces to strike the enemy's right flank as they advanced forward for 36 miles. If the Union army could thus be compelled to retreat, their destruction was a definite possibility. Jackson told D. H. Hill, " I am opposed to fighting on the Rappahannock. We will whip the enemy, but gain no fruits of victory. I have advised the line of the North Anna, but have been overruled."
Jackson's Corps defended the right side of Lee's defensive line and his troops were skillfully deployed. Many of his men were hidden from enemy view and about two-thirds of his force was placed in reserve. On 13 December, Burnside ordered his troops to attack. Gen. Franklin crossed the river with 50,000 men and the Divisions of Meade and Gibbon assaulted Jackson's position and were repulsed. Longstreet's Corps, defending the left of Lee's line, repulsed numerous piecemeal Federal attacks along their front as well. Jackson ordered a counterattack which subsequently wrecked the Divisions of Meade, Gibbon and Birney, and demoralized many thousands more Union soldiers who witnessed it. Burnsides' army withdrew on 15 December, and this brought the activity in this theatre to a virtual halt for the remainder of the winter.
On 26 January, Gen. Hooker succeeded Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker soon initiated a plan which he hoped to use to drive Lee back toward Richmond by making a wide strategic envelopment by way of Kelly's Ford. Hooker sent one-third of his 134,000 men on this turning movement, kept one-third of his men at Fredericksburg to pin Lee, and kept the rest as a reserve to reinforce either wing as deemed necessary. Lee boldly split his force in the face of the enemy as well, leaving Gen. Early with 10,000 men to hold Sedgwick at Fredericksburg and marched to oppose Hooker with the balance of his army. Hooker learned of Lee's maneuver and halted his turning force in the heavily wooded Wilderness, thus surrendering the initiative to Lee. J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry learned that Hooker's right flank was exposed, and Lee quickly sent Jackson and 26,000 men to strike the exposed flank while he pinned Hooker with his 17,000 men. Jackson's attack crumbled Howard's Corps and they routed with heavy losses.
"I know not how to replace him."
Just after dark, Jackson rode forward to reconnoiter the enemy positions in preparation for ordering a night attack. Upon his return, the Rebel pickets opened fire in the darkness and mortally wounded their beloved commander. His left arm was amputated and he died eight days later of pneumonia resulted from his wounds. Jackson's death shook Lee badly, and of him he said, "I know not how to replace him."
Jackson's leadership qualities and methods deserve mention before this article is brought to a close. He was exceedingly strict with his inferior officers and demanded of them exact compliance with his orders, which on more than one occasion caused him to be at odds with some of his subordinates, including Richard Garnett and A. P. Hill. He saw to it that he, as well as his officers, treated the rank and file with tact and consideration. He was a strict disciplinarian with his troops and carried out several death sentences to demonstrate that he would not tolerate any foolishness. But even so, his men had full faith in his justice and they did not dislike him because of it in the least. Jackson treated the humblest privates with the same courtesy that he showed Gen. Lee himself. The men loved him dearly and cheered him whenever he rode by.
Jackson was a leader whose real talent shone when operating as an independent commander. He possessed an iron will, a sense of unwavering purpose, and carried out his orders to the letter. Morally and physically fearless, he had every quality needed to achieve success in war. He permitted no obstacle to sway him from his appointed path, and in seizing an opportunity or in following up a victory he was a bundle of untiring energy.
His principles of strategy were to secure the initiative, however inferior his force; to create opportunities and to utilize them; to waste no time and to give the enemy no rest. He once told Gen. Imboden, "There are two things never to be lost sight of by a military commander: Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow, for an army routed becomes panic-stricken and can then be destroyed by half their number. The other rule is to never fight against heavy odds if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible."
Another revealing Jackson quote is: "War means fighting. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to throw up breastworks, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts, but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end. To move swiftly, strike vigorously and secure all the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war. "
Even though his main emphasis was on maneuver, he was not a general who hoped to win victories without bloodshed. He never spared his men when he felt a great achievement was at hand, and he was never content with anything less than the complete annihilation of the enemy. He never dreamed of retreat until he had committed his last reserve. His victories were won more by sweat than by sheer hard fighting. His enemy, usually surprised and feeling outnumbered, was beaten before a shot was fired.
On the March
Jackson was well known for the Herculean marches he could get from his men. His "foot cavalry" often marched 30 or more miles a day and his methods of achieving this have been preserved. He let his men stop to rest often, but for only brief periods, and he preferred for them to lie down during these rest periods because, he said, " A man rests all over when he lies down. "
Despite his energy, he could be very patient and cautious. He also had an incredible talent for divining the strength and intentions of his enemy. His estimates of the condition of the Federal Army after Bull Run, Malvern Hill, 2nd Bull Run, Sharpsburg and the first day of Fredericksburg were absolutely correct.
While he was never surprised himself, he never failed to surprise his enemies. He knew the detrimental effect of his sudden and unexpected attacks on the morale of the Federal generals and troops. He was quick to make an enemy pay for his mistakes. His maneuvers were always sound and often brilliant, for he never failed to pick out the key point of a position or make the best use of the terrain.
When on the defensive his flanks were always strong and his troops concealed whenever possible both from enemy view and fire. On the offensive he invariably attacked when least expected to do so. He handled the three combat arms in the closest combination and with maximum effect. His troops were always deployed in such a way as to be instantly ready to dash forward and pursue a retreating foe.
Gen. John B. Gordon wrote this of Jackson: "What seemed reckless audacity was the essence of prudence. His eye had caught at a glance the entire situation, and his genius, with marvelous celerity and accuracy, had weighed all the chances of success or failure. While, therefore, others were slowly feeling their way, or employing in detail insufficient forces, Jackson, without for one moment doubting his success, hurled his army like a thunderbolt against the opposing lines, and thus ended the battle at a single blow."
Napoleon once said, "The greatest general is he who makes the fewest mistakes." Based on this, Jackson must rank quite high on the list of history's greatest military commanders. He made the most of his opportunities and yet offered his opponents no opportunities to do him harm. His death caused irreparable harm to the Confederate cause, and Lee sorely missed him on every battlefield for the remainder of the war.
His loss was the turning point of the war in my opinion, not the Battle of Gettysburg as many believe. Jackson, Lee's greatest captain, could not and would not ever be replaced, and on numerous subsequent battlefields after his death, many of the officers and soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia were heard to exclaim, "Oh for another Jackson!"
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