"I have never witnessed heavier musketry in my life;'
--Colonel Simon Burns of Parsons' Missouri Division."
NARRATIVE: THE CAMDEN EXPEDITION
Major General Frederick Steele's "Camden Expedition" is little more than a foot-note to the great American Civil War campaigns of 1864, yet for the 5000 or so men who were casualties as a result of it, an important campaign it was indeed.
Steele's Spring expedition into central Arkansas was dictated by a Union strategy aimed at the destruction of Confederate power in the Trans-Mississippi region. The city of Shreveport located on the Red River in northwest Louisiana, was the administrative seat of that power, and the target of the 1864 Federal offensive west of the great river. Major General Nathaniel Banks planned the details of the campaign, and his strategy looked good on paper,
In early March, Banks himself would advance north along the west bank of the Red River toward Schreveport with a land force of 28,000 men. This army would be supported by a powerful river flotilla commanded by Rear Admiral David Porter. Simultaneously, General Steele would march south upon Shreveport from his base at Little Rock, Arkansas. This column would number 11,000 of all arms. The Rebel Trans-Mississippi army would be caught between these converging pincers and crushed, and Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith's military government would be ousted from its stronghold. It would not happen that way.
History records that Banks and his cronies were enthusiastic to open their campaign on the Red River, but Fred Steele was disgruntled at the prospect of a full scale movement of his forces into the forbidding rebel environs of central and southern Arkansas. He tried to convince superiors that this area had long been stripped of the supplies required to sustain a large body of troops. He pointed out that everything needed by the expedition would have to be hauled along on wagons. These cumbersome trains would embarrass and slow the movement of his column, and would be especially vulnerable in an area known to harbor numerous guerrilla bands, not to mention significant regular Confederate cavalry formations.
To top off his list of objections, Steele complained that his operations would have to commence at the height of the rainy season in order to render proper support to Banks, thus assuring that the progress of his force would be further impaired by the muddy road conditions that would certainly exist. But all Steele's remonstrances and fore-warnings went unheeded by decision makers intent upon crushing the fiesty Trans-Mississippi rebels, so he dutifully and diligently set about organizing his troops for the offensive, and on March 23, 1864, his main column marched south out of Little Rock.
Though delays were encountered, and hard to replace supplies consumed while waiting for outlying reinforcements to join, the first seventy miles of the advance went well. Resistance was at first light. Bank's had taken the field three weeks prior to Steele, and all Confederate infantry in Arkansas had been ordered to Louisiana to oppose him. Left with only cavalry with which to defend Arkansas, it took the Graycoat commander, Major General Sterling Price, a while to organize his widely dispersed mounted force for effective defense.
It was not until April 2 that Rebel resistance stiffened as the Union advance collided with hard-fighting troopers of Brigadier John S. Marmaduke's Missouri division near Elkin's Ferry on the Little Missouri River. From that time on, daily skirmishing, often threatening to escalate into general engagements, hampered the Bluecoat advance. Gradually, Price was concentrating against Steele the entire Rebel cavalry strength in his department; seven brigades totalling perhaps 6000 veteran troopers.
By April 12, Steele became convinced that further advance at the present time was not practical. Not only was rebel resistance fierce, but all supplies had been exhausted during the time it had taken the column to press forward one hundred miles, and Schreveport was still another hundred miles away. Though foraging parties ranged miles from the main body in search of fodder, barely enough was accumulated to keep the stock alive. The army was slowly starving to death.
It was therefore necessary to postpone offensive operations pending receipt of additional supplies brought forward from Federal bases at Little Rock and Pine Bluff. Consequently, on the 12th Steele feinted at the enemy and then rapidly countermarched his army due east, bound for the fortified town of Camden, located on the west bank of the Ouachita River. Here he intended to "hole up" until resupplied. He would then make Camden into a defensible advance base, and would resume his movement upon Shreveport. it was a good thing for Steele that the supply situation compelled him to retire to Camden when he did, because the Southern infantry was on its way back to Arkansas. On April 8th, Major General Richard Taylor's ferocious and well led little Trans-Mississippi army had whipped the tar out of Banks' men at Sabine Cross Road. The next day Taylor struck Banks again at Pleasant Hill, but after a desperate conflict, was repulsed. Still, these two hard blows took all the fight out of Banks, and he gave up any semblance of offensive action, and retired toward Grand Ecore, posing no further serious threat to "Kirby Smithdom."
Haggling
After haggling with Taylor for several days over how best to exploit the Greycoat's success against Banks, Smith assumed personal command of most of Taylor's infantry, three slim infantry divisions numbering around 6000 muskets, and set out to reinforce Price. The Rebel chieftain had determined to destroy Steele's exposed army. On April 16, Smith marched from Schreveport bound for Arkansas. On that same day Steele's bedraggled adventurers shuffled thankfully into Camden. Instead of improving, however, the plight of the expeditionary force worsened in the days following arrival at the supposed refuge.
On April 18, Steele's ability to gather even meager supplies was crippled when a foraging train of 198 wagons was set upon by Marmaduke's troopers at a place called Poison Springs. Although the train was escorted by 1100 troops of all arms, all the wagons were burned or captured. Of the escort, 301 became casualties and the balance fled back to Camden in disorder, leaving four guns in the hands of the enemy.
Still smarting from the loss of so many wagons and men at Poison Springs, On the 19th Steele recieved the evil tidings regarding Banks discomfiture and subsequent retreat. The Union commander began to contemplate the bleak possibility that all the rebel legions might descend upon his rather modest force.
Fred Steele was clearly in one hell of a fix; but still an unkind fate was not through raining blows upon him and his soldiers. On April 25th, a full fledged disaster convinced the emotionally battered Federal commander it was time to go home to Little Rock and abandon this hopeless and costly adventure that he had all along opposed.
Steele had on the 24th ordered his primary provision train toward Pine Bluff under heavy guard. A full brigade of infantry plus cavalry and artillery, in all 1600 troops, defended the train of 245 wagons. The next day, near Mark's Mill, this convoy was attacked by Brigadier General James Fagan with a large force of cavalry. After a severe and bloody fight that cost the Johnnies 500 casualties, nearly the entire Bluecoat force was captured or destroyed. Only about 300 defenders escaped. All the wagons and guns were taken. This event made it impossible for the Northerners to forage for supplies. Steele had no alternative but to flee for the safety of Little Rock. Therefore, on the evening of the 25th, after destroying all non-essential supplies, Steele's army slipped silently across the Ouachita and headed north to safety; stomachs growling all the way.
The troops of Sterling Price and Smith entered Camden the next day, but having no bridging train, it was the morning of the 28th before the Southerners were able to take up the chase. Once across the Ouachita, however, a killing pace was set, and the rebels rapidly closed on Steele's rear elements.
On the afternoon of April 29th, Steele's column reached the flooded and impassable Saline River, the last natural obstacle standing between the Federal expeditionary force and Little Rock. Once across this river, the Unionists would be safe from further pursuit, and could breath easier.
By 4:15 pm, engineers had succeeded in throwing a ponton bridge across the swollen stream at Jenkin's Ferry. All through the late afternoon and evening exhausted soldiers toiled to get the army trains and artillery through the mucky Saline bottoms and across the river. All effort was in vain. The heavy impedimenta of the army could not be gotten to safety prior to the arrival of the enemy pursuers. The troops of Fred Steele had been brought to bay. With hard-hitting Rebel infantry fast approaching, the Bluecoats could only face about and prepare to defend the bridgehead against the inevitable enemy onslaught. Thankfully, the Confederates could not attack until morning. The rearguard, under Brigadier General Frederick Salomon, would have time to organize a defense. While the stoic rearguard hopefully fought the Johnnies to a standstill, the balance of the army would struggle across the river to safety.
At dawn the next day the Graycoats began to appear in force. Colonel Colton Green's tattered horsemen were first to arrive, and soon engaged Salomon's vidette's in a lively skirmish. In a few hours the head of the infantry column, Churchill's hard-bitten Arkansas division, came onto the field, and the battle flaired up in earnest.
The historical engagement was a bloody and confused slugging match that will not be covered in detail here. I have described the situation that existed at the moment our scenario begins, and have therefore accomplished my purpose. Those wishing to read about the battle itself are referred to Ludwell Johnson's excellent THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN; POLITICS AND COTTON IN THE CIVIL WAR, which has recently been reprinted by Butternut Press. Another good description of the tactical battle appeared several years ago in CIVIL WAR TIMES ILLUSTRATED. Unfortunately, I cannot seem to lay hands on my copy to tell readers what issue it was in. Sorry.
It is unclear who actually won this bitter little struggle in the remote forests of central Arkansas; both sides of course claimed victory. Steele's army did escape destruction along the west bank of the Saline, but lost 2800 men, nine guns, and over 600 wagons in the campaign. The accuracy of Confederate records always leave something to be desired, but it appears they may have lost up to 2300 men in the campaign, Up to 1000 of these casualties may have fallen on the field of Jenkin's Ferry. It is clear that both sides suffered, but Steele's Arkansas army was for all practical purposes immobilized by the losses it sustained in men and material. This reduced state of Federal power in Arkansas was an important factor that made it possible for Sterling Price to invade Missouri in the fall of 1864.
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