This Hallowed Ground

A Conceptual Approach to Rules

By Stephen A. Thomas of 19th Century Miniatures

Editor's Note: 19th Century Miniatures is one of our Corporate Sponsors and Steve was kind enough to send me a copy of THIS HALLOWED GROUND, complete with orders of battle (Series I) for Second Bull Run, Gettysburg, and Perryville. After reading the rules thoroughly, I asked Steve to write a short article giving the rational for the rules set. The following article fulfills that request.

I have not played a scenario with the rules, making it unfair for me to give an objective review. However, for those who enjoy ON TO RICHMOND, I can say that THIS HALLOWED GROUND follows many of the same concepts, but has improved on the mechanisms and is, in my opinion, much more historically sound. This rules set deserves a try from those of you who enjoy playing large scale scenarios, but feel that OTR is perhaps a bit too simplistic. To order a copy of the rules, refer to the ad found in this issue. Now to the article by Stephen Thomas:

After sending a copy of THIS HALLOWED GROUND (THG) to the editor for review, he requested that I explain the concept of the rules. So, I propose to expose the basis of my rules writing ability - or lack thereof, depending on your point of view.

Before I delve into the depths of THG, I would like to wack a bailiwick of mine. That is, the difference of perception of rules writers regarding the fundamental idea of "grand tactical". As you know, there are many rules covering the ACW period. Some of them purport to be grand tactical. Where they fail is in the writer's inability to let go of the small unit concept.

If I were to fight a battle - small unit action - which depicted the confrontation between two regiments and one battery of artillery, I would use the company as the base of maneuver, and the artillery piece or section for the artillery element. As my scope of involvement increases and I view the battle on a larger level, the battalion/section become my elements of action. Once I reach the grand tactical level, I must increase my element of maneuver accordingly. It is no longer a battalion or regiment, but a brigade and a full battery. Some rules continue to follow the small unit action syndrome and use the battalion/section in large scale actions. I firmly believe this to be in error. One cannot purport to command a corps or army and at the same time become concerned in the activities of a single regiment or artillery section. The overall view must be enlarged to encompass the entire battle. This can only be done by using the brigade or a larger formation.

That leads me into the reasons for the creation of THIS HALLOWED GROUND. We wanted to play the entire battle of Gettysburg and the like, not just disjointed sections of the battle. So, we had to enter the area of grand tactics. The one element of gaming that I dislike is order writing. 1 feel that my time can be better spent than writing orders to offset any rules-lawyer challenge. Having spent the last 10 years in ACW re-enacting in the role of private on up to battalion commander, I have obtained a feel for the problems experienced by the commanders of the era. This I have translated into the rules in a number of different ways, one of which is orders/time. Most rules treat officers as having unlimited time to formulate their thinking and moving their men. I must tell you that, while drill books are fine and troops look pretty on parade, it is an entirely different situation on the battlefield. While we do not use real bullets, re-enacting, done correctly, is the closest thing anyone alive will come to real ACW combat conditions. One loses immediate control of the unit once the blood is up. Control of troops, even in shoulder-to-shoulder formations is anything but easy. Because of that, we have eliminated order writing and use Move Option Markers. These allow a latitude of moves to the commander. After all, YOU the player, are not the regimental or battery commander. You are in the role of playing the army or corps commander, ordering the units to perform a task. It is up to the unit commander to judge which formation, approach, etc. it would be best accomplished in.

Each unit (brigade, battery) is assigned one of a set of move options, each -with its own allowed actions. That action must be followed for the entire duration of the turn. Each side places its markers face down, allowing for a little of the fog of war concept, not really knowing what your opponent is going to do. Incorrectly placed markers must be followed also, resulting in unexpected deviations from plans.

In our evaluation of the melee or close action, we felt that in grand tactical terms, what is important is the result of the action, not the various-little components that interacted to create resultant action. Thus, the usual die rolling and chart checking associated with rules dealing with pre-melee morale fighting, post melee morale, etc. have been eliminated/combined into one operation. Most all of the close action modifiers are a mixture of physical and psychological factors. We believe that morale is the most important factor in the unit's ability to stay on the field. Hence, we have placed great weight of thought and writing into the impact of morale in the various affected actions.

Morale, with Brigade Effectiveness, judges the unit's losses on a two tier system-- the actual manpower loss due to casualties, straggling, skulking, etc. and the psychological impairdness associated with combat. Once Brigade Effectiveness has been reached, the unit suffers a penalty which can only be removed by the unit going off the field and re-fitting in every sense of the word. Once refitted, stands of casualties are replaced as the unit regains its psychological status. A player can leave his units in the. action beyond their ability to effectively carry out their ordert, but with a penalty which subjects the unit to even greater possible loss in combat.

This points out another feature of the rules. Unlike most rules on the market, reserves become extremely important - almost indispensable. Battles revolve around hours of combat, not just one big push. Units must be fed in to relieve spent comrades. Reserves mit be maintained to plug holes in the lines and launch local counter-attacks. batteries must be pulled out of the lines to replenish exhausted ammunition supplies.

That covers the main areas which I believe our rules to be different from the run of the mill variety. They iere designed to fight large actiins, on the level of corps or entire armies. have refought Gettysburg, Second Bull Run, Antietam, and many others with THIS HALLOWED GROUND, and have felt that the rules reflect the feel of a grand tactical command.


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