It is one of the myths inherent in his legend that Napoleon invented a new system of warfare. This was not the case as the system that Napoleon used to achieve his brilliant victories had in fact been developed before his time. Napoleon's genius lay in his ability to apply the systems already developed in the field with daring and intelligence. In the field of tactics the French armies continued to practise the methods developed by the Revolutionary forces during the campaigns of 1792-1795. The normal procedure was that the commander launched his main attack in dense assault columns against what he judged to be the key-point of the enemy's position with a concentrated and converging artillery bombardment. Napoleon made no essential change in this procedure. In the field of Grand Tactics, the envelopment of a flank, with the aid of cavalry was no new procedure in war. Napoleon's practice of this was limited as he made no attempt to threaten Wellington's vulnerable flank at Waterloo. And the organization of Napoleon's armies in divisions and army corps merely followed the practice which was being adopted in other European countries after experience with the Seven Years War. During the century in which Napoleon was born the French monarchy waged four major wars: The Spanish Succession (1702-1713), The Polish Succession (1733-1738), The Austrian Succession (1741-1748) and The Seven Years War (1756-1763). These wars produced a wealth of experience and only one commander of outstanding genius -- Marshal Count Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750). Marshal Saxe was not only a great commader in the field, but also an original thinker in strategy. The basic purpose of Marshal Saxe's doctrine was to increase the mobility and manoeverbility of an army. He proposed an army organized in legions, the prototype of the modern division. The divisional organization foreshadowed by Marshal Saxe was adopted by Marshal de Broglie in 1759. An army thus gained elasticity and could operate more freely to outmanoeuver and outflank the enemy. Another important development of the Seven Years War was the forming of corps preceded by advanced guard corps and flanked by the reserve corps. So the advanced guard engaged the enemy frontally while the main corps could deploy to outflank the enemy. It is interesting to note that Napolean adopted this tactic in 1796 at the opening of his first campaign in Piedmont. Bibliography James Marshall-Cornwall, Napoleon As Military Commander: 1967 Barnes and Noble, U.S.A. Back to Table of Contents -- Warfare in History Newsletter 2 Back to Warfare in History Newsletter List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2005 by Shahram Khan. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com