If readers will refer to the November 1969 number of the Newsletter the objective of the exercise will be revealed.
Five generals replied to the invitation:
- M.Gibbs-Harris of Cardiff (MG. H)
K.Robinson of Winchester (K.R.)
Alister Sharman of London (A.S.)
Christian C. Strachan of Copenhagen (C.C.S)
P.M.Street of Southport (P.M.S)
I believe that the standard was high by comparison with 18th century, and certainly my own standards. Here is a brief analysis of the replies.
1(i): The soft knoll found great favour as an artillery site and infantry were stationed behind it. Such artillery would certainly be blown away by the superior enemy and the infantry would suffer little better. Only K.R. recognised the ford between the villages -- what other reason could the Northern village have to exist. M.G-H whose reply I preferred kept his army well in hand out of harms way south of the villages to attack the enemy when he was half across.
1 (ii) Many ingeneous solutions here but I preferred P.M.S. who fortified the high ground either side of 'H.'
2(i): Some blood and thunder here as M.G-H attempted to escalade 'A' by a coup de main and then march on 'E.' The most comprehensive solution was K.R. who attempted the ford, a bridge opposite the knoll, and still remembered to contain the garrison of IA%
(ii) Fortifying the villages (G.C.S., A.S., K.R.) seemed the best solution with the bridge, (and ford K.R.) between. Fortifications on the knoll are commanded by the next hill and that hill by the one after.
3(i): The heights south of 'A' found favour but they are too far back to deny the enemy the villages -- which he could hold defensively and turn one flank with the rest of his force. Incidently, the higher of there hills is distinctly convex and those who placed artillery on the top would leave a lot of dead ground in front. There were some attempts at ambushes C.C.S. and M.G-H from the woods but these would not succeed against an alert enemy. I preferred K.R's fluid position behind the villages.
(ii) The three hill line North-west of IF' was generally favoured. K.R. preferred a more forward position behind the wood and village IF' and superbly supported his right wing with an enfilade battery from the North bank of the river.
(iii) A variety of tight defensive positions but I believe the P.M.S. was very right in thinking discretion the better part of valour against such odds. He retired on 'D, ' and sought opportunities to interfere with the enemy's convoys and await reinforcements.
4. Only P.M.S. and K.R. threw everything (except a rearguard) against one enemy column and I preferred P.M.S's selection of IBI as the target to K.R's selection of 'E' since the 1atter can be reinforced by two columns while the former by one only. the danger of splitting the force into two medium and one large is that the larger one pay not be large enough.
5(i) Two generals, who shall be nameless, omitted any scouting and could have ended up in an ambush. M.G-H moved on 'A' from the East -- an excellent strategem since the 350-foot hill S.E. of 'A' is very advantageous to him -- such an approach made the answers to 3(i) look pretty sick and it holds the possibility of achieving the objective without fighting a battle.
(ii) No one put any pickets on the hills south-west of 'L' which are 100 ft. higher than 'L' but there were some impressive redoubts along the ridge north of 'L.'
6. Three favoured the eastern route through the marsh -- a hasty march by night. C.C.S. left his camp fires burning which would be a useful direction finding ploy as well as confusing the enemy. K.R. offered the splendid choice of marching to the ford at the twin villages and crossing to the north bank -- a longish march with the danger of an ambush at 'L.' He also offered an alternative (if the north bank was blockaded) of the relatively easy march along the watershed North from 'G' and the dash at dawn -- favoured he hoped by a sortie from an alert garrison. P.M.S. also marched along the watershed but delayed his march until daylight. I think he would be caught by cavalry in the last two miles.
7(i) and (ii): Three generals split up their force into fragments but K.R. and C.C.S. relied on pickets with a central main body. C.C.S. was thoughtful enough to allow his troops some rest -- he bivouacked during the day -- and gave full alert during the night. C.C.S. also used a cunning strategem of a false camp with fires burning at night to guard part of the perimeter -- a trick that might serve a turn but would not do for very long.
8. Some fought in front of the defile at 'L' -- a risky performance, others held the line of hills -- another risky business if the enemy does anything but a frontal attack. K.R. passed the defile held the 'KL' line lightly with a central reserve at 'F'' to await eventualities.
9. There was a considerable wastage of good troops in a succession of frontal attacks. K.R. and A.S. tried to turn the position from the North, but I liked C.C.S' choice of expending treasure rather than soldiers and as he put it "gaining access to A" and then turning the position -- it would be well worth trying.
10. I had no intention of comparing peoples rules but I believe with Don that rules on a postcard is an objective well worth aiming at.
To select a winner is invidious as in war there is so much luck that an apparent blunder could possibly be a potential brilliancy -- but I hand the Marshal's baton (metaphorically) to: K. Robinson.
Robinson's Selected Rules
| Unit | Movement (mm's) | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Line | Column | Road | |
| Infantry -- Artillery | 200 | 250 | 250 |
| Cavalry | 400 | 400 | 400 |
| Infantry charge | 250 | 300 | 350 |
| Light Cavalry charge | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 |
| Heavy Cavalry charge | 850 | 850 | 850 |
| Unit | Firing Range (mm) | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Short | Medium | Long | |
| Artillery | 0-300 | 300-800 | 800-1500 |
| Musketry | 0-100 | 100-225 | 225-400 |
Casualties
Artillery: 1 average dice per gun
Musketry: 1 average dice per 8 men
Musketry: 1 average dice per 6 Grenadiers or Light infantry.
Short range: undivided. Divide by 2 for cavalry,
Medium range: divide by 2. open order or behind cover.
Long range: divide by 3.Deduct 1 for each gunner killed.
Firing and moving simultaneous -- cannot fire and move.
Melees
Throw one die per 10 points. Throw is number of casualties. Winner is side with least casualties. Loser retreats 1 move.
Infantry: 1 point.
Grenadiers, Guards -- 1.25 points.
Light Cavalry : 2 points.
Heavy Cavalry: 2.5 points.
Disordered troops: Deduct 1 from all dice throws
Troops behind cover add 1 to all dice throws
Surrender if outnumbered by 3 to 1.
Defeated troops become disordered
Troops after charge become disordered.
All formations at 50% strength must retire from field.
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© Copyright 1970 by Donald Featherstone.
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