French cavalry destroyed three British infantry battalions in three minutes at Albuera but it was the open-flanked line formation of the infantry rather than the rain that did the damage. Infantry lines three or more ranks deep did sometimes repel cavalry but they could always be overlapped and their flanks turned. On the very rare occasions that cavalry broke into infantry square the foot soldiers were exhausted, their morale was low or they had taken heavy losses; lances sometimes prised an opening and rain rendered muskets useless. It was the presence of artillery rather than a cavalry threat that forced a square to surrender at Dresden.
An infantry square was usually formed by a battalion although two battalions sometimes combine in Egypt and Russia the French divisional squares had artillery at the corners and between the battalions; cavalry, headquarters and train sheltered inside the formation. Squares were formed in the following manner:
- With battalion in line, the two centre companies stand fast and the remainder wheel or file back to form the flank and rear faces of the square.
From open column, forming on the leading company, companies wheel to right and left to form the flanks while rear company closes up and faces about.
From close column the rear company faces about, files on the flank of each centre company face outwards with N.C.O's filling up small gaps between the flank of the companies.
From column of companies it took about 30 seconds to form a square; wargames rules should allow for a time lag to cover awareness of the need to form square and for necessary orders to be given.
Squares were usually formed with the front ranks kneeling and, after firing the first volley, t "set" their bayonet-tipped muskets in the same way as pikes; after firing their volley the second ranks crouched low while the third and subsequent rank did not fix bayonets.
British battalions formed square four ranks deep with a front face of four ranks each of 34 mei and rear faces of four ranks each of 26 men. Each face was about 60 feet in length and the open space inside was about 39 feet wide. All other European armies normally formed six ranks deep on each face although there is considerable recorded evidence that indicates three ranks.
A combination of cavalry, artillery and infantry are most likely to succeed against a square, which is an almost unmissable packed target for artillery and musketry while its own fire-power is reduced by three-quarters because only a quarter of the men facing the enemy can fire. Because it could always out-range them, cannister against squares was a classical tactic - Wertingen in 1805 and an example of this and at Quatre Bras steady infantry (the 42nd Regiment) caught in the act of forming square were able to beat off cavalry who had out-run their guns.
With the cavalry close enough to force the infantry into square, horse artillery flays its packed ranks with cannister; then supporting infantry move up and deploy into line (the infantry in square dare not deploy for the forthcoming fire-fight or they can be rolled up by the nearby cavalry). With an advantage of 4 to 1, the attack fire can so shake the square that the supporting infantry are able to charge home.
To prevent this happening, enemy horsemen should be held off by a friendly cavalry force and the square supported by horse artillery thrown well forward or in the space between the squares, firing until the last moment when the gunners run to the protection of the nearest square, throwing themselves on the ground behind the front-rank bayonets. If time allowed, they removed a gun wheel and brought it back with them. Courageous gunners often remained with their guns sheltering beneath them while the cavalry attack flowed past on either side, as did Mercer's men at Waterloo.
Horses dislike stepping on a prone man and refuse to charge into a solid obstacle so that a bayonet-fringed, solid-looking wall of unyielding infantry caused cavalry to swerve round the "island." The deciding factor was the coolness of the infantry which obviously affected the quality of their musketry. Accurate musketry required steady infantry who could wait until the enemy was right upon them before they fired -- at Quatre Bras it "broke and shattered" the French cavalry. Even when fire was delivered at 30 paces Fortescue relates that cavalry was turned back in confusion. The number of casualties inflicted upon the cavalry was not always decisive (the Thin Red Line at Balaclava killed a few Russian Hussars but turned them back). It was a question of morale, balanced between big men wearing cuirasses and riding large horses against an unflinching wall of infantry fringed with 18-in bayonets.
The length of the face of a square only allowed about 18/20 cavalry to attack it at a time; bei in more than two ranks added little if any power to the attack and bodies of men and horses piled up in front of the square from previous attacks gave it increased strength and protection. When attack a line, cavalry were forced into its centre because there was nowhere to swerve to avoid impact and, providing the line did not look too solid, the horses would go forward; the 3-deep line was the very minimum depth that allowed the slightest chance of warding-off cavalry. At Salamanca, Ferrey deployed seven battalions in a 3-deep line with a battalion in square on each flank. In a wargame a square with reasonable morale should be almost invulnerable to a non-lancer cavalry charge.
During the Napoleonic Wars the lance was an effective weapon against the sword or the bayonet, I when used against trained infantry in square who could fire musketry volleys, lancers do not appear have been any more successful than other types of cavalry.
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© Copyright 1976 by Donald Featherstone.
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