Preamble This battle came about as a result of reading several books about the Sino-Japanese War. I possess a small Japanese Army based upon the Fujimi Japanese Infantry set and a First World War British Army suitable for use as Chinese Army units, and therefore set up the following battle. It was fought solo using my own rules which are based upon ideas by Featherstone, Sandars, Wise and Grant. I also tried out a new idea of my own regarding major tactical decisions to remove bias in my decisions. When any major tactical decision had to be made I wrote down 6 alternative courses of action. I then threw a die and the number on the die was the course of action chosen. Scenario Several small Japanese units have been fired upon, and the local Japanese commander has decided to take punitive action against Chinese units in and around the village of Hanlow. In order to do this he has sent the following forces to Taiping, just north of Hanlow 1st, 2nd & 3rd Infantry Coys. Mortar section. Machine gun section. 3 Infantry guns. The Chinese forces in and around Hanlow are as follows A, B, C, D, E and F Infantry Coys camped in the village. An artillery battery (3 18 pdrs) by the line of trees to the east of the village. Sentries are at the railway bridge over the river, and at the railway crossing. Terrain The terrain is a flat plain split by a railway embankment, which has paddy-fields to the north and south of it. A river (the River Tai) runs from north-east to south-west across the northwest corner of the plain. The Battle During the night the lst Japanese Company advanced along the east bank of the river, while the 2nd and 3rd Companies, with the M.G. and mortar sections moved towards the railway embankment along the Hanlow-Taiping road. The Chinese sentries were more alert than expected and were able to give waring before being killed. The Japanese forces at the railway embankment now spread out along it, with the M.G. and mortar sections sited to cover the road from Hanlow. The 1st Company continued its advanced along the river bank after leaving a small force to cover the railway bridge. The Chinese commander, on hearing the sentries warnings, immediately alerted his men and despatch A and B Companies towards the railway embankment, along the road, The Japanese held their fire until the Chinese were almost upon them, and then opened fire with all available weapons (rifles, light and heavy machine guns, 'knee' mortars, and 81mm mortars). The Chinese, who were becoming more and more visable in the growing light of dawn, now retreated to the paddy-fields after suffering heavy casualties. In the meantime the 1st Company advanced further along the river bank and began to move into the southermost paddy-fields. The Chinese C, D, E and F Companies now deployed towards these same paddyfields, although unaware of the Japanese presence there. The Chinese battery opened fire on the embankment from their gun line near the trees, but only caused a few casualties on the well spread Japanese forces there. They did, however, alert the Japanese commander of their existence, and he moved his infantry guns forward and formed a gun line to the rear of the embankment. Using the paddy-fields as cover, A and B companies had begun firing upon the embankment to cover the other companies as they advanced on the bridge. However, these four companies blundered into the Japanese 1st Company as it was deploying in the next field. The Japanese company commander did not hesitate in his action and charged the Chinese who, although superior in numbers, were shocked by the sudden appearance of the enemy on their flank. In the ensuing melee both sides suffered casualties but the ferocity of the Japanese attack had its desired effect, and the Chinese retreated towards Hanlow. The Japanese company commander, realising that the Chinese were only temporarily demoralised, and that he was considerably outnumbered, withdrew towards the river in order to make good an escape back to his own lines. The Japanese infantry guns had, by now, moved into position and begun firing upon the Chinese gun line, who were still trying (in vain) to dislodge the Japanese on the embankment. The Japanese guns were, however, more effective and, within a short time, had caused several casualties amongst the Chinese gunners. The Chinese now switched their attention to counter-battery fire, but without any observation their fire remained ineffective and wide of the target. The Chinese commander now reviewed the situation. His artillery was not being very successful (especially in view of mounting casualties to the gunners) and although A and B companies were in contact with the enemy, C, D, E and F Companies were shaken after the skirmish in the paddy-field. He was also aware of a Japanese force on his flank (although unaware that this force was, in fact, retreating). He therefore decided that withdrawal was the best course he could take, and issued orders to the artillery to cease fire and move southward with C, D, E and F Companies. He also ordered A and B Companies to slowly withdraw southward to cover the retreat. The Japanese 2nd and 3rd Companies, seeing this retreat, began to advance down the Hanlow-Taiping road, but were checked by A and B Companies long enough for the main Chinese force to withdraw, although the infantry guns were able to inflict some casualties upon the retreating force. When the Chinese finally withdrew off the battlefield the Japanese advanced and occupied Hanlow. Conclusions and Observations The Japanese attack was not as successful as it should have been. The main advance down the Kanlow-Taiping road stalled as soon as the sentries alerted the main Chinese force. The flank attack also failed in its main purpose because of the size of the attacking force. The Chinese counter-attack failed for two main reasons. Firstly the artillery support was bad as lack of observation made it impossible to adjust ranges, etc. Secondly the lack of reconnaissance by C, D, E and F Companies when advancing towards the railway bridge across the paddy-fields. The battle was very enjoyable, and the new idea I tried out with regard to major tactical decisions worked quite well. An example of how well it did work is in the reaction of the main Japanese force when the Chinese sentries managed to give the alarm. I gave the commander the following 6 alternatives and then threw the die 1. Withdraw to Taiping. 2. Leave a company to guard the crossing and send the rest of the troops towards the river. 3. Leave a company to guard the crossing and advance with the remainder. 4. Stay put and defend the embankment. 5. Continue the advance. 6. Using the embankment as cover move the entire force towards the river. The die score was 4 and this was the course of action which was followed. By using such a system it is possible to have forces reacting to situations without bias on the part of the solo player, as long as he keeps the alternative options reasonable. I am going to use this system again in solo games as I found that it made this one much more enjoyable than my usual games have been. If you are a solo player you might like to try it. Please do - you might find that it works as well for you as it has for me! Back to Table of Contents -- Wargamer's Newsletter # 175 To Wargamer's Newsletter List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1976 by Donald Featherstone. 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