What are we trying to do in wargaming? If we can get our aims clear, we might be able to improve our methods and avoid the sterility of complex rules and petty gamesmanship of which recent contributors to Wargamer's Newsletter have complained. We might then be able to play games that are both realistic and enjoyable. The study of the campaigns of Napoleon and of Moltke and of the American Civil War, together with the theories of Clausewitz and Jomini, should help us to do this. Indeed, wargames, military history and military theory should illuminate each other.
What we ought to be doing is trying to simulate battles, great battles, that is, between large armies. Since Napoleonic armies numbered scores of thousands and fought on fronts of up to ten miles, we need to adopt small scales: six inches to a mile. At this scale only units which advance to contact are placed on the table and the game is played in "the fog of war." The players can also make the sort of decisions commanders-in-chief make, by building military methods into the rules, by allowing subordinate units automatically to adopt the required formations; throwing forward skirmishers, advancing in column, deploying into line to fire and so on.
What then is the aim of the commander-in-chief? To destroy the enemy army whilst preserving his own. How is this done? What is the decision of the battle? It does not of ourselves involve wiping out the enemy to the last man. The Spartans at Thermopylae are the exception that ;rove (the existence of) the rule. It does not mean killing more of the enemy than they kill of your army. There are several cases in which the winner lost more casualties than the loser. It does not mean destroying as casualties a certain proportion of the enemy. One's own casualties may not be known until after the battles the enemyts cannot be and, therefore, can have no effect on its decision. It does not involve the capture of strong-points. Marlborough beat Tallard, whilst the latter still held Blenhei and Oberglau.
It does not necessitate the breaking of the enemy's order of battle, though this was the case with pre-Napoleonic armies which fought in effect as single units, for each Napoleonic corps constitutes a self-sufficient formation. It does not, as Marshal Foch maintained, mean merely refusing to believe that youiare beaten. You may not believe it but you still can be beaten. It does not mean seizing the enemy's lines of communication. An army may be in possession of the enemy's lines of communication at the start of the battle as at Marengo, Jena-Auerstadt and Gravelotte-St Privat. If, at the end of the battle, one has :severed.the enemy's communications and preserved one' own, then one has won but such obvious, complete victories are difficult and rare. The decision is arrived at by the relative destruction of parts of the army, which can be estimated in the course of the battle by the visible losses to both sides, by the commitment of one's own reserves and by the occupation of ground. The commander who estimates in this way that he is suffering the greater losses whose communications are threatened, decides the issue by quitting the battlefield before his army is completely destroyed. If he insists on hanging on, then he incurs that complete destruction, as did Napoleon at Waterloo, and there is no retreat but a rout.
The tactical decision is, therefore, connected with the strategic decision, with the decision as to battle. A nineteenth century army with an open line of communications could always refuse battle by retreating. There were occasional encounter battles like Albuera and Gettysburg but an army could only be forced to give battle by threatening its lines of communications or its base. Thus Salamanca, Chancellorsville and Vionville-Mars-la-Tour were brought on by threats to the enemy's lines of communications. And thus Borodino, Waterloo and Chattanooga were brought on by threats to the enemy's immediate base.
Again it must be insisted that a simplification of rules is necessary to produce both realism and playability. If we play with accurate large scale maps, we possess an advantage that nineteenth century armies rarely had. Only the major features like mountain ranges, rivers, large towns and main roads should be known to us. The staff-work involved in moving forces and arranging supplies should be automatically carried out and, therefore, built into the rules.
The strategic decision is obviously connected with the political decision, with the decision of the war. The destruction of the enemy's main army is in itself insufficient to end the war. The conquest of his territory is also necessary, for out of that territory he may furnish a new army. For example, the defeat of the main French armies around Metz and at Sedan in 1870 did not bring about the immediate" defeat of France; the capture of Paris was also necessary. On the other hand, the capture of the capital is not sufficient. Austria fought on after the loss of Vienna in 1809 and Russia after the fall of Moscow in 1812. Even the conquest of the enemy's entire country may not be sufficient, if he can rely on a more powerful ally to help him. Thus the conquest of Prussia in 1806 did not result in Prussia making peace until the defeat of their Russian allies in 1807. However, the destruction of the enemy's armed force, the occupation of his capital, the conquest of his country and the defeat of his senior partner in an alliance will constitute victory.
These conditions of victory are implied in the preconditions which led to war in the first place, in the decision as to war. The commencement of hostilities is, of course, a political act which may involve ideological, economic and other considerations not of a purely military nature. Nevertheless, the motives for war usually involve territorial issues which imply military potential. In other words, the aims of the war include the occupation of territory which would improve the strategic position and furnish military force or, negatively, the denial to a rival of such territory. Thus French aggression during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars was motivated, apart from ideological and commercial considerations, by the wish to dominate Germany and Italy with the security and military forces they could provide. This motive had a direct effect on the strategy of the Great Powers.
In 1796, it obliged the French to invade both Germany and Italy. In 1805 it persuaded the Austrians to advance towards the Rhine, without waiting for the Russians, so as to secure Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden. In 1806, it caused the Prussians not to wait for the Russians but to cross the Elbe so as to occupy Saxony. By 1812, half Napoleon's forces consisted of foreign contingents. Their disloyalty in 1813 was the result and the cause of Allied victories with dramatic effect in the desertion of the Saxons in the battle of Leipzig. Again, the Austro-Prussian War and the French-Prussian War were directly caused by the wish to dominate Germany. With Saxony and Bavaria each able to field 25,000 men in 1870, the minor powers could be not only major causes of war but could have significant effects on their course.
Even the American Civil War was affected by similar considerations. "I hope I have God on my side," said Lincoln, "but I must have Kentucky." We can thus providr the wars we game with realistic motives which will affect our strategy and influence their outcome. Strategy and tactics are the wargamer's concern, not dice and toy-soldiers.
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© Copyright 1976 by Donald Featherstone.
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