Just a short note that was inspired by Mr.Hardcastle's problem in the September NEWSLETTER (No.162). He was asking about enemies for his Roman Army, and it struck me that a few thoughts on the Roman Army would not go amiss. I do not intend to say anything about the organisation of the army which has been covered by people far more qualified to talk about these things than I am. One book that I have not seen mentioned is a booklet by Drs. Breeze and Dobson (two prominent students of the Roman Army) called "The Army of Hadrian's Wall" which is published by Frank Graham, 6 Queen's Terrace, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, NE2 2PL, and costs 40p (postage extra). It is a very useful little book written by two people who know something about the Roman Army. It is much better than the Men-at-Arms book by Simkins, which is only useful for its drawings. The Dobson and Breeze book covers organisation, details of the officers of auxiliary units in particular, information about forts and life on the frontier. To the main point of my letter - first I must make it clear that I am referring to the Army of the Principate, that is of the first two centuries A.D., and not to the Republican period. Most people, when they think of the Roman Army think in terms of the Legions, the heavy, well-trained infantry that was the backbone of the Army. They provided the engineers and the craftsmen of the Army, and, of course, were the main element in a PITCHED BATTLE. If they had a drawback it was that they were suitable for one role only -- as heavy infantry. Caesar came up against this problem in his campaigns. The cavalry element had been reduced to little more than a handful (120 to be precise) that was of little use for anything but scouting and carrying dispatches, and as a result Caesar was forced to recruit Gallic Cavalry to his army. The inability of the Roman army to follow up victories because of a lack of cavalry or light-armed troops is well attested in the literature. The practise of using allies, whether acquired through treaties or as mercenaries, was an old practise referred to by Livy in the Macedonian campaign of 171 B.C. - in this case Numidians (cavalry) from an ally, Masinissa; Ligurians obtained by a forced levy; and, last, Cretans (archers - sagitarii) who were mercenaries. Here we see the elements to the Legions lacked - cavalry, light-armed and missile troops (Livy XLII, 35). The deficiencies in these categories became more obvious when the Roman Empire needed policing an( when the fighting was against loosely organised but courageous Celtic or Germanic tribes. The Roman Conquest of Britain provides good examples of the strengths and weaknesses of native troops. In his sorties to Britain, Caesar found his lack of cavalry a handicap in combatting the mobile Britons. They were fearless warriors well practised in fighting through their constant inter-tribal warfare. They were mobile and where they were able to use their mobility they could be devastating, but if they attempted to take the Romans on in a set piece battle they rarely did well. The tribes of South East England were rapidly subdued (with some exceptions - the Iceni especially), some supporting the Romans from the outset, others quickly succumbing to the strength of Roman Arms. Only in Wales and in the North of Britain (the Pennines and later in the mountains of Scotland) did the Romans encounter real problems. Caratacus held his own against the Romans under the governor Ostorius Scapula from 47 to 51, at which point he tried to meet the Romans in the field and was decisively defeated and eventu ally captured. After his capture and the celebration of a triumph by the Romans the Silures began to cause trouble. They attacked small detachments of Romans, scattering and killing them, attacked and killed a Praefectus Castrorum (third in command of a Legion), eight centurions and many troops and eventually they were able to meet Ostorius Scapula in the field and manage to get "away with only slight loss". The latter action involved the best part of two legions. The constant guerilla warfare eventually wore out Scapula, and, according to Tacitus, this led to his death. Before he could be replaced a Legion under its Legate Manlius Valens was defeated and the Silures were rampaging through the province. Didius Gallus, Scapula's successor, was able to restore order very rapidly, that in spite of Tacitus' unflattering comments on his ability. The parallels with 19th century Colonial warfare or modern guerilla warfare are clear. To police their new territories and frontiers the Romans employed their auxiliary units. The size of the problem can be judged by the number of auxiliary units stationed in Britain: under Hadrian there were 15 Alae and 46 Cohortes, totalling something in the region of 27,000-28,000 men. In addition to these were ti three legions of the province, II Augusta, VI Victrix and XX Valeria Victrix, giving another 15,000 m The grand total being somewhere in the region of 43,000 men. Other legions that were stationed in Britain for a time were II Adiutrix and XIV Gemina Martia Victrix. 4 The auxilia were used to police the frontiers because they were well equipped to do the job with cavalry and missile troops - in addition to the 15 alae there were 13 Cohortes equitatae, made up of part infantry and part cavalry. The latter units were particularly well suited to policing work. It would be interesting to base a campaign on an area of frontier and attempt to recreate the problems i would pose its garrison - from the problems of attacks on foraging parties and detachments out traini to fullscale raids on civilian population. Back to Table of Contents -- Wargamer's Newsletter # 165 To Wargamer's Newsletter List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1975 by Donald Featherstone. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com