1. This battle situation was taken from the successful Russian attempt to cut the line of retreat of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad in November 1942 by capturing the bridge over the River Don at Kalach. In my game no attempt was made to recreate the battle; I merely took the situation to provide a game in which a German infantry force would try and hold off a large Russian force until armoured reinforcements arrived. 2. Figures and tanks were taken from the Heroics, Skytrex and other Micro-tank ranges and the Wargames Research Group Armour/Infantry rules were used. Ground scale was 1 inch to 100 metres so although the playing surface was only 40" by 30" a reasonably large area was actually available. 3. SITUATION The Russian 95th Shock Army is plunging deep into the rear of 6th Army fighting grimly at Stalingrad. Units of the 95th have been ordered to capture the bridge at Kalach and hold it under reinforcements arrive next day. Meanwhile the reinforced IIIrd Infantry Company has been ordered to hold Kalach and has been told that elements of 24th Panzer Division will be arriving at about 0900 in anticipation of a Russian attack. 4. TERRAIN The river was uncrossable at all points except at the bridge at Kalach and a ford about 4 of a mile upstream. Marshes and the large wood to the south of the Kolkhoz (collective farm) were passable only to troops moving on foot. The stream was crossable at all points except that wheeled vehicles had to cross it at the ford or bridge. 5. RUSSIAN FORCE 1 Coy heavy tanks (7 KVI) 1 SMG Coy (2 platoons, total 73 men) 1 Pla. KV2 (3 vehicles) 1 Coy Medium tanks (10 T34/76) 1 Coy light tanks (10 BT 7 tanks) 1 Mortar platoon (3 82mm mortars) 1 MMG Platoon (3 Maxim MMGs) 1 A/T Rifle platoon (5 A/T Rifles) 1 A/T section (2 45mm A/T Guns) 8 Katyusha Rocket Launchers 1 Motor Rifle coy (3 platoons, total 156 men + weapons platoon with 2 MMG and 2 50mm mortars) 6. GERMAN FORCE a) At start: IIIrd Inf Coy (3 platoons; total 108 men) 1 MMG section (2 MMGs) 1 Mortar section (2 80mm mortars) 1 A/T platoon (2 50mm A/T guns, 1 88mm Gun) 1 Panzerjager platoon (4 Marder III) 1 OP Officer with 4 105mm guns b) Reinforcements: HQ (1 Pz IV, 1 Pz IV Special) 1 pla. Pz III (5 tanks including 2 "Specials") 1 Panzerjager platoon (4 StuG IIIs) 1 Armoured Pz Gren platoon (27 men) 2 Sdkfz 222 Armoured Cars. 7. THE BATTLE The ground was very much in the favour of the Germans; there were only two suitable approaches for tanks, one through the Kolkhoz and round the southern flank. Accordingly the Germans converted the Kolkhoz into a strongpoint and garrisoned it with 7 and 8 platoons with all the anti-tank guns, MMGs and 1 Marder in direct support. The other 3 Marders covered the long approach round the southern flank but could' also fire across the approaches to the Kholkhoz. 9 platoon was in defensive positions in Kalach but could move in Volkswagens to the Kolkhoz if required. The reinforcements would be deployed as necessary.  The Russian plan, governed to a certain extent by the fact that its OPs were static and could therefore only cover the kolkhoz, incolved a simple steamroller assault in which the KV tanks and SMG company would capture the kolkhoz while the T34s and Motor Rifle company would move through to take the village from the north. The BT7s were to demonstrate in the south. The Russian commander also rejected putting his main attack in the south because he thought unsuitable ground would restrict the deployment of his armour. From 0600 until 0625 the Katyushas bombarded the small wood north of the kolkhoz: The fire destroyed the tractor of the 50mm gun and the 2 trucks and 1 motor-cycle forming the transport of 7 platoon but the dug-in troops suffered no casualties. At 0625 the KV company advanced across the start-line, No. 1 platoon on the (Russian) left and No. 2 platoon on the right. The BT7 company moved up onto the ridge in support. The Germans opened fire with artillery and mortars at the infantry of the SMG company being carried on the back of the KVs while the Marders had to concentrate on the BT7s. The 88 also fired on the KVs but was forced to move by accurate covering fire from the KV2s, before it could do any damage, to a new position at the edge of the trees on the eastern end of the main ridge. As the KVs approached the 50mm guns opened fire at 500 yards but were quickly silenced and scored no kills. No. 2 platoon suffered lightly from the fire and prepared to assault the wood under covering fire from the tanks but No. 1 platoon was forced to dismount by artillery fire and when the company commander tried to rally them his truck was destroyed and he was killed. The platoon retreated to the start-line with heavy losses. All the German fire now concentrated on No. 2 platoon which was pushing the Germans from their positions and it was pinned down and destroyed by machine gun crossfire, mortars and artillery. Nevertheless 7 platoon had been much reduced by rocket, tank and small arms fire. Despite the destruction of their infantry support the KVs tried to take the position on their own No. 1 platoon moved towards the kilkhoz down the track while No. 2 platoon moved round the German left flank. This platoon came under fire from the 88 and Marder III in defilade positions so that they could not be engaged by the Katyushas and the tanks withdrew without loss. No. 2 platoon tried to pus] into the heart of the German position but was slowed down by the fire of two anti-tank rifles and then had 2 tanks disabled by anti-tank grenades. The surviving tank fell back, with the other platoon, to the start-line at about 0730. Although 7 and 8 platoons had lost 24 men as well as both 50mm guns the; had knocked out 2 heavy tanks and the 53 casualties of the SMG company meant that it could be of no further value to the Russians. The diversionary attack of the BT7s had also resulted in the loss of 6 tanks while 2 Marders had been destroyed. This was a high price to pay for keeping the attention of the Marders diverted from the attack on the kolkhoz. The first phase of the battle could definitely be regarded as successful by the Germans. The Russian plan was now in ruins. An hour and a half had been used up to no avail; tanks were unable to take positions on their own and infantry was massacred by artillery as soon as it appeared. Because of the time already lost the Russian commander decided to send the T34s and the Motor Rifle company round the German southern flank to take the village quickly. The trucks of the Motor Rifle company could only cross the stream at the ford so a 200 yard gap was to be maintained between vehicle to reduce the effects of artillery fire. In fact the only vehicle hit was a BT7 which was bringing up the rear of the Russian column. The other 3 BT7s withdrew but the rest of the force crossed the ford without casualties and the German OP had to leave his position together with the remaining Marder III which had failed to score any hits on the advancing Russians. As the Russians swung onto the road they knocked out the Marder although the 88, now in position on the west bank of the river behind the marsh, destroyed a T34. The Germans had also brought up an WAG to cover the approaches to the bridge and had moved the mortars to a position behind the main ridge. The leading T34 platoon had attempted to capture the village quickly but a second tank was destroyed by anti-tank grenades and the remaining tank of the platoon withdrew although covering fire had knocked out the 88. An attempt by the infantry to advance was stopped as artillery fire fell on them straightaway. A quick attack having failed the commander of the Motor Rifle company ordered one of his platoons to hack its way through the dense woods and attack the village from the North-East. This platoon set off although it would take 22 hours to get into position. Meanwhile the German reinforcements had arrived and T34 commander led an attack on the village with all guns firing. The infantry resisted with anti-tank grenades but the leading platoon crossed the bridge and engaged the 4 StuG IIIs crossing the ford, destroying one of them. Nevertheless the other German tanks deployed and without further loss wiped out the whole platoon with a hail of fire. At the same time the company commander' tank, still moving through the village, was disabled by anti-tank grenades and the other Russian tanks outnumbered and leaderless, fled the field losing one more to pursuing German tanks. While the Germans had been fully occupied in the village the Russian commander ordered a further assault on the kolkhoz: He sent his intact KV1 platoon across to the cottage to rendezvous with a platoon of Motor Riflemen and their weapons platoon and then to attack the kolkhoz from the south-east 8 platoon had been heavily bombarded and had suffered some casualties but the attack took time to organise and on seeing the KVs advance the Germans had guessed what would happen and had shifted the MMGs further back and had deployed the OP and tanks in hull down positions on the main ridge. Even though the infantry had only 2 or 300 yards of open ground to cover as they crossed the small hill to the south-east of the kolkhoz artillery, mortar and machine gun fire hit them and forced them back with 26 casualties. The Marder III knocked out one of the KVs and artillery fire disabled another but return fire from the KVs destroyed the Marder as well as a Panzer IV on the main ridge. The KVs fell back to the start-line again and the surviving infantry re-crossed the stream to reach their trucks. Nevertheless the Russians still had one card left; before the attack on the kolkhoz was over the Russian platoon in the dense woods attacked the village from.the north-east. .'.The German OP and tanks were still on the main ridge although the Panzer Grenadier platoon was waiting in its half-tracks at at the eastern end of the ridge. Consequently one section of 9 platoon was overrun and the surviving T34s and the reserve Rifle platoon pushed up the road to add their weight to the attack. However, the German infantry resisted strongly and the Panzer Grenadiers moved in to restore the situation. The OP and Panzer III platoon moved down the street but the leading tank was destroyed by a T34 and the others pulled back as there was no room to manoeuvre. Then artillery fire began to fall on the Russian infantry who had already been halted by the Germans. Knowing that he was using his last reserves and that he would not be able to hold the village even if he took it the Russian commander withdrew his infantry under covering fire from the T34s, having lost 32 men. The Germans had lost only 14 men as well as a Panzer III and some other vehicles. The Russian offensive had failed and they fell back to the start-line since their losses had been so high that they could not even keep the road closed. 8. CASUALTIES a) Russian: 7 BT7; 7 T34; 4 KVI; 1 truck and 112 infantry out of 229. b) German: 4 Marder III; 1 Panzer IV; 1 Panzer III; 1 StuG III; 2 50mm guns; 1 88mm gun; 1 Sdkfz 10 tractor; 1 Sdkfz 251 half-track; 2 trucks; 3 Volkswagens; 1 motor-cycle; 60 infantry out of 135 men. 9. CONCLUSION The battle clearly showed the importance of artillery and motor fire in breaking up infantry attacks Only in the final attack on the village did the opposing infantries really get to grips with small arms. Even with the primitive infantry anti-tank weapons of 1942 the battle also showed that tanks could not take an infantry strongpoint on their own. While the situation was often hectic for the Germans good use of the lateral road behind the position and interior lines enabled them to shift reserves quickly from one threatened point to another. The fact that they had radio down to platoon level also speeded up movement times. The Russians only had radion down to company level and had they been in defence this could have been a problem. As it was shortage of radios did not affect them to any great extent since distances and rough ground were really responsible for the unco-ordinated nature of the attacks. Simultaneous attacks on kolkhoz and village might have succeeded but this would have taken time to arrange and, wrongly as it turned out, the Russian commander tried to win by launching a series of unco-ordinated attacks before German reserves could arrive. Back to Table of Contents -- Wargamer's Newsletter # 165 To Wargamer's Newsletter List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1975 by Donald Featherstone. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com