Recently, in the Newsletter and elsewhere, I have heard wargamers complain that though they are interested in Colonial wargames they are put off because of the vast numbers of natives they feel they would need to buy and paint. In part this hesitation is due to a misunderstanding of the scope of the Colonial period. The following notes are inteded to show the wide variety of wargames that can be made out of just one period in Colonial warfare - that of the Mahiyya in the Sudan. I. Egyptians vs. Mahdists, early stages and late. Why stick with Hicks and Baker? Try Slatin in Darfur, beleaguered garrisons at Sinkat, Tokar, Kassala, Sennar and Berber, or Lupton Bey and Emir Pasha in the Southern Sudan. SOURCES: Slatin, R. Fire and Sword in tne Sudan, London 1896 (Darfur). Royle, C. The Egyptian Campaigns, 1882-1885, II London, 1887 (for early Egyptian battles). Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, London 1891, Frank Case, 1968 (for the same and for the Eastern Sudan). Paul, A. "Tewfik Bey", Sudan Notes and Records XXXV No.1, 1954 (for the siege of Sinhat). Collins, R.O. The Southern Sudan, Yale, 1962 (for Lupton and Emill). Mareo, E. "Frank Miller Lupton", Sudan Notes and Records, XXVIII, 1947 II. Frontier Fights, 1884-1896 The frontier fights around the southern border of Egypt, after Ginnis and up to the reconquest of Dongola, offer a wide variety of actions: pure cavalry reconaisances, attacks on villages and block houses, infiltrations by enemy forces of each other's "lines". Similarly the area around Suakin, with the redoubts, block houses and "water forts" around the city holds the same sort of opportunity. Suitable for either small actions of a few companies up to a battalion, or individual "skirmish" battles. Sources: Wingate (for the frontier and Suakin). Mitford, Major-Gen. B.R., "Extracts from the Diary of a Subaltern on the Nile in the Eighties and Nineties," SNR, XVIII, No.2, 1955; XIX, No.2, 1936, XX, 1937. (excellent, for the frontier). de Cossen, Days and Nights Service (Suakin Haggard, A., Under Crescent and Star, Edinburgh, 1895 (also for Suakin, c. 1884-5). III. Larger Actions, 1884-85 Perhaps the ponderousness of hollow squares bother you? Remember Kirbekan was a "line" battle where the British, instead of the Matidists, did the attacking. Take the campaign up to Ginnis (the last time red coats were worn) where the Egyptian Army was involved. Certain troop values should be worked out, such as a lower value for cavalry being used for mounited infantry (as with the cavalry regiments in the camel corps). Perhaps some sort of reaction test for unscheduled advances should be adopted to allow for such events as the Black Watch's advance away from the square at Tarnai. Keep in mind that, the British at no time faced the best of the Mahdist army or its generals. What would happen it you had Wd al-Nujumi or Abu Anga leading the Ansar? And if you had Abu Anga's jihadiyya and artillery, all trained soldiers with (at that time) good weapons? Even Fr. Ohrwalder claims that the British Desert Column would have been eaten up if they had waited for Wad al-Nujumi to catch them. Sources: Colville, Col.H.E., The History of the Sudan Campaign 2 vols. with maps, London, 1889. Royle, C. (especially good as it gives verbatim official reports, and then spicier "what really happened" account. Symons, J., England's Pride, London, 1965 (recommended mainly because it is more available than the others). IV. Larger Actions, 1896-98 It is unfortunate that most of the major actions of the Reconquest do not make interesting wargames (Firka, Abu Hamill, Atbara, Omdurman). But there is potential. Mahdist attacks on long straggling columns, hitting the Anglo-Egyptian Army before it was concentrated, could have caused a great deal of damage, as would a defence of the Shabluka gorge. Yet the Malidists were hampered by poor leadership -- a divided command at Firka, and incompetent commander at Atbara. Had Wad Bishara been in command of the frontier from the first, rather than assuming command only a few days before Firka; had Osman Digma rather than Mahmud commanded the force at Metamma, things may have been different. The one thing wargamers can realistically change in a wargame setting is leadership. Even given the Mahdist Army by 1896, and the problems of supply the armies of given the deterioration in the north faced throughout, an even battle can be fought around supply lines, or in preventing the Egyptian forces from concentrating. Sources: Churchill W., The River War, London, 1899 (preferably the first edition of 2 volumes over all subsequent editions) Knight, E.F., Letters From the Sudan, London, 1897 (The Dongola Campaign). Steevens, G.W., With Kitchener to Khartoum, London, 1898 (for Atbara and Omdurman). V. The Pursuit, 1898-99 The war did not end with Omdurman. The Khalifa and many of his main amirs (including Ahmad Fadil and Osman Digna) were at large for over a year afterwards. Againthese are smaller actions, of not more than two battalions. Flying columns of cavalry, camel corps, horse artillery and "galloping maxims" worked independantly of or tried to link up with groups of Askaris and "friendly" irregulars. No British troops were involved, the work being done solely by Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers. Often times the forces were equal in numbers and strength. At Rosaires, December 1898, the Malidists kept up a fire as hot as they received at Omdurman. Churchill's second volume is the only source. In setting up armies for these wargames it is essential to remember a few points: 1. Raise a balanced Sudanese force first, and then raise an Anglo-Egyptian force to match it. In this way you avoid the temptation to raise a large European army, and then lose interest in the whole thing because of the number of native troops you feel you must raise to meet it. 2. Remember that there were variations within each army, and often within each type of soldier. Try to reflect this variation in grading Your troops in firepower and morale. In the Egyptian army of the early '80s the Sudanese baitalions were generally better than the Egyptian, though there were some good, steady Egyptian battalions as well. The Bashi-Bazuks of this period along with "friendlies" of later years, varied widely in ability and steadiness. In the Anglo-Egyptian army of the '90s all the askari battalions were steady, though the Sudanese battalions usually were the most reliable because they contained so many veterans. The Egyptian cavalry, camel corps, and artillery were always of a high standard. At the same time some of the British troops of the '80s and '90s were a little below average; especially those new to the Sudan and not used to the climate or the style of fighting, or those who composed ad hoc units like camel corps and mounted infantry and were unfamiliar with their new role. As far as the Mahdists are concerned,there were some very good, trained riflemen (especially under Abu Anga in the '80s, and some decent, artillery and artillerists, some very bad riflemen (especially in the Eastern Sudan) who were inclined to throw their rifles away and charge with sword and spear when the enemy got close enough, and tribes of spearmen of varying degree of loyalty and ability. The best scales for wargaming in the Sudan are 25mm and 15mm because of availability of figures. Scruby, Minifigs, Stadden and others make some Mahdists and British of the period, while Scruby and Hinton Hunt make the only Egyptian infantry. Scruby's 9mm British, Asharis and Mahdists can be used with 15mm, but Peter Laing's range is by far the most extensive and varied. Back to Table of Contents -- Wargamer's Newsletter # 156 To Wargamer's Newsletter List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1975 by Donald Featherstone. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com