by Don Featherstone
Morlaix was the first pitched land battle of the Hundred Years War; it proved that Bannockburn and Halidon Hill had taught the English something. In fact Halidon Hill formed the prototype for Morlaix and all the other great battles of the war -- except the last: Castillon. RALPH NEVILLE EARL OF WESTMORELAND (from his Monument in Staindrop Church, Durliam) (Ralph Neville fought at Agincourt) Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt, the three major battles of the Hundred Years War, revolved around Edward, the Black Prince and Henry V, but, more than that it was the day of the English archer, because without him and the tactics built around him, none of the victories in France during the mediaeval period would have been possible. Crecy The Battle of Crecy in 1346, marks a step in the progress of the military art, in the age-long contest between mounted and dismounted men, between missile and personal weapons and in the emergence of a third arm: artillery. Edward had laboriously transported in waggons, some crude iron tubes firing iron and stone balls -- the first appearance of cannon in open warfare, it appears only to have had a minimal effect. In this battle, the men-at-arms were armour-clad; wearing a visored bascinet, the crested helmet was used only in the lists. The casing of the body in jointed armout was now nearly complete, and the adoption of breast and back plates enabled the knights to dispense with the ancient hatiberk of rings. The use of plate-armour was a decided improvement from a protection point of view; it was also possibly lighter than chain mail with its accompanying garments. The magnificent jupon, emblazoned with the wearer's arms, and the splendid knightly girdle were both testimonies of the warlike age, greaves, or jambs (steel boots) and sollerets to cover the feet had been introduced; the backs of the gauntlets were furnished with overlapping plates, armed with knobs or spikes of iron. Poitiers The Battle of Poitiers (1356) was the second of the great trinity of memorable victories. Altliough its details are somewhat controversial, it is fair to claim that it is easily the most interesting and instructive of them all from a military point of view. There were a number of valid reasons for the English victory at Poitiers; a success prominent among the consistent English victories over numerically stronger forces that marked this sixteen-year period in the middle of the fourteenth century. In a way, Poitiers was a throw-back to the previous century in that it was won by men-at-arms with a successful late action of mounted against dismounted troops. Although it began in the Crecy tradition, the archers did not really play their usual prominent roll. The eventual result of the battle was much affected by the manner in which the two opposing commanders handled their armies. The Black Prince never let go his strong personal grip; he most adequately utilised the full after beating off the Dauphin's attack by brilliantly deciding to mount and attack, coupling the onslaught with a mounted flank attack. He chose his ground well in that it was suitable for the size of his army; the hedge served its purpose admirably, the vineyard in front broke up the cavalry attacks, and the nature of the ground on the right lent itself to the flank move. The Prince gave his force mobility by keeping hit horses handy -- without this there could have been no combined frontal attack, so unusual for battles of the period. On the other hand, King John of France lacked combined control over his forces, who were formed into what amounted as three distinct and separate armies. This is reflected in the manner in which he allowed his own division to be so far behind the battlefield at the time when the Dauphin was being repulsed; at that moment he should have been handy and ready to take it up again. Instead his men had a long and slow advance to make, giving the Black Prince time to formulate alternative, winning tactics. Obsessed with King Edward's defence at Crecy King John dismounted his men-at-arms, but failed to observe that the circumstances were absolutely different in that he required a vigorous impact through shock and mobility, whereas Edward sought defensive stability. Coupled with this error and connected with his lack of overall control, the French King allowed his army to be formed into one gigantic wedge that, division by division, dashed itself against the strongest part of the English position. Agincourt Writing of Agincourt (1415) the chronicler Holinshed says: "The King ordered his battle thus; It caused stakes bound with iron sharpe at both ends of the length of five or six foot, to be pitched before the archers and on each side of the footmen like a hedge, to the intent that if barbed (i.e. armoured) horses run rashlie upon them they might shortlie be gored and destroyed. Certain persons were also appointed to remove the stakes as, by the movement of the archers, occasion and time should require, so that the footmen were hedged about with stakes. This device of fortyfieing the army was at this time first invented." If the English did not present a tidy, colourful appearance, their tarnished, dented and well-used armour and equipment gave them a workmanlike status that held a hint of what was to come. It had been bright and burnished when they had left Southampton two months before; bright plumes in the apex of the helmet had long since bedraggled and drooped, but the form of the helm itself was still quite beautiful, with an orle or chaplet around it. The breastplates had become globular in recent years and the steel gorget was replacing the ancient chainmail which had hitherto protected the throat. Hanging sleeves of rich cloth had been worn with the armour, now hanging in threads and tatters. The lance-rests were hooks just below the right breast; two-handed swords with heavy blades had just been introduced and a pole-axe was often carried by commanders in the field. Auray At Auray, on the 29th of September 1365, English troops aided John of Montford in his quarrel with Charles of Blois. The forces were small again, about 4,000 a side; both dismounted and the French discarded their lances, to fight with battle-axe and sword. The English archers opened the engagement, but, their shafts could not penetrate the French armour. After some futile shooting, with great deliberation, they threw down their bows, and boldly advanced towards the French men-at-arms. Their lightness of foot and nimble tactics are said to have enabled them literally to run rings aroundt the armoured men, whose axes and swords they plucked from their hands and used against their former owners! In a series of detached struggles between brawny, active Englishmen in doublet and hose against panting Frenchmen eased stiffly in mail and plate-armour, staggering and rattling as they cursed from behind closed visors, the struggle swayed back and forth. Quickly, men-at-arms came to the assistance of the archers, and, after a desperate engagement, the French were driven from the field of battle. It is said that there were some mercenary English archers among the forces of the Duke of Burgundy at Morat in 1476, but there is no record of them achieving any success against the Swiss - perhaps the rain in which the battle was fought affected their bow strings. Back to Table of Contents -- Wargamer's Newsletter # 156 To Wargamer's Newsletter List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1975 by Donald Featherstone. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |