The scenery is laid out on the table and before you lies the enemy army (unless your rules include spurious markers as is usual in Naval and World War II battles). After wondering how he got all those troops for the same points total as your meagre force you will write the orders which will send your men into battle, andlargely 3ecide the honours of the day (you can blame the dice and the rules afterwards!) Any major change of plan in mid-engagement is usually fatal, so you must decide what to do now. The following notes are taken from 2 typed list found in the back of "Elementary Tactics" by Major Peckenham-Welsh (London 1926) and were probably made by Colonel F.Russell, the previous owner of the book. I have extracted those most useful in showing the sort of factors to be considered when we try to devise orders which will allow us to "get there fustest with the mostest" whilst keeping our "men" in good morale. APPRECIATION OF A SITUATION: Do not confuse OBJECT and OBJECTIVE. The selection of the objective or objectives to attain the OBJECT may only be possible after an appreciation of the situation. Remember: CONCISENESS AND RELEVANCY Leave out a heading if it is irrelevant or unnecessary. Remember to always distinguish between FACT and ASSUMPTION. Remember to always distinguish between ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL. MAIN HEADINGS 1. Position and strength of our own and enemy forces. 2. Considerations affecting the attainment of our object. 3. Courses open to ourselves. 4. Courses open to the enemy. 5. The plan. The proposed course of action. 1. Position and strength of our own and enemy forces. (A list, Table 1, with headings Arm. My Force. Enemy. Difference is inserted in the original AW). Armament. Efficiency. Morale. Reinforcements. Resources. If a force is detached to carry out an operation which will decide the issue one way or another in 3 hours .... it is a waste of time discussing reinforcements which cannot arrive until after that time. 2. Considerations affecting the attainment of our object. 1. Considerations affecting the attainment of our object. 2. Information available to the enemy (1) reliable: (2) doubtful. 4. Topography. Roads, rails, rivers, canals, telegraphs, etc. Hills, rivers, forests. How far do all these items affect our own and the enemy's operations. 5. Conjectures. Regarding enemyts strength, movements and intentions. 6. Character of enemy's commander. Assume sane and sound tactically until he is proved otherwise. 10. Time and space. Very-vital. 11. Vulnerable spots. His. Yours. 3. Courses open to ourselves. 1. Object in view. 2.Consider HOW can we obtain our- object first. Not how can we prevent the enemy from obtaining his, - this inculcates the OFFENSIVE SPIRIT - - THE ATTACK. When the initiative rests with the enemy it may be advisable to consider his probable course of action first ... prior to making one's own plan. 3. Initiative once gained .... the enemy has to conform. 4. If the enemy remains where he is ... where ought he to be attacked? 5. If the enemy is in position....are his flanks exposed? 6. If the enemy retires ... where can we come up to him? 7. If the enemyadvances .... where are we likely to meet him? 8. Time. How much is available? 9. Preparations. What P's necessary or advisable? 10. Are my own flanks and communications secure? 4. Courses open to the enemy. 1. Situations ... realise this from the enemy's point of view and credit him with acting soundly. 2. Action. What action on his part would interfere most with your plans? 3. Countermeasures. What ones are available? 4. Remember. It is excusable to be beaten, but never to be surprised. 5 The Plan. The proposed course of action. 1. Plan. Decide on a practical, definite and simple course of action. State briefly what you propose to do. 2. Reduce detachments to a minimum, but detached forces are often necessary for feints. 3. Omit no precaution to conceal dispositions. 4. Fears. The enemy is usually just as afraid of you as you are of him. 5. Usually necessary to show what part each arm will play in the operation. The omissions deal mainly with administration and supply. I hope that this will be of some use in clarifying the writing of orders, by breaking the process down into its composite parts. If it still does not work out too well, at least our mistakes only send us away thinking "I'll get him next time -- all I need is to increase the proportion of Light/Medium/Heavy/Cavalry/Infantry/Guns -- mistakes by those for whom this synopsis of order writing were written were quite likely to have been, literally, fatal. Back to Table of Contents -- Wargamer's Newsletter # 152 To Wargamer's Newsletter List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1974 by Donald Featherstone. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com