In the light of the current arguments over the quality of the British soldier in the Napoleonic wars; his morale, capabilities, and so forth, I would like to make a few comments and suggestions on the state of morale rules in general. Firstly, I feel that they are themselves often far too generalised, and (coming back to national characteristics) deny certain types of troops the qualities, which, in real life would carry them through almost any action, whereas on the wargame table they run straight back for the start line at the first sight of blood. Take one famous example; the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava - here we have a brigade which had so far seen no action in the campaign, other than chasing the odd cossack round the camps, only 674 strong, cantering down a valley a mile and a half long under heavy artillery and infantry fire from both flank and front, straight towards twelve guns and messed Russian cavalry. That afternoon over 400 of their number were dead, missing or wounded, yet still a survivor managed to call to Lord Cardigan: "Never mind, my lord, we are ready to go again." On the wargame table, however, the brigade would probably have broken and retreated before it had even gone half way down the valley, such are most rules concerning morale. Still using the charge as an example, survivors have stated that at the beginning of the charge they experienced a very great, and very natural, feeling of fearm and their panic showed itself in the way they quickened their pace; but they did not break ranks and they did not turn about and run. As they advanced, however, their fear was forgotten and many were seized with a "blood-lust" which showed itself in the reckless rivalry between the 13th and the 17th to be the first regiment to reach the battery. To quote from W. Baring, Pemberton's chapter on Balaclava in his excellent book Battles of the Crimean War (Pan British Battles series): "Courage can stem from an instinctive resolve to live or can be inspired by rage, rage in this case at seeing comrades struck down, at being bespattered with their brains and blood while being powerless to retaliate." This "rage", I feel, is rarely, if ever, accommodated for in rules, and I see need for the creation of factors concerning desperation or determination, or just beer patriotism. To illustrate the desperation factor, in an A.C.W. action I fought recently, having lost most of my force through a mid-game panic, I had only to survive another two bounds to prevent the Federal forces from destroying a bridge before the main Confederate was due to enter the field and cross the bridge. Placing one regiment (my only regiment left intact, come to think of it) between the main Union Force and the bridge, I thought they could hold them off for the two bounds necessary. But! Lo and behold: my regiment was wiped out in one bound; and I feel that in real life a unit would be able to summon up enough courage and powers of endurance to hold a vital position for a little longer than they would in a normal melee situation. Therefore may I suggest something on the lines of the following, which is by no means accurately calculated and is only meant to provide food for thought: Using morale factors and figure type grading, double (that should set 'em off shouting) the melee capabilities (but not the fire power) of any unit in a situation a) on which the whole objective of that force undoubtedly depends b) in which they are within two(?) bounds of being relieved. c) in which they have come under very heavy fire and suffered more than half casualties, have been unable to retaliate, and have not inflicted any casualties on the enemy beforehand. OR d) when covering the retreat of two or more regiments while under half(?) the strength of the directly opposing forces. As I said before these are not intended to be rigid and are only meant to be food for thought; no doubt many people have already devised something on these lines, while others will dismiss them altogether. There are, of course, endless possibilities for special cases (I am beginning to sound like a Trade Union Leader) but if anyone does decide to adopt something like this, do limit the number of acceptable situations as they are special cases and do not often occur in real life. Lastly, going back to the question of British capabilities, I would like, once again to scavenge W. Baring Pemberton's book to use the words of "Redan" Wyndham on the subject of the British spirit: "British pluck is very much like any other pluck, and British soldiers will be found to resemble others most uncommonly, if they are badly managed." Back to Table of Contents -- Wargamer's Newsletter # 125 To Wargamer's Newsletter List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1972 by Donald Featherstone. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com