Marechal Maurice de Saxe

The Legion System

by James J. Groholski

The Marechal Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750) was one of the great military theorists and, most probably, the most distinguished French military leader of the eighteenth century. His book, Mes Reveries, can be considered among the great military classics. In this book, Saxe presented whatever he thought was new and an improvement ever the existing military strategy and tactics of his day. One of these new ideas was his system of an army based on the Roman Legion.

"One would say that it is a badly fitted machine which breaks down every instant, and which only gets under way with infinite trouble." [1]

Thus did Marshal Saxe give his impression of an Infantry Battalion of his day. Saxe was one of the first men prior to Napoleon to recognise that the principle of mobility was one of the utmost importance in war. He laid stress on drill as being the base or groundwork for both steadiness in battle and mobility. To complement this basic idea, Saxe devised the following Infantry force. [2]

In looking around for a force which was compact, flexible, and extremely mobile (as far as Infantry is concerned) Saxe turned to the Roman Legion. Using this as a model, Saxe built up an Infantry force. In his Legion, Saxe provided for four regiments, each to be composed of four centuries of Infantry, one 4 century of Light Infantry and one i century of Cavalry. Each of these centuries would be composed of ten companies. Saxe also instituted three basic strength's for the companies.

In peace, the company would consist of 2 NCO's and 5 men; for war this would be raised to 10 men and at full strength it would be raised to 15 men. In each of these three categories the number of NCO's would remain the same. Thus, Saxe made it possible to increase the strength of the Legion by some 1,600 men without adding additional officers or NCO's, Saxet however, stated that Cavlalry would be kept at full war strength on a permanent basis as he considered only veteran cavalry to worth anything.

On a full war basis then, Saxe's centuries would consist of 184 officers and men. The fixed number of officers would, he felt, provide uniformity in carrying out evolutions during the war.

Saxe's regiment would total out at 741 officers and men, plus 70 Light Infantry and 70 Cavalry. This gives his regiment a total of 881 men, all arms. His legion would consist of 3,579 officers and men plus 2-12 pdr. guns and 2 pontoons. Thus, the breakdown was as follows:

    Infantry Company: 15 men + 2 NCO's.
    Century: 150 men, 20 NCO's, 12 Officers, 2 Artymen + 1 Amusette.
    Regiment: 600 men, 80 NCO's, 53 Officers, 8 Artymen, 4 Amusettes, 70 cavalry, 70 Light Infantry.
    Legion 2,400 Inf., 320 NCO's, 217 Officers, 82 Artymen and Engineers, 16 Amusettes, 2 12pdr., 2 Pontoons, 280 Cavalry, 280 Light Infantry.
    Total of 3,579 men all arms.

In addition, each century would be provided with light artillery of Saxe's own design. This small cannon which is described as looking like an overgrown fusil and was named "l'Amusette") was on wheels and was provided with rails so that it could be picked up and carried by two men. This cannon was designed to fire a 4 pound ball up to 4,000 paces (4 times the range of contemporary German and Swedish guns), or so Saxe claimed, and could be manned by a crew of one.

Attack

Saxe a Legion would attack in the following manner. The Light Infantry would be dispersed on the Legions front and about 100-200 paces ahead of it. The regiments of the Legion would be advancing in column of Centuries four ranks deep with intervals between the regiments. This four deep formation would be made up of 2 ranks of fusil men in front, who would fire, and 2 ranks of men armed-with both fusils and a 14 1/2 foot pike. These rear ranks would not use their fusils. This formation was due to Saxe to mistrust of the effectiveness of fire power. Saxe did, however, state that in some occasions one must resort to fire power. These conditions being when attacked by cavalry or when fighting in rough or enclosed ground. Saxe was also derisive of the practice of fire by command. He considered the whole thing preposterous and against common sense.

While the regiments were advancing, the Light In fantry would be moving up on the enemy line. They were instructed to begin single fire when 300 paces away from the enemy and continuing up to 50 paces; at which point they would retire on the Legion by word of command. Prior to this, the regiments would double up, forming 8 deep ranks with spaces between regiments into which the Light Infantry would retire and fill up. The attached Cavalry would be formed into two troops per regiment and would take station thirty paces to the rear of the regiment. In addition, the Light Artillery (which Saxe called "amusettes") would be firing on the enemy line.

Thus, we can see that Saxe advocated a flexible, all arms unit with troops advancing in small enough units which would avoid the lumbering gait of the battalions. These Centuries, then, were able to advance rapidly without firing and crash into and through the enemy line which had been softened by the Light Artillery and Infantry. Saxe considered that this type of assault would avoid the inconvenience of the heavy assault column advocated by Folard.

This Legion envisioned by Saxe was the forerunner of the Infantry Division adopted by the French Army some 30 years later.

SAXE ON CAVALRY

In speaking of Cavalry [3], Saxe insisted that it should be well trained and hardy. It should be instructed in mass yet simple manoeuvres. It must be trained to fight as a unit and should not engage in mix-it-up fights with enemy Cavalry. Saxe also maintained that any Cavalry unable to charge in squadron formation without breaking, for a distance of two thousand paces was unfit for war. He also stated that Cavalry should be drilled in squadron exercises at least three times a week.

In his forces, Saxe only considered two types of mounted forces. These were Cavalry (Cuirassiers) and Dragoons. He had no use for Light Cavalry, maintaining that Dragoons could do everything a Hussar could and more besides. Saxe also stated that, for an army of 30,000-50,000 men, one should not have more than 40 squadrons of Cavalry. Tais force would be used only for battle action and mounted guards, nothing else. It would, as did the artillery, march with the main body. The Dragoons would be twice as numerous as the Cavalry, although both would have regiments of the same strength. These troop must know both mounted and infantry drill and would perform all the functions of hussars and skirmishers.

Both Cavalry and Dragoons would be formed into regiments of four centuries, each of 130 men. Saxe strongly maintained that Cavalry must always be kept at full strength but, as for the Dragoons they may be reduced in number or dismounted for use a, Infantry.

Saxe considered only two cavalry drills absolutely necessary. These were right and left turns by half-quarter-ranks and to caracol. The caracol was to be executed as in fig. 1. The former enabled Cavalry and Dragoons to gain ground to right or left when there was insufficient room to enable the entire squadron to wheel (fig.2). Saxe stated that the Dragoons must be especially well versed in this manoeuvre As it was performed preparatory to dismounting to fight on foot.

These theories of Marshal Saxe were built upon and used to a great extent by Napoleon and others. Saxe's doctrine of war was, in general, to take all necessary security precautions, avoid negligence, and do that which the enemy does not anticipate, attempting to catch him off balance and vulnerable.

In conclusion, Saxe was dissatisfied with manoeuvring with light, highly mobile columns, disconcerting the enemy and striking him while he was off balance. He was a man who attempted to improve many of the defects of warfare as practiced in his day. In setting forth his theories, he, and others, laid the groundwork for the French Armies of the revolution and the Empire.

Notes

[1]. Saxe, Man Reveries, 19 32-33.
[2]. Discussed is Velune III Mes Reveries.
[3]. Ibid. p77-119.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Phillips, T.R. Roots of Strategy.
Quimby, R.S. The Background of Napoleonic Warfare.


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