One of the least documented aspects of Napoleonic armies in historical sources on the Napoleonic Wars is the loss suffered due to non-combat causes (i.e., 'Strategic Consumption,' or 'Attrition'). Attrition figures always have to be derived from available strength data. Little or no effort was expended on keeping records of non-combat losses at the time, and historians of the later 19th century seem to overlook the matter entirely.

In order to really calculate attrition we have to begin with a total army strength given at various periods, taking note of which entire formations have been transferred into or away from the army, and then determine as closely as possible the numbers of replacements received by the army. The difference is attrition. That calculation can be done for an entire campaign or for a brief period. Another method is to check the strength of an army before and after a long march during which no combat took place and no replacements were received.

This is the approach we followed in the Sun of Austerlitz, determining Attrition levels of Kutusov's First Russian Army during its march from Poland to Bavaria at the opening of the campaign. Scott Bowden in his book Napoleon and Austerlitz states on page 173: "When excluding Rosen's detached VI Column numbering approximately 7,500 (including artillerists), the units remaining with Kutuzov numbered 38,905 when they left Radziwilow.

More than 11,000 of these young Russian soldiers fell out of ranks on the way to the Bavarian border and never rejoined their units. Therefore, Kutuzov's army suffered an astounding strategic consumption rate of 30% on its march to Braunau. 1

Bowden calculates the distance of the march from Teschen as 265 miles, and the daily average at slightly more than 16 and one-half miles per day. He provides a table on page 293 that shows the strengths of each column of the Russian Army upon their departure and again on their arrival in Braunau, which makes it possible to determine the attrition rate for each column.

However, Bowden states incorrectly the distances of the marches and therefore arrives at an incorrect march rate for the Russian Army. The attrition rates seem not that astounding given the actual distance marched. Attrition rates suffered in the French Army over the same period are shown in Bowden's Appendices. For instance, on 23 September 1805, as Davout's III Corps troops, still far away from the enemy, were about to cross the Rhine, their strength was 25,161.

On 5 November they numbered 22,388, a loss of 11% by the best troops anywhere over a six-week period. The soldiers of III Corps in hospitals or in rear areas increased from 2,855 to 4,873 during the period.

Let's look at the progress of one brigade in III Corps. The brigade of Pierre-Charles Lochet was the second of three brigades in Louis Friant's division, the division that would march so quickly from Vienna to reinforce Napoleon's right flank in the defense of Sokolnitz. This brigade was arguably the best infantry unit in Napoleon's army at the time.

On 23 September the brigade mustered 1,522 men in its 48th Line Regiment and 1,778 in its other Regiment, the 111th Line. (Figures are provided in the Appendices to Bowden's Austerlitz, sourced to the Archives of the Service Historique de 1'etat-Major de l'Armie de Terre, Vincennes.) As the brigade rested in Vienna on 29 November awaiting the summons northward, the 48th had 1,365 men and the 111 with 1,440.

From the time it crossed the Rhine until it came to rest in Vienna two months later, the brigade lost 15% of its manpower without having seen any significant combat. Davout's Lt. Cavalry was engaged at Ried on 30 October, and again at Lambach the following day; his Advanced Guard under Heudelet encountered the rearguard of Meerveldt on 6 November, and destroyed his main body on the 8th; but Lochet's brigade played no significant role in any of these engagements. The number of replacements Lochet may have received during the period is unknown. We know that the other units of the Grande Arm& probably suffered a higher rate of attrition. That gives us a good indication of the levels we are looking to recreate.

Here is how we went on to determine the actual attrition rates for the Attrition Table.

1. Kutusov's march from Radziwilow to Teschen

Kutusov's Army was able to march all the way across western Poland in just under a month (29 days, of which about 23 days were spent marching). The troops set out on 25 August and arrived in Teschen on 22 September, the eve of the French crossing of the Rhine.

a) Point-to-point distances
Radziwilow-Radom 50 mi.
Radom-Skarzysko 30 mi.
Skarzysko-jedrzejow 50 mi.
Jedrzejow-Krakow 50 mi.
Krakow-Teschen 50 mi.
total 230 mi.

b) Allowing for the meander of roads
230 x 1.175 270 mi.

C) Rendered in Game Terms

The Russian Army covered 270 miles in 23 days of marching, for an average of 11.74 mi./day, or 6-2 mi. hexes, expending 3 MP per day, assuming all the roads were Primary Roads (at 1/2 MP per hex). This equals 15 Regular Marches at an average of 4.5 MPs each.

II. Kutusov's March from Teschen to Braunau

Kutusov's Army completed the remainder of the march to Bavaria at a redoubled pace in just 20 days, 16 of which were spent on the road. Departing on 23 September, their lead elements (Bagration's column) arrived in Braunau on 12 October.

a) Point-to-point distance
Teschen-Olmatz 70 mi.
Olmiltz-Brno 46 mi.
Brno- Hollabrunn 50 mi.
Hollabrunn-Melk 46 mi.
Melk-Linz 50 mi.
Linz-Braunau 50 mi.
total 312 mi.

b) Allowing for the meander of roads
312 x 1.175 367 mi.

c) Rendered in Game Terms The Russian Army covered 367 miles in 16 days of marching, for an average of 22.9 mi./day, or 11-2 mi. hexes, expending 5.5 MP per day, assuming all the roads were Primary Roads (at 1/2 MP per hex). This equals 10 Regular Marches at an average of 5.5 MPs each and 6 Forced Marches at an average of 5.5 MPs each.

The total strength of Kutusovs 5 columns on 25 August was 39,040, and the remaining strength on their arrival on 23 October was 27,092. Therefore, they suffered 12 SPs of Attrition, probably all of which occurred in the last 20 days, or 10 Game-Turns, of the journey.

The army moved not in one mass but column by column, at strictly controlled intervals. The army made an administrative march without concern for the march security of the separate columns, since they were moving in friendly territory far from the enemy. Once they reached Braunau and the Inn River-the boundary of Bavaria and the gateway to the theater of active operations-they had to halt and close-up.

Concentration of the whole army took about two weeks, from 12 October to 23 October. The spacing of the columns was such that the last column was 11 days behind the leading elements. Thus, we can estimate that the II Column arrived in Braunau about the 14th, the III Column about the 16th and 17th, the IV Column on the 19th and 20th, and the V Column on the 22nd and 23rd.

The Austrian Administration provided food and fodder for the troops en route; they even provided some 2,233 two-horse carts, more than enough for Bagration's leading column to ride forward from Teschen. In order to speed their march even further, Kutusov ordered the Army's baggage train left behind at Teschen.

The Strength of the various columns on 25 August, and on 23 October, 1805, as given in Bowden, were as follows:
I Column (Bagration) 7,324 5,435 (.742)
II Column (Essen II) 7,020 4,992 (.711)
III Column (Docturov) 6,367 4,475 (.703)
IV Column (Skepelov) 6,095 3,629 (.595)
V Column (v. Maltitz) 8,263 5,351 (.647)

As you can see above, each column of troops begins the march from Radziwilow with 6, 7, or 8 SPs. It is assumed that few of these were lost on the first half of the march to Teschen, for two reasons: 1. This part of the march took place within the Russian Empire; and 2. The pace of the march prior to Teschen was half that of the later segment.

Assuming that the army marched in column order with Bagration in front, v. Maltitz in rear, we ought to see a greater attrition rate suffered by the troops at the back of the line than by those in advance, because of the churned-up mud caused by thousands of marching men, horses, and wagons during a rainy autumn. Additionally, the provisions set aside for the army would have been over-consumed by those arriving first. The figures in the third column (in parenthesis) show the percentage of men remaining in the ranks at the end of the journey, indicating that Skepelov's IV Column may have been the last to march, falling behind v. Maltitz's column. Bagration's Advanced Guard column fared the best, losing 25.8% over the two months of marching, while Essen lost 28.9%, Docturov 29.7%, and v. Maltitz 35.3%. Skepelovs column fared the worst, losing 40.5% of the men who setout on 25 August.

If the game would have any value as a simulation and tell us anything about the campaign, it must be able to duplicate historical conditions.

Many of these men may well have straggled-in to Olmatz to rejoin the colors before the battle of Austerlitz on 2 December. Each column except Maltitz's lost 2 SPs: Bagration and Essen each started with about 7 SPs and ended with 5. Docturov and Skepelov each went from 6 down to 4 SPs, and v. Maltitz went from 8 down to 5.

All the Attrition should be suffered during the six forced marches performed by the troops after 23 September. That means our Attrition table will have a two-in-six chance of losing 1 SP for a force of 7 Strength Points.

It was critical for us to get the attrition figures in the game to fit historical parameters. The attrition table sets the speed at which the armies in the game can operate. If this table is not accurate, it will either allow the armies to move at an ahistorical pace, or cause forces to suffer too much attrition in attempting to duplicate their historical marches.