The following article, drawn from Thiers' Consulate and Empire of France, lays- out the situation in Spain prior to the start of Massena's Campaign in Portugal.
After Talavera the Spaniards fled into Andalusia and Sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position in the environs of Badajoz, enlisting the lapse of time, always a great enemy to invasion. p. 172
Two parties in Spain, led by Jovellanos and the Palafoxes respectively, one sought reforms in the monarchy, and the other feared revolution and sought the immediate readoption of the royal regency. p. 173
St. Cyr's siege of Girone, with Verdier, against a garrison of 7,000 under Don Alvarez de Castro, which surrendered Dec 11, 1809. p. 175
General Suchet was complete master of Saragossa and the fertile plains of Aragon, p. 178
The guerilla bands overran the borders of Aragon (enumerated list) p. 179
Only one-fourth of reinforcements ever reached the front. p. 182
Advance of Duke del Parque, late Oct 1809. p. 183
Kellermann's realistic assessment of the situation. pp. 182-83
Marchand checked at Tarnames, p. 184
Marshal Soult at Madrid p. 185 I Corps-Victor II Corps-Reynier IV Corps-Sebastiani V Corps-Mortier Milhaud's dragoons (1 SP) Div. Dessoles Joseph's Guards
Battle of Ocana, 19 Nov.
Defeat of 50,000 Spaniards terminated the campaign of 1809.
Plan of Campaign for Spring 1810
Joseph's forces were diverted into Andalusia; with 30,000 men to join Massena by the left bank of the Tagus after the submission of Southern Spain.
Massena's Army of Portugal p. 190 VI Corps-Ney, in Old Castile VIII Corps-Junot (the two corps together totalling 60,000) Cav-Montbrun, 10,000 Gde-15,000
Suchet to take Lerida and Mequineza, but Soult changed Suchet's mission to the covering of the left of the Army of Andalusia. P. 191
Joseph's advance upon the Sierra Morena, Jan. 19, 1810. p. 192
Seville captured, 1 Feb. p. 193
Despite the success of Joseph's offensive, the troops in Andalusia were stretched thin in holding widely-separated regions and would prove unable to spare any troops to support Massena. p. 196
Marshal Ney made a token approach to Ciudad Rodrigo and then withdrew to Salamanca. p. 197
Napoleon converted the provinces of Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre and Biscay into military governments, a step toward their incorporation into France. p. 198
Reorganization of the Army of Spain: Commander in Chief: Napoleon (no longer Joseph) Soult-South - I, IV, V in Grenada, Andalusia, and Estramadura. Joseph-Center - Div. Dessoles + depots at Madrid Massena- Portugal
Plan of Campaign for Summer and Fall of 1810
September offensive in Portugal still called for an advance by Soult on the left bank of the Tagus and Massena on the right bank. The summer to be occupied in sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida p. 201
Siege of Lerida by Suchet; capitulated on 14 May. p. 204
Massena departs for Spain. Mis givingsin re: materiel shortages, his own health, and the insubordination of the other Marshals. p. 204
Massena arrives at Salamanca. p. 206 Materiel bound for his army had been seized and consumed by the corps or intercepted by guerilla bands. Utter decay of discipline.
Massena sent the siege train and Ney's corps toward Ciudad Rodrigo. Junot to support his right. Guerillas intercepted the route across the and plain between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. Massena requested the prompt arrival of Drouet to keep the line open after his departure for Portugal. p. 207
Ney proposed an expedition against 20,000 English and 15,000 Portugese troops at Viseu with the VI, VIII and Motbrun. Massena reminded the Marshals of Napoleon's directive to take the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida during the intense heat of summer.
Wellington's plan to retreat before the French, wearing them down, until he reached the strong position of Torres Vedras- and leaving the French to perish in their tracks. p. 209
Marshal Ney commenced the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo about the 1st of June. With this, the campaign begins. p. 210
THE SIEGES ON THE BORDER
Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, pp. 210-12
Governor: General Hervasti
Garrison: 4000 soldiers
+ 1 bn of wealthy landholders (800 men)
Population: a fanatical 6000
Artillery: numerous
Trenches opened: Night of 15/16 June,
north side of fortress
The rain which had lasted the whole month of May, and which now in mid-June recommenced, caused more damage than all the sorties of the enemy, delaying by the effect it had on the roads, the arrival of the siege train.
Ney employed snipers firing from fox holes to suppress the guns of the fortress.
p. 210
Massena arrived with the siege train of 46 guns on 24 June, evening. The bombardment began on 25th. The fort surrendered on July 9th. The VI Corps was placed on half rations by the end of the month. p. 212
Massena returned to Salamanca where, in his absence the most important matters had made little progress. He worked at stockpiling provisions for 20 days for the army, besides what was found in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. p. 213
August-Ney advanced to Almeida, Wellington watched passively from Alverca.
The Siege of Almeida, p. 213
Garrison: 5,000 Portugese, stores, good ordnance.
1st fortnight of August-collecting provisions & material, awaiting siege train (train increased to 64 guns).
15 August-Trenches opened.
20 August-Bombardment commenced. 21 August-Surrender of the fortress.
end of August-spent creating a base of operations, provisioning the fortresses, hospitals and magazines formed, and LOC organized and garrisoned.
THE INVASION OF PORTUGAL
Massena planned to march across the frontier between 10-15 Sept. Napoleon urged him to move sooner. Massena's concerns, however, were insufficient forces, communications intercepted, his soldiers could not forage while in presence of the enemy. Requested a large reinforcement with provisions and munitions.
Massena delayed his departure to the 16th in order to await cooler weather and to complete his preparations,. He had only 4 months' provisions in the two fortresses and had only 16 days rations for his field army. p. 215
Thiers blames the French generals for failing to cooperate.
19 Sept-Viseu: 7000 population.
The French found vegetables and cattle. Two day halt allowed the wheeled units to catch up and repair carriages. Roads almost impassible to wheeled units, p. 216
27 Sept-Along the Mondego, and Battle of Busaco
Entire Anglo-Portugese Army of 50,000 assembled on the plateau of the Sierra Alcoba, pp. 218-20
The first encounter between French & English, French lost 4500 men. The baggage train, now loaded with 3000 wounded, but lightened of the provisions which had been consumed, would follow Ney.
Three Routes to Lisbon
a) Eastern- The Tagus via Santarem to Lisbon
b) Middle Road- Pombal, Leyria, Moliano, Alcoentra
c) Seacoast- Alcobaca, Obidos, Torres Vedras
Hill retreated on a, Wellington by b and c; Massena pursued by b.
9 Oct- French Advanced Guard reached Alenquer 10 Oct-Villa Nova & pursued Crawford's & Hill's rearguard
11 Oct-Eng. Army assembled in front of Alhandra and Sobral.
(The Torres Vedras position had been chosen 12 months before.) p. 221
THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS
3,000 Portugese artillerists were available to man 150+ guns in the lines.
General Hillstationed behind the heights of Alhandra
Crauford (Lt. Div.) between Alhandra and opposite Sobral
Picton (from the coast road) line of the Zizambro to Torres V.
Leith-in front of Torres V.
Spencer, Cole, Campbell-Torres V. la Romana-enroute from Badajos with 8000 Spaniards.
TOTAL LINES-30,000 English, 30,000+ Portugese, 8,000 Spanish, 700 guns
Actually three separate lines-2 behind Torres V., the last protecting the harbor of Lisbon for troops to embark. p. 223
English transport flotilla cost 75m pounds per year to maintain. p. 224
Massena's Army had not more than 45,000. To attack the lines would require 90- 100,000 men. An attack by 45,000 would mean 10,000 killed & wounded and further losses in the ensuing retreat. p. 224
It was necessary in providing subsistence for French troops that both banks of the Tagus be occupied, in order to secure all the resources of the fertile province of Alentejo.
14 Nov- Withdrawal to Santarem and Thomar
With one div. at Leyria to watch Estrella and guard the Coimbra road, the French could still at this distance blockade the lines, relieved from perpetual small skirmishes.
Reynier-Santarem Junot-Torres Novas, p. 225
Ney-Thomar with divisions covering the timber yards of Punhente
Massena's goals-crossing the Tagus, capture Abrantes, and blockade the lines while awaiting reinforcements.
Marshal Ney dissatisfied: The withdrawal did not improve chances of communication with Almeida. "Had we kept only the cavalry and a brigade of infantry at Leyria, we would have insured the Coimbra and Almeida Roads could be speedily regained. And a post on the Zezere would have given better communications with Spain on a route less infested by guerillas. p. 226
Reinforcements were expected via Almeida on from Andalusia via Badajoz. Preparations for crossing the Tagus and attack Abrantes.
General Foy's mission to Paris to explain the situation and urge the immediate transmission of stores and reinforcements. p. 226
"On this extreme promontory rested the fate of the nations of Europe, for had the English been once expelled from Portugal, the universal tendency of affairs throughout Europe would have been toward peace. "
Wellington was threatened by two dangers p. 227
1) French concentration toward Lisbon (in rear of lines). Troops in Andalusia might join Massena's army by the left bank of the Tagus.
2) Loss of support from his own government-(Morale Track).
Wellington asked the Spanish to destroy the bridges of the Guadiana, and fortify Elvas, Campo Mayo, and Badajoz. The Portugese refused his request to devastate the province of Alentejo. p. 227.
British officers sent home letters full of bitter complaints. p. 228
King George suffered a relapse of mental incapacity and a regency was established under the Prince of Wales, a friend of the opposition party. However, the King's illness was not expected to be of sufficient duration for him to name a new cabinet which would have been from the peace party.
Also in December 1810, the commercial crisis resulting from warehouses full of imported goods. Revenue of the government 37n., expenses 56m.
Any day the Prince Regent might appoint a new cabinet. p. 230
About 8 Nov-General Foy despatched with 400 picked men to Paris, p. 231.
Following the Zezere, in 6-7 days through dangerous country he came to Cuidad Rodrigo.
Gen. Drouet had only one of his 2 divs. at Burgos, awaiting the 2nd. Gen. Dorsenne had 15 - 18,000 men, great difficulty keeping open the route from Burgos to Valladolid.
About 28 Nov-General Foy arrived in Paris. Foy brought the only direct communication from the army of Port. since the start of the campaign.
Napoleon prepared orders for the despatch of all the disposable troops in Old Castile to Massena's aid. p. 233.
EUROPEAN GRAND STRATEGY
p. 233Napoleon's Goals-
- sincere Alliance with Austria
- appease Germany by evacuating the countries beyond the Rhine
- devote all his attention to Spain
- sustain the continental blockade.
To increase the effectiveness of the
blockade he had
13 Dec 1810-Napoleon converted the Duchy of Oldenburg, a portion of Hanover, the territories of Bremen, of Hamburg, and of Lubeck.
These "usurpations of territory violent confiscations, and ruinous exactions had aroused all that distrust which Napoleon had desired to dissipate. p. 234
Russia p. 234
Treated most cavalierly since the war with Austria. and expected by Napoleon to observe his decrees on trade with neutrals as though they were bound by treaty Russia was alarmed by the annexation of Oldenburg and the other territories and by the augmentation of the garrison of Danzig and convinced that with Napoleon there was but a short interval between estrangement and actual warfare. First however, Alexander wished to consolidate his conquests along the Danube gained from the Turks in 1810 and for this one more campaign would be required. p. 235
Already deprived of trade with England, he was unwilling to lose trade contacts with America and Sweden [Napoleon decreed all Neutrals that touched at England "denationalized." p. 2381 and would choose war rather than suppress his country's commerce.
Russian military precautions-line on the Dwina-Dnieper. Fortifications constructed at Riga, Dunaberg, Vitebsk, Smolensk and Bobruisk.
- regiments in Finland recalled to Lithuania
- divisions on the Polish frontier placed on war footing. p. 23 6
Jan. 1811-Napoleon determined to teach Russia a final lesson, and finish the job he had begun at Friedland. p. 239
Gave divided attention to the Peninsula and no longer thought of leading there in person. p. 242
It became impossible to send a reinforcement of 60 - 80,000 when he was occupied in preparing three armies between the Rhine and Vistula.
He would try and furnish reinforcements in the shape of the divisions of reserve serving at the sieges in Catalonia and Castille, along with the corps of General Drouet and the Army of Andalusia. p. 242
The troops were in rags. The officers were compelled to pay enormous sums to the few workmen who remained at Santarem.
General Eble constructed a pontoon bridge at Punhete out of nothing. The horses of the baggage train began to die for want of fodder. Eble obtained cordage at Santarem (Supply Source or Depot). p. 243
The sad state of the Hospitals p. 245
Napoleon directed Massena to ensure the power of maneuvering on both banks of the Tagus to accumulate provisions for an extended stay beneath the walls of Lisbon; to capture Abrantes with its stores; to entice the English beyond the lines to risk a general engagement. p. 245
Drouet (one div., 7,000 men) arrived by the road through the Mondego valley, p. 245, debouching upon Leyria. Without provisions he had subsisted on the supplies in Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.
Gardanne's Dragoons (2,000) arrived at Neys advanced posts between Espinhal and Thomar. The IX Corps of Gen. Drouet scarcely amounted to 15,000, 8,000 of which had been left behind at Viseu to maintain, communications.
Massena determined to cross the Tagus so as to avail himself of the provisions in! the province of Alentejo-sufficient for 34' months in the environs of Santarem; to continue the blockade of the Lines, and await the army of Andalusia. When this reinforcement should arrive, he would advance on Lisbon.
General Foy's return with a new detachment of 2,000 men on 5 February increased morale.
The impossibility of obtaining subsistence in the present camp.
First crossing place proposed Punhete-rejected and then Santarem proposed.
General Foy said the V Corps of the, Army of Aragon (under Soult) would probably arrive on the left of the Tagus in 10 days. p. 249
Marshal Soult approached slowly, reaching Oliveica with Div. Gerard, and invested it,' on 11 January. The other div. marched more slowly in escort of the siege train. p. 253
Soult (w/Mortier in chg of V) capturedi Olivenca on 23 January. Opened trenches at Badajoz on 20 Jan. Div. Gazan arrived in: first days of February with guns & tools, raising Soult to 12,000 infantry, 1200 sappersl & miners and artillerists and 2,500 cavalry.
18 Feb.-Attacked the camp of Santa Engracia and dispersed the Spanish covering army.
Beresford, who commanded at Abrantes, was commanded to delay Soult on the tributaries of the Tagus but not to risk a battle. Soult was unaware that the road ahead lay open.
Massena lacked provisions (15 days of biscuit remained) and increasingly demoralized army, first disappointed by the arrival of Drouet with no more than 7,000 men and made worse by the nonappearance of Soult. Massena gave orders for the retreat to the Mondego to begin by the 4th of March. p. 258
THE RETREAT
Here's an opportunity for a truly unusual scenario; where one is not advancing but trying to getaway from a watchful enemy.
On 4 March the sick and the baggage pulled out, and the whole army followed on the eve. of the 5th. Reynier withdrew from Santarem to Golega. Junot toward Torres Novas and Ourem; Ney toward Leiria and Ourem. p. 258
7 March-Reynier, Thomar; Junot, Ourem; Ney, Leiria; Loison remained at Punhete until evening, then burned the pontoons.
9 March-Ney, Pombal, with Massena.
Wellington concentrated against him, Junot taking positions at Coimbra and Mondego. Drouet announced his departure from Ney's command, promising to retire slowly
The British threatened to cross the Soure and Ney fell back on Venda da Cruz.
12 March-Ney with 12,000 inf. , 1200 cav. followed by 25,000 English in three colsPicton (R) with Port. under Pack; Cole (C); Erskine (L) with Lt. Inf-cav. linked these columns.
Ney fell back to Redinha. Wellington attacked with his 3 columns. p. 261
Ney abandoned Condeixa and fell back on Miranda de Corvo to join Loison, Clausel and Reynier p. 263
He ordered Montbrun to fall back likewise from the bank of the Mondego.
Massena at Fuente Cuberta with Loison and Clausel. Ordering Ney to halt his retreat at the end of the defile (Casal Novo) to give the heavy baggage time to escape, he withdrew during the night, debouching behind Ney. p. 263
Ney fought a skillful rear-guard on the 14th, leaving 2 divs. on the farther bank of the Ceyra. Wellington attacked these on the 15th am. Div. Mermet occupied the heights while Div. Marchand withdrew over the narrow bridge. p. 264
These troops panicked at the bridge, but Ney rallied a battalion and some voltigeur companies and ascended the heights to assist Mermet and at this, order was restored.
On the 17th, Massena withdrew to the Alva, reaching it on the 18th. Junot near the confluence with the Mondego. Ney in center, behind Ponte Murcelha; Reynier towards the mts. and the Estrella (the source of the Alva). Drouet was withdrawing on the Almieda road. p. 265
Reynier abandoned the Sierra de Murcelha and posted on the Sierra de Moita in the rear. This caused Ney to yield Ponte Murcelha. The army now retreated into Spain. p. 266
The English halted to bring up supplies. Port. troops dying of hunger. Without being pursued the French arrived on 22 March at the heights separating the Mondego from the Coa, back within the frontiers of Spain. p. 266
effective end of campaign game.
PLANS FOR NEW CAMPAIGNS AND CHANGES IN COMMAND
Massena proposed to Cross the Sierra de Gata and descend the Tagus by Alcantara. He had 40,000 men, still after the withdrawal of Drouet, to act in connection with the Army of Andalusia by a new road. These orders stirred universal indignation.
Massena assigned Reynier's corps to Belmonte; Junot, Guardia; Ney, Celorico. Ney demanded to see the orders of the Emperor which he knew did not exist. p. 268
Massena removed Ney from command and appointed General Loison in his place.
Napoleon nominated Marshal Bessieres as commander of all troops in Northern Spain. Massena renounced the project of a new campaign due to lack of resources, horses and equipment.
Massena sent an officer to Napoleon to request supplies and led his army into canonments at Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca and Samora.
In the meantime, Marshal Soult had accomplished the siege of Badajoz on 11 March. p. 271
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