The jungles and fields of Southeast Asia are no strangers to conflict but 1979 has brought to them the largest conflicts ever between nations which claim allegiance to the doctrines of Communism. The Vietnamese invaded and occupied most of Cambodia while the Chinese subsequently invaded Vietnam all the while in the shadow of 44 Soviet Divisions poised to march.
Looking beyond the headlines one is struck by the bankruptcy of many traditional means of analysis. The comfortable bi-polar view (the good guys against the bad guys) that emerged in the First World War and sustained us through the Second, was powerful obviating the need for deeper analyses. It may be that the 'monolithic communist bloc' of 1951-61 was actually forced upon the Communist states in a union that now appears actificial.
Nor can the world be seen as dividing along some tri-polar lines. The Pol Pots of the world take their marching order from no one. The key is to beware of simple explanations The issues involved are if anything. more complicated than they appear.
Vietnam was at the time of the Chinese attack very much engaged in a two front war. Every one of the 13 regular PAVN (Peoples Army of Vietnam) divisions was in Carnbodia. according to US military sources. The secondline home defense divisions that spent the Vietnam War in North Vietnam were pulled South to replace them.
There are reports of continuing warfare in South Vietnam allegedly including al least one case of Viet Cong and ARVN troops joining forces aganst the Northerners. It's obvious that the North Vietnarnese have had trouble dealing with ethnic rninorities throughout Vietnarn. The 'Parrot's Beak' region on the Cambodian border has been a a source of conflict since the fall of Saigon in 1975 and there is doubtless need for continued military presence. Garrisoning North Vietnam was apparaently militia and support units--the 308th Training Division was one unit identified in the fighting.
The five divisions reported along the border were to screen and delay--classsic covering force. They did well, aided bythe terrain--dense miserable country that was a contributing factor to a slow advance.
While military reasons have been offered for why the Chinese did not defeat the Vietnamese as thoroughly as they did the Americans or Indians, it would repay the effort to sirnply consider the reason for the Chinese Invasion was to teach the Vietnamese a lesson. It was not to take Hanoi nor to cut up five divisions of second line Vietnamese. The Chinese advanced at a deliberate pace for what may have been anv number of reasons. Desire to keep the war lirnited. All sides were making gestures to prevent escalation. The Vietnamese stated that they would not break diplomatic relations with China. Both sides refrained from using their considerable air strength even in tactical missions. The considerable Soviet squadron off the Vietnamose coast just hovered. It convoyed no troops northwards. While the Soviets did bring the 44 divisions situated on the Chinese border to full strength the whole frightening and massive procoss of Russian mobilization was not begun.
The Chinese Army apparently relied more heavily on artillery than the fast moving infantry infiltration. Of course, by Soviet standards of 70-100 weapons per km firing at a maxirnum rate for 20 minutes for a breakthrough, the "sheel a second" the Chinese delivered is rather paltry. Yet the latter stages of the Korean War were marked by effective use of Chinese artillery and mortars so the Chinese ability to use artillery shoulld not be denigrated.
For almost twenty years the Chinese Army has been primarily defensively oriented. Their divisions are relatively static, growing much of their own food and assisting in civic porograms. The units sent into Vietnam were apparently pulled from futher north--photos show most seem to be the taller, bigger men of Northern Chine.
The Russians remain throughout history the great enigma. They still maintain the capability for a Invasion of China But the course of Soviet relations in the later decades of this century is still uncertain. It is difficult to conceive of what the Soviets would do even if they did invade China. Would they garrison China? Annex Manchuria as if it were Alsace-Lorraine? These alternatives are rather unlikely if not impossible. Yet throughout Asia what was once thought incredible daily becomes fact.
Ground Forces Deployed Along the Russo-Chinese Border, 1979
SOVIET FORCES:
Mid-Asia: 6 Mech, 1 Airmobile, 1 Armor Divs
Siberia: 4 Mechanized Divs
Transbalkal: 8 Mech, 2 Armored Divs
Mongolia: 3 Mech, 1 Armor Divs
Far East: 19 Mech, 1 Airmobile, 2 Armor Divs.
Sakalin: 1 Mech Div
Kamchatka: 1 Mech Div
CHINESE FORCES
Sinklang: 4-5 Inf, 2 Cav Divs.
Inner Mongolia: 5 Inf., 1 Artillery Divs
Peking Area: 19 Inf, 1 Airmobile, 3 Armor, 1-7 Cav Divs
Manchuria: 21 Inf., 1 Airmobile. 2 Armor, 2 Artillery Divs
Source: Frankfurther Allegemeine Zeitung, 24 II 79, page 4.
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© Copyright 1979 by Operational Studies Group.
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