The blueprints for a major Allied drive into the Khe Sanh Plateau had been on the drawing boards at III MAF Headquarters in the embryo stage since late January. The 1st ACD was slated for the campaign since that division had displaced from Bong Son, in II Corps, and arrived at Phu Bai on 22 January. Three days after he assumed operational control of the new division, General Cushman directed General Tolson to prepare a contingency plan for the relief of Khe Sanh.
This action eventually resulted in Operation PEGASUS but there was a series of events which delayed its start until April. The first was the disruptive Communist TET Offensive and the resulting Battle of Hue City which raged until 25 February. Throughout February and early March, the 1st ACD was busily engaged in and around the old imperial capital. Logistics was another consideration.
General Westmoreland had initiated a supply build-up in I Corps during December 1967 but III MAF did not yet have sufficient stock levels to support an operation the size of PEGASUS, especially while the heavy fighting still continued in Hue. Finally, the poor weather prevented large-scale helicopter operations in the Khe Sanh area.(200)
An alteration of the command structure in I Corps also indirectly affected the proposed operation. Until the early part of 1968, the three divisions in I Corps (1st MarDiv, 3d MarDiv, and the U. S. Army Americal Division) were under the direct control of General Cushman, CG, III MAF. General Westmoreland, however, was convinced that a critical, if not the most critical, phase of the war was taking shape in I Corps and had begun to pump reinforcements into the two northern provinces. These included the 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne Division.
To keep closer tabs on the action in the north, General Westmoreland also established a forward echelon of his MACV Headquarters, under the Deputy, ComUSMACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, at Camp Hochmuth, Phu Bai on 9 February. There was little formal change in the command structure; General Abrams simply acted as an agent for ComUSMACV in an advisor/coordinator role. On 10 March, however, the structure did change; MACV Forward was converted to Provisional Corps, Vietnam (P CV) and placed under the operational control of General Cushman, CG, III MAF. PCV's new commander, Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, U. S. Army, assumed control of all American combat forces operating in the northern two provinces, less the southern portion of Thua Thien. At that time the three major U. S. units in the area were the 3d MarDiv, the 1st ACD, and the 101st Airborne Division.
In addition, the reinforced ARVN 1st Division was operating in this region. In essence, PCV was established to provide closer supervision over growing U. S. forces and coordination with the Vietnamese units in the northern area.(201)
As the operations around Hue tapered off, General Cushman, on 29 February, directed General Tolson to take the plans for PEGASUS back off the shelf. During the first week in March, General Tolson met in Da Nang with Generals Cushman and Abrams for a discussion of the operation.(*)
(*) It was around this time that PCV was formed and General Abrams departed I Corps. General Rosson then became a key figure in the planning of the operation.
The mission was threefold: relieve the Khe Sanh Combat base, reopen Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe San's, and eradicate any NVA elements within the area of operations. In addition to the three brigades of the 1st A CD, General Tolson was to assume operational control of the 26th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force. D-day was tentatively set for 1 April--depending on the weather. With the basic directives, General Tolson returned to Camp Evans, and settled down to detailed plan ning with his division staff. During the next few weeks, there were numerous planning and coordination meetings with III MAF, PCV, the 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Seventh Air Force, and representatives of the attached units.(202)
The logistics portion of the plan hinged around construction of a base and airfield near Ca Lu which could accommodate C-7 Caribou transports and later C-123s. Before work could be initiated, elements of the 3d MarDiv had to secure and repair the stretch of Route 9 between Ca Lu and the Rockpile so that supplies, fuel, ammunition, and construction material could be stockpiled. Once this was accomplished, a joint task force of engineers--the 11th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, the 1st ACD's 8th Engineer Battalion, and Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 5--began construction of an airfield, parking ramps, logistical facilities, and defensive positions. By the time the lead assault elements were ready to jump off in the attack, the installation was 83 percent completed. The base was dubbed Landing Zone (LZ) Stud.
On 25 March, D-6, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9 CavSqd), operating from LZ Stud, began extensive reconnaissance in the PEGASUS area of operations to pave the way for the initial air assaults. The mission of the unit was "to find the enemy, destroy his antiaircraft capability, acquire hard intelligence for exploitation, and locate and prepare suitable landing zones."
Since General Tolson had little concrete information on exact enemy locations, the activities of the 1/9 CavSqd were essential to the operation. The squadron fanned out from LZ Stud in ever increasing concentric circles under the cover of tactical air, B-52 strikes, and the 8-inch and 105mm batteries which had been moved to Ca Lu. During this phase, the air cavalrymen called in 632 tactical air strikes, 49 specially fuzed construction sorties (Daisy Cutters), and 12 Arc Light strikes on enemy antiaircraft positions, troop concentrations, and future landing zones.(203)
As a prelude to PEGASUS, the 3d MarDiv launched a regimental-size, diversionary attack in eastern Quang Tri Province. On 30 March, Task Force KILO, comprised of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines; the U. S. Army 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry; and the 3d Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment pushed northward from Dong Ha on a search and destroy sweep through the Gio Linh coastal plain area between the Cua Viet River and the DMZ. In addition, a compan from the 101st Airborne Division was used as a reconnaissance force and to convey a picture of greater weight and diversity of attack. Although the foray was primarily designed to confuse the NVA and draw attention away from the mailed fist which was poised at Ca Lu, the Allies of Task Force KILO killed 150 North Vietnamese during the first day.(204)
At 0700 on D-day (1 April), two battalions controlled by the 1st Marines (2/1 and 2/3), which had moved from Phu Bai to LZ Stud several days before, spearheaded the attack to the west. Meeting only light resistance, 2/1 wheeled to the north of Route 9 and secured its objective while 2/3 swept through and consolidated the area to the south of the road. With both flanks screened by the infantry, the 11th Engineer Battalion began the mammoth task of renovating Route 9.
Later in the day, elements of the 3d Brigade (Bde) 1st ACD leapfrogged by helicopter to positions midway between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. The 1st and 2d Squadrons, 7th Cavalry swarmed into LZ Mike which encompassed Hill 248, approximately 7,500 meters east of the KSCB. This high ground to the south of Route 9 was cradled on three sides by branches of the Quang Tri River. To the north some 3,000 meters, the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry air-assaulted the southern slope of Dong Chio Mountain which was designated LZ Cates.
This stretch was particularly critical because the road was sandwiched between the Quang Tri River on the south and the nearly perpendicular cliffs which towered menacingly over Route 9 to the north. Following the initial waves, the 3d Brigade Headquarters displaced to LZ Cates and established a CP. By 1650, the Flying Horsemen were in place and continued to expand both zones while 105mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were helilifted in for direct support. Throughout the PEGASUS area of operations, the Americans established defensive perimeters and passed the night with little or no contact.(205)
While the combat engineers continued their steady movement along Route 9, additional elements of the airmobile armada were thrown into the action. On D plus two, the 2d Brigade, 1st ACD which had been staging at Ca Lu conducted a vertical envelopment into LZ Tom and LZ Wharton which were roughly 6,000 and 8,500 meters southeast of Khe Sanh. The air assault went smoothly even though the zones were shelled by NVA gunners. By the end of the day, all 2d Brigade units were in position along with three batteries of the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery. In the meantime, the 3d Brigade and the 1st Marines expanded their TAORs along Route 9.(206)
On 4 April, General Tolson began to put the squeeze on enemy elements to the south of the KSCB. Moving northeast from LZ Wharton, the 1/5 CavSqd attacked the old French fort near the junction of Route 9. At the same time, the 26th Marines, which had been attached to the 1st ACT) since 31 March, began the long awaited breakout from the base. At 0600, three companies of Lieutenant Colonel John J. H. Cahill's 1/9 (relieved Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell on 1 April) moved out of the rock quarry perimeter and advanced on Hill 471 which was 2,500 meters due south of the airstrip. The hill was a key terrain feature since it overlooked the road junction and that segment of Route 9 which snaked to the southwest. The area was also occupied by major elements of the 304th NVA Division.
After heavy prep fires, the Marines stormed up the slope in the face of light enemy fire and secured their objective at 1720.(*)
(*) Although the rifle companies encountered only slight resistance during the assault, the Company A command group, while advancing toward the objective, took a direct hit from an enemy mortar. The Air Officer, Captain Walter C. Jones, III was killed as was one radio operator; the battalion Operations Officer, Major Ted R. Henderson, was seriously wounded and evacuated. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Cahill and his Artillery Officer, First Lieutenant John K. LeBlond, Jr. were also wounded at that time but were able to continue.
Thirty North Vietnamese bodies were strewn over the hilltop.
The men of 1/9, however, were in for a long night. Later that night, the enemy lashed out at the hill with 192 mortar and artillery rounds. The barrage was undoubtedly designed to soften up the Marines for a counterattack the next morning. The North Vietnamese might as well have saved their ammunition and their counterattack.(207)
At 0515, the 7th Battalion, 66th Raiment, 304th NVA Division, charged up Hill 471 in a vain attempt to knock 1/9 from the crest. The 66th Regiment_ was definitely a hard-luck outfit; it had been bloodied at Khe Sanh Village on 21 January and again during the abortive attack against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, on 29 February/1 March.
The enemy's string of bad luck remained unbroken on the morning of 5 April. Lieutenant Colonel Cahill's Marines stood their ground, poured withering fire into the onrushing enemy troops, and, with the aid of artillery and tactical air strikes, smashed the North Vietnamese attack. During the one-sided exchange, one Marine was killed and 19 wounded; the 66th Regiment left 122 dead on the slopes. This fight was one of the major highlights of Operation PEGASUS.(*)(208)
(*) In addition to the Marine killed during the attack, nine were killed by enemy shelling the night before. A total of 57 Marines were medevaced.
The surge of Allied units into the previously uncontested domain of the 304th NVA Division continued for the next few days.(**)
(**) The 325C NVA Division had long since departed the area and left the 304th to continue pressure on the 26th Marines. Some elements of the 304th swung to the north of the base and replaced units of the 325C.
On the afternoon of the 5th, the last element of the 1st ACD--the 1st Brigade--departed Ca Lu aboard droves of helicopters and swooped into LZ Snapper, 7,500 meters south of the base. The following morning, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry (2d Brigade) moved northeast from LZ Wharton and relieved Lieutenant Colonel Cahill's battalion on Hill 471. After relief was effected 1/9 initiated a drive toward Hill 689 some 4,500 meters to the northwest. On the opposite side of the KSCB, the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry (1st Brigade) conducted a landing just 500 meters north of the Blue Sector wire. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 26th Marines fanned out to the north and northwest of their hill outposts. Company G, 2/26 bumped into an NVA company that afternoon and killed 48 of the enemy.
The initial relief of the combat base occurred at 1350 on 6 April when the lead company of the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force was airlifted to Khe San's and linked up with the 37th Rangers. This move was primarily intended as a morale booster for the 37th. Two days later, after 2/7 CavSqd had completed the sweep along Route 9 and linked up with the 26th Marines, the official relief took place. At 0800 on 8 April, the 3d Brigade airlifted its CP to the base and became the new landlord. Relieved of its duties along the perimeter, Lieutenant Colonel McEwan's 1/26 saddled up and attacked to the west that day but made little contact. (209)
Traditionally, the lifting of a siege has been the occasion for great emotional outbursts, bands, and stirring oration; in this regard, the relief of Khe Sanh was somewhat of a disappointment. General Tolson intended for the link-up to be "as businesslike as possible with a minimum of fanfare" so that he could get the Marines on the offensive again. A few newsmen at the base snapped pictures of Marines shaking hands with the Cavalrymen but the men usually shrugged indifferently afterwards and went about their business.
The defenders generally looked on the proceedings with sort of a "ho-hum" attitude, perhaps they felt that they had not been rescued from anything. In fact, they were right; the enemy threat had been squelched weeks before PEGASUS had gotten off the ground. "I've been at Khe Sanh for nine months," the regimental commander stated, "and if they keep me supplied, I could stay here another nine months." No doubt most men were glad they did not have to remain because the stand at Khe Sanh had not been "all peaches and cream," but, as far as the defenders being snatched out of the jaws of destruction --it just did not happen that way.(210)
With the arrival of the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force, all maneuver elements involved in PEGASUS were on the Khe Sanh Plateau. On the 8th, the three South Vietnamese battalions (minus one company) leapfrogged from Quang Tri to LZ Stud and then conducted a helicopter assault into LZ Snake about 2,000 meters southwest of the base. In effect, the encirclement was complete; only, this time, pressure was being applied in the opposite direction. As the Allied oil slick spread over the valley, the Americans and South Vietnamese uncovered ghastly evidence of how badly the NVA had been beaten. The various units found hundreds of North Vietnamese in shallow graves; hundreds more lay where they fell.
A total of 557 individual weapons, 207 crew-served weapons, and 2 antiaircraft pieces were either captured or destroyed. In addition, 17 vehicles, ranging from PT-76 tanks to motor scooters, and tons of ammunition, food, radios, and individual equipment were discovered. The mountains of captured or abandoned enemy stores indicated that either Operation PEGASUS had caught the NVA completely flatfooted or the remnants of the two enemy divisions were in no shape to cart off their equipment and supplies.(211)
Even though the rest of the operation centered around completing work on Route 9 and sifting through the debris of battle, there were several contacts with the retreating enemy. On 8 April, the ARVN forces turned back an NVA counterattack west of the base and killed 78 in the process. The same day, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, assaulted and seized Hill 689 with no opposition but discovered 37 NVA killed during a fight the previous night.
Air and artillery also hammered away at the NVA; on one occasion, a U. S. Army airborne observer spotted 100 North Vietnamese in the open and called in artillery fire which accoucited for 30 of the enemy. While the NVA pulled away to the west, the engineer task force crept toward the base from the opposite direction, and at 1600 on 11 April, Route 9 was officially declared open. The engineers had repaired 14 kilometers of road, replaced 9 vital bridges, and constructed 17 bypasses; General Westmoreland applauded their feat as "herculean."(212)(See Maps 8 and 9).
The day before the road was completed, General Tolson received a visit from the PCV commander, General Rosson, which resulted in an alteration of Operation PEGASUS. General Rosson directed his division commander to begin extracting units to Quang Tri and Camp Evans in ?reparation for an assault into the A Shau Valley (Operation DELAWARE). General Tolson anticipated that the operation would last much longer and had initially planned to expand his sweeps far to the south, north, and northwest. In addition, the 1st Marines was slated for air assaults into a valley west of the Rockpile.
The A Shau Valley, however, was a major enemy base area and logistics complex which supported his operations in Thua Thien and Quang Nam provinces. To launch a mobile strike into this region and destroy the enemy's base had been a major MACV objective of long standing. Support of this operation had been one of the reasons for the troop and logistical buildup in the northern area which had begun the previous December.
The weather in the A Shau Valley was now ideal for airmobile operations and General Westmoreland was anxious to get DELAWARE underway before the end of April. The following day, the 11th, all air assaults were cancelled and General Tolson began to withdraw elements from Khe Sanh. The 1st Brigade, less one battalion, was airlifted to Quang Tri City and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, which had fought so valiantly, was pulled out and sent to Da Nang. Two days later, the_ division command post and elements of the 3d Brigade departed for Camp Evans.(213)
Another noteworthy departure was that of Colonel Lownds. The colonel, who did his job well enough to earn the nation's second highest award--the Navy Cross--turned over the reins of the 26th Marines to Colonel Bruce F. Meyers on 12 April. The new commander wasted no time; he planned and executed the attack which in effect, ended the Battle for Khe Sanh. It was scheduled for 14 April--Easter Sunday.
Ironically, the last engagement took place between Hills 881S and 881N precisely where, on 20 January, the whole affair had begun. The 3d Battalion, 26th Marines which had started the fight was also on hand to finish it. Ever since the 4th, Lieutenant Colonel John C. Studt's battalion (relieved Lieutenant Colonel Alderman on 15 March) had been sweeping to the north and northwest of Hill 8815 and, on several occasions, had taken fire from 881N.
The enemy troops still clung tenaciously to that piece of real estate from which they had directed rocket fire against Khe Sanh and antiaircraft fire against the helicopters resupplying the Marines on 881S. Lieutenant Colonel Studt's mission was to secure the terrain between the two hills, then attack and seize 881N.(214)
Since the enemy gunners had zeroed in on the slopes of 881S with their mortars, Lieutenant Colonel Studt moved his attacking elements into position the night of the 13th. The assault companies of 3/26 slipped out of the defensive wire under the cover of darkness and moved down the forward slope of the hill along routes which were protected by security patrols.
As he watched the Marines file by, the battalion's operations officer, Major Caulfield, could not help but be concerned about them. Most of the men had spent the past two and a half months in a foxhole or trench; they had received minimum rations and a maximum of enemy shelling. All were tired and dirty; some suffered from large body sores because the water received by these men had gone into their bodies and not on them. Even though they were Marines, the major wondered how they would perform the next morning. At 0800, he received his answer.(215)
The attack, which the troops referred to as their "Easter Egg Hunt," was preceded by a deluge of supporting fire. Colonel Meyers, who flew to 881S by helicopter, observed the attack and personally ensured that sufficient supporting arms were employed. In addition to the artillery of 1/13 at Khe Sanh and the 175mm bases, 155mm and 8-inch batteries of the 1st ACD at LZ Stud were called on to help cave in the enemy bunkers. Strike aircraft worked over the hill with bombs, rockets, and napalm. The Marines who remained on 881S also provided heavy support.
Besides the 60mm and 81mm mortars, these men had pooled all eight of the battalion's 106 recoilless rifles, the two remaining 105m-n howitzers, and six .50 caliber machine guns which had been salvaged from downed helicopters or stripped off of trucks at the base. As the assault troops advanced, the weapons on 881S provided direct overhead fire which sometimes preceded the front ranks by no more than 50 meters.
As usual, the recoilless rifles were extremely effective. One observer later remarked that when the lead elements approached a treeline, no chances were taken; the 106 gunners fired a broadside and the treeline was simply blown away.(216)
Because of the weight and speed of the attack, the enemy was never able to recover. Moving behind a wall of steel, the j battalion clawed its way through the defenses between the two hills and prepared for the final push. Major Caulfield, who had worried about the Marines' weakened condition the night before, soon found the opposite was true--he was having trouble holding them back.
At one point, a group of NVA soldiers who had been hammered senseless by the prep fires, broke from their positions and fled into the open. An airborne spotter directed the companies to hold up while he called in air and artillery.
Scanning the front lines, Major Caulfield noticed that a handful f Marines with fixed bayonets were in hot pursuit of the enemy. The major contacted the company commander by radio and told him to collar his troops. The reply was, "Sir, I can't stop them...." Neither could the enemy.(217)
The men of 3/26 stormed the hill, swarmed over the crest, and killed anyone who stood in their way. At 1428, the objective was secured and the men signaled their victory in traditional Marine Corps fashion, as Colonel Meyers later described:
- On Sunday, 14 April (Easter), I helicoptered to 881S and with Captain Bill Dabney, Company Commander of 1/3/26, personally watched the U. S. Colors (which had been fortuitously carried in a squad leader's pack) hoisted again over 881N. This was the signal (visual) that Lieutenant Colonel John Studt's assault had been completed. I watched the jungle utility-clad Marine "shinny-up" a shrapnel torn tree whose limbs had been sheared from the intensive prep fires, and affix the Stars and Stripes.(218)
With the enemy either dead or gone, the hill again lost its value. Terrain wasn't so important in the fluid Vietnam war, but people were and, in that respect, Lieutenant Colonel Studt's men had completed a very successful operation--106 North Vietnamese were dead. In addition to the enemy dead on the objective, air strikes and artillery fire had completely blanketed three large groups of NVA fleeing from the hill but because of the dense vegetation and the approaching darkness, no bodies were recovered.
Two slightly shot-up North Vietnamese, one of them an officer, were captured and flown back to Khe Sanh in Colonel Meyers' helicopter. Considering the strength of the enemy defenses, Marine casualties were surprisingly light--6 killed and 19 medevaced. Lieutenant Colonel Studt stated: "...stand off plastering with supporting arms...prior to each assault was the key factor here."(219) That night the battalion commander and his operations officer stood at the gate on 381S and slapped the men on the back as they trooped back into the perimeter. One Marine, a tall, lanky, slow-talking Kentuckian, held out a captured rifle for Lieutenant Colonel Studt's inspection--it was filthy. During the attack, the Marine had come face to face with the owner; both men raised their rifles simultaneously and pulled the trigger but only the M-16 barked out--the enemy's rifle jammed. The survivor's explanation Haas simply, "I cleaned my weapon last night, he didn't."(220)
The next morning at 0800, PCV terminated PEGASUS. The operation was very successful and all objectives were achieved; Route 9 was open, the enemy had been routed,and the base itself was relieved. The North Vietnamese had lost another 1,304 killed and 21 captured, while 41 U. S. Army troops, 51 Marines, and 33 South Vietnamese died. Air support again had played an important role. There were 45 B-52 Arc Light strikes and 1,625 tactical sorties conducted during PEGASUS. Of the latter number, 650 sorties were flown by Marines, 463 by the U. S. Air Force, 436 by carrier-based Task Force 77, and 77 by the U. S. Army and VNAF. From 31 March to 8 April, U. S. Air Force C-130 and C-123 aircraft delivered 843 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by paradrop and the low altitude extraction system. On 9 April, the strip was reopened to C-130s and the supply level at the KSCB began to grow large enough so that the 1st ACD could draw from the 26th Marines stockpile.(221)
With the termination of PEGASUS, the 3d Marine Division again assumed responsibility of the Khe Sanh area. Task Force GLICK, comprised of the 26th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 2d Brigade(-), 1st ACD, launched Operation SCOTLAND II at 0801, 15 April. The 26th Marines, however, did not remain in the operation very long. Three days later, the new commanding officer and two of his battalions were transferred to Quang Tri Base and, for the men who had taken 77 days of the best the NVA could offer, the defense of Khe Sanh was over.(*)(222)
(*) The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines did not return to Quang Tri with the regiment but was transferred to the operational control of the 4th Marines at Camp Carroll. General Tompkins saw to it that each man who returned from Khe Sanh immediately received a hot shower, a clean uniform, and a big steak dinner. As an added touch, the 3d Marine Division band was on hand, and greeted each arrival with a stirring rendition of the "Marines Hymn."
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