Thesis:

Both a soldiers and a commanders perspectives hold vital lessons in the comprehension and prevention of wartime atrocities such as the March, 1968 "My Lai incident" in Vietnam. A carefully constructed "battle simulation" gives multi-level insight in surmising some of these lessons and their significance.

I. Introduction

Very few classes graduate from the United States Army Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia which are taught anything about an infamous predecessor of theirs: convicted war criminal and OCS alumni Lieutenant William Laws Calley.

Although most Officer Candidates are college graduates, and have prior service experience as enlisted soldiers, very few of them will have previously heard of Calley or the Vietnam War atrocity he is associated with called the "My Lai Massacre."

The man who was once referred to as "the catharsis of the Vietnam War" and what was considered "the biggest story of the decade" is not often brought to mind. For years, at many military institutions, instructors of graduate and undergraduate levels have avoided even discussing the subject of My Lai. Some were unwilling to face this ugly side of war, while others convinced themselves " . . . that what happened at My Lai was an aberration. Since it was abnormal, it was something to be put in it's 'proper historical context': that is, ignored."

The My Lai example is not taught to the young men and women who could potentially face a similar scenario. It should be.

II. Perspectives

In The Face of Battle, John Keegan claims that there are "two voices about the problem of human behavior in battle; one . . . which admits that everything ultimately rests with the ordinary soldiers 'motivation to combat'; and . . . one which continues to emphasize the primary role of discipline and command." Keegan allows " . . . no real inconsistency in this duality of attitude." Both "soldier motivation" and "command discipline" are seen as dual perspectives, to be understood if one is to understand the outcome and significance of battle. This same precept holds true for other aspects of war, not necessarily viewed as "battle proper."

Both the social-behavioral causes and the corruption of military command and disciplinary principles are deeply interrelated, and cannot be studied in isolation. It is important that case studies such as the "My Lai atrocities" in Vietnam not be forgotten, but emphasized from this "dual perspective." Many of the military failures related to My Lai were (and are still today) individually typical, but when combined created a collective nightmare.

Recognizing these failures is essential at all levels of warfare. As Martin Van Crevald puts it "A group of people unclear about just whom they are (and are not) allowed to kill for what ends, under what circumstances, and by what means is not an army but a mob.

Battle simulations, "kriegspiel" or "wargames" have long been used to teach military leaders the situational process of combat operations, and the tactical lessons of historical battles. During WW II the Japanese used a wargame, the lessons of which went unheeded, prior to their defeat at Midway, The Germans conducted a "kriegspiel" in 1944, just before D-Day, predicting a surprise allied landing at Normandy. Today US Armed Forces spend millions on computerized simulations at all levels, strategic, operational, tactical, even individual, to get maximum exposure to the practice of, and expertise at, "warfighting."

Of the "dual roles" defined by Keegan, battle simulations are extensively used to " . . . emphasize the primary role of discipline and command." but are almost never applied to " . . . the ordinary soldiers 'motivation to combat.' " This is unfortunate because the lessons learned in such "games" come from stimulation of the individual's decision making process. To play, one must make decisions. When one decides wrong, one learns. In battle, those decisions made at every level decide the battle. In ethical situations, such as at My Lai, decisions are equally, if not more significant. A carefully constructed "battle simulation" of the My Lai Incident would serve to illustrate both a soldiers and a commanders perspectives, as a historiographic tool, and be potentially instrumental for prevention.

III. The My Lai Incident

The combat operation conducted at My Lai was a tactical failure as well as a moral one. The operation was poorly executed, by soldiers under "chronic stress," who had assumed a racial contempt for the Vietnamese, in an improperly trained unit, with serious organizational problems, with a general permissive attitude, following ill conceived plans and orders, given by leaders who failed to follow the most basic principles of integrity.

Extensive evidence and even military photographs of the operation depict a virtual nonmilitary "lackadaisical" posture, and complete lack of tactical proficiency. In what was supposedly a combat operation, photos show weapons unattended, and soldiers are carelessly lounging about in various stages of undress with a happy or "festive' look on all of their faces.

Along with the psychological effects of combat and murder evident, these soldiers were also displaying a syndrome referred to by Army drill sergeants as "civilianization." When the command climate does not keep soldiers continually trained and disciplined they revert back to being civilians. During the rapid expansion and hurried training conducted at the height of the Vietnam War many soldiers never stopped being civilians.

They were in combat zone, but quartered in a base camp, with ample access to beer, marijuana, other drugs, and prostitutes, in all of which the officers jointly participated.

Charlie ("C") Company (commanded by Captain Ernest Medina), of 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, and C Company's 1st Platoon (commanded by Lt. William Calley) are normally identified with the My Lai atrocity. Medina's company, and Calley's Platoon were part of "Task Force Barker." This was a temporary force commanded by the 11th Brigade Operations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, containing three companies detached from each of the 11th Brigade's three Battalions. The entire Task Force is "credited" with similar atrocities during the same operation (Calley and Medina were the only ones tried, only Calley was convicted).

The principle combat assault task was given to Captain Medina's Charlie Company. The "Search and Destroy" mission required a four-stage helicopter landing in an open field directly adjacent to a Vietnamese village (My Lai-4) and suspected Viet Cong (VC) guerrilla stronghold. Company B was to follow and support A Company by clearing adjacent villages, and A Company was to set up blocking positions along suspected VC escape routes.

These soldiers were anxious and apprehensive about this, their first major combat assault mission. They had received unanswered casualties from VC snipers, mines, booby traps, and some "apparent noncombatants" while on patrols.

Bravo company had to be "extracted" from a bloody ambush at My Lai just one week prior. Charlie Company conducted a memorial for a very popular Sergeant just before receiving their operation order. They were given a search and destroy mission to clear out the "homes of these VC" and many saw this as an outright "revenge mission."

The intelligence report accompanying the operation order asserted that all of the noncombatants would be at the market by seven am that day, and that "only the enemy would be there."

On the morning of 16 March 1968, the soldiers of Task Force Barker entered several villages and, finding no resistance, began killing all of the noncombatant inhabitants, livestock, and burning the villages. Calley's platoon was particularly efficient in My Lai-4, gathering all of the old men women and children into groups before executing scores of them with machine-gun fire (much of this by Calley himself). Accounts indicate that a "blood lust" took control of the troops putting them into a "killing frenzy." Other crimes such as group rape, torture, and mutilation were also rampant.

Although these types of crimes were prevalent in other cases throughout the Vietnam War, those committed at My Lai seem to be some of the worst.

Some soldiers refused to take part in the killing, and some killed the wounded to "stop their suffering." Only one American is reported to have intervened to halt the slaughter: a helicopter pilot, Hugh Thompson, who landed and confronted Calley, threatened to fire on Calley's men, and evacuated several wounded civilians.

Although there were some Armed VC killed in the overall operation, the only American casualties were due to mines, booby traps and a self-inflicted wound.

IV. Simulating My Lai

Simulating the combat situation at My Lai for a wargame is relatively easy. Any wargame could put "role players" in command of a company of soldiers, and "simulate" a combat assault on a suspected guerrilla base. The apparently impossible task would be translating a reason-emotion dilemma into a "decision situation" similar to that which supposedly caused the atrocity. The project is not so hard as it might seem. I have run a "My Lai experiment" simulation over a dozen times, with over 100 various subjects (players) ranging from field grade officers to college students. All have confirmed gaining a new perspective and understanding of what happened and what can happen.

All Battle Simulations must have some "game mechanic" to replicate the emotional aspects, unknowns and "uncontrollables" of war. These are represented in such things as troop morale effects, limited intelligence, and random events. "Game mechanics" can also be devised to replicate and observe ethical aspects as well. These "game mechanics" effected from a participatory standpoint can give significant insight to the "social-mechanics" of the event.

The first rule in battle simulation (or any experiment) will always be "garbage in = garbage out." Any faulty concepts, biased convictions, or erroneous data will result in erroneous conclusions. An ethical-simulation would serve more to illustrate simple accepted concepts more than it could be expected to divulge new insight. The only "new" concept might be one of a broader perspective through participation at various levels.

I have given the game mechanics my "My Lai experiment" two simple goals: (1) motivate players toward decisions they normally wouldn't make, and (2) Provide tactical group dilemmas for the player-decision-process. To avoid "gamesmanship" ('ethical cheating or deceptive over-morality) the simulation can not be openly conducted as an "ethical simulation" but as a "tactical problem" or just a win-loose game. My Scenario is identical, except it takes place in Haiti (to retain some of the critical "race factor"). Group dynamics are always better with a larger group, and miniatures allow for a visual grasp of events.

To motivate players some form of incentive is required. "Not loosing " is often incentive enough (and surely had an impact on Task Force Barker). A prize or money is good, but "risking and loosing" something makes an astounding impact, and an excellent post game analogy. Since players cannot be expected to loose their life in the game, I normally have them pay a few dollars to play, winners take all. Combat loss of one's character results in ejection. I provide different (secret) victory criteria for each participant (which includes a "body count" for some, and even one who will commit "rapes").

Each subject assumes the role of a key player at My Lai. "The enemy" (VC players) and "the intervening Helicopter Pilot" are secretly part of my team, and not competing. Subjects are given the historic 'rules of engagement' in writing, but briefed verbally that accidental killing of noncombatants is "expected to be unavoidable."

Providing tactical group dilemmas for a player-decision-process is the best part. It is uncanny to see the antics and extremity of emotions displayed in a simple game. (These are invaluable discussion points.) To get the group into the "Task Force Barker Mode" I use a "false start." I start the participants on a "patrol" in which "VC" use snipers, mines, booby traps, and "apparent noncombatants" to cause quick, unanswered casualties.

I am always sure to "kill-off" an apparently popular member, and then have one of the "VC" taunt him). Then, before the group can recover, I start the game over with a new mission; a de facto "revenge mission." I give them a new operation order as identical as possible to that of the historical situation. When the assault begins I compartmentalize the subjects, and keep them from knowing the full picture in other sections of "the village." Once the noncombatant killing motive is apparent I halt the simulation, inform the group of the "real" nature of the project, and conduct an after action review.

Every iteration of this simulation has ended in a major atrocity. This should be no surprise, it was designed that way. The subjects, regardless of gender, age, race, or military exposure were easily conditioned to participate with the group. While no subject has ever assemble large groups for execution as Calley did, the subjects are always motivated to kill noncombatants (and not necessarily in order to win the game).

The arguments that always follow are: "I know I would not have done this in real life because in the game . . . " (a) I didn't have to actually face the physical carnage of death and murder." or (b) I knew it was just a game and I was not afraid of being held accountable. My response to these types of comments is to point out that the experiment is not intended to prove that anybody would commit atrocities, but to illustrate some of the group dynamics involved. I also mention that most soldiers in Vietnam were not afraid of being held accountable, and had gradually been conditioned to face, and commit, the physical carnage of death and murder.

IV. Conclusion

The military justice proceedings for the mass murder of over four hundred civilian men women and children at My Lai, were once proclaimed by the Associated press as "the trail of the century" but are now overshadowed by an ex-football player accused of killing his wife. Examples of the My Lai Incident may be mentioned and brought up by a few instructors at our military institutions, but there is no adequate case study taught. Soldiers and scholars at every level can use a "battle simulation" to give insight to what can and did happen to a "seemingly typical" American combat unit. Such an important case is now far too obscure for far too many young military professionals to help them avoid future atrocities.