CATASTROPHIC KILL was one description used in Desert Storm (and elsewhere) for a hit on an enemy AFV (Armored Fighting Vehicle) when the thing really exploded. This would, of course, be a "confirmed kill." Confirmed kills were important because nobody wanted to be shot as they passed a supposedly dead enemy. Confirmed kills also soaked up less ammo, and were ". . . fun to watch!" The most common occurrence was the "SWISS CHEESE EFFECT," (or the Gang-bang effect, depending on your 'political correctness'). This was the universal practice of pumping rounds into a target until it reached the "Catastrophic Kill" stage of existence. Bradley Gunners, with a rapid rate of 25mm fire, were notorious for this. The M-1 tankers tended to share their targets with all of the other tanks in the formation (thus the Gang-bang term ). When an explosion died down, it was important that the vehicle continue to burn for a while, otherwise we had the "ROAD KILL" effect. With "ROAD KILL" any fire was usually blown out by the explosion, and so the vehicle once again became a popular target for any gunner within range. Stories abound of prominently positioned Iraqi AFV's with literally dozens of pretty holes. BRDM's were especially prone to this treatment because of their potential anti-tank threat (SAGGER MISSILES) and their knack for not exploding. T-72's made the best fireworks, while the BMP's tended to have a delayed reaction. [sagger meltdown] The Iraqi T-72's had two distinct ways of going up. Both were equally spectacular. The first was a true catastrophic kill, usually resulting from a deep penetrating hit, causing the near simultaneous explosion of 20-35 main gun rounds stored inside. This explosion would normally toss the turret up in the air, and get everybody's attention on the battlefield, day or night. On occasion 4th-of-July like "ooohs and aahh's" would crackle across the radio nets (a gallows humor). The second most popular T-72 technique was what I call the "ROMAN CANDLE." This was the result of fires gradually igniting the main gun munitions. There is no major explosion to set off the rounds. They burn fast and hot, shooting torch-like flames out of the turret hatches, 60 feet into the air, for several minutes (like the candle). The roman candle is also frequently referred to as a catastrophic kill, since it is (probably) rather catastrophic for the tank crews who experience it. Unfortunately, U.S. AFV's are susceptible to some of the same effects. The impact of which is significantly diminished by an automatically engaging halon flame extinguishing system (this all layman's terms) that gives crewmen a chance to bail out. The M-1 Tank is specifically configured to blow its munitions out of the top of the turret. Apparently the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle is especially designed to melt down into a little black spot on the desert floor. CATASTROPHIC KILL (CK) micro-armor wargame rules were designed to replicate the night battle at Ghazlani on 26-27 Feb, 1991. I used the system at a few conventions, the first time, in Europe, without one minute of play-testing! (Don't try that at home folks!) I also incorporated the system into several battle simulations at The U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA. All to rave reviews, and promises to publish. Well, I personally dislike the period "because it's too much like work' (LTC Ed O'Niel). Hopefully some of the kind folks who asked for the data (such as my favorite wargamer, Mr. Donald Featherstone) will see them here and consider the promise kept. I found CK fun for "BIG GROUP GAMES," and have enjoyed umpiring it (because I enjoy "RANDOM EVENTS). There are a few decision making dilemmas not seen in some simulations. It's a bit dicey, but hey! It's WAR! Anything can happen!!! I use Dennis Wong's PANZER TACTICS for spotting, close assault, infantry, and artillery integration. An umpire helps, but after 30-40 replays of the same night battle (not always with sufficient beer and pretzels) I'm about burned out on the subject. Perhaps I'll make CK an appendix in my book DECISIVE POINT... Perhaps not. I. SCALE/SEQUENCEa) GROUND SCALE: 1"=50M b) 6 PHASES per turn:
2) COMMUNICATION/MORALE 3) US BOUND (FIRE/MOVEMENT) 4) IRAQI BOUND (FIRE/MOVEMENT) 5) RANDOM EVENTS 6) ARTILLERY SPLASH/ILLUM II. OPERATIONSEVERY turn each separate element, (IRAQI=CO; U.S. = PLT or SECTION) rolls TWO D6 PER UNIT to determine operations conducted per tum: this determines the number of OPERATIONS DICE received. Each of the die can be used to: 1) Shoot, 2) Move &/or 3) Communicate. Players can use up to three dice per AFV for any one operation, nr use a separate die for different operations in any combination. (shoot-shoot-shoot; communicate-move-shoot; move- move etc.) The best way to do this is to have a big pile of D6 and lay them next to the element for that turn, setting them aside as they are used. NORMALLY COMMAND AFV's "SPEND THEM DICE" IN THE COMMUNICATION MORALE PHASE, TO ALLOW THE REST OF THE ELEMENT TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY. Example: The SCOUT Platoon Leader spots an enemy BMP, he spends one die telling everyone about it, and they all shoot. FUNCTIONS AVAILABLE PER OPERATION DIE USED:SHOOT:
OPPORTUNITY FIRE (*2) OVER-WATCH (*2) SCAN FOR TARGETS (*2) ENGAGE w/ATGM (*2) CLOSE ASSAULT SUPPRESSIVE FIRE *2: IT TAKES TWO OPERATIONS DICE TO CONDUCT THESE FUNCTIONS, (ONE TO PREPARE, AND ONE IS ACTUALLY ROLLED FOR THE SHOT). MOVE:
D6 x 1/2" BKWD D6 x 3" ROAD COLUMN MOUNT/DISMOUNT CHANGE FORMATION CHANGE DIR OF MVT COMMUNICATE
CALL INDIRECT FIRE ADJUST INDIRECT FIRE MORALE CHECKS/RALLY DISPATCH ELEMENT REQUEST MEDEVAC REQUEST MAINTENANCE OPPORTUNRY FIRE: ENGAGEMENT OF TARGETS NO LONGER IN VIEW. OVER-WATCH: A SHOT DURING ENEMY BOUND W/IN 60 degrees FRONTAL ARC SCANNING: To SHOOT DURING FRIENDLY BOUND W/IN 360-degree ARC. ENGAGE: TARGET IS w/in 180-degree FRONTAL ARC. NOTE: Each time a vehicle is hit, the umpire or owning player will roll in secret to see the effect (EFFECTS TABLE). Only if it explodes or burns will the shooter know that he knocked it out, hence a vehicle will repeatedly get shot full of holes, until it explodes. (I use board game counters to mark hits, and painted cotton to mark "Flamers") III NIGHT MOVEMENT RULES:DURING NIGHT MOVEMENT WHEN ANY "TWO SIXES" ARE ROLLED FOR MOVE DISTANCE, THE MOVING UNIT WILL WANDER OFF OF INTENDED ROUTE.
B) ROLL 3D6, ODD = LEFT, EVEN = RIGHT. THATS HOW MANY INCHES LEFI OR RIGHT OF INTENDED PATH THE UNIT ENDS UP, UNITS MAY INTERMIX. IV RANDOM EVENTS ROLL1: Air Force A-10s drop illumin (ODDs: over U.S. central positions, EVEN- Iraqi's).
*D-6 random placed as marked on map, ID is unknown until under 1 Km V. MORALEEACH SEPARATE UNIT (CO OR PLT) HAS A MORALE of 8 (2xD6), EACH SUPPRESSED, MOB, OR KO'D VEH. OR SQD DROPS UNIT MORALE BY 1. UMPIRE ROLLS MORALE AND MODIFIES. UNITS THAT FAIL WILL WITHDRAW OUT OF DANGER. MORALE ROLL: (2xd6) MODIFY: -1 PER LOST Vehicle FAIL BY:
2-BACK UP 1xD6 (IF NOT IN COVER) 3-SUPPRESSED 4-FLEE 3xD6 (SUPPRESSED) 5+ WALKS HOME (surrender if PB Range of enemy) IRAQI FORCES1B/Brigade TAWAKALNA DIVISION TASK FORCE HEADOUARTERS
T-72 BATTALION
BMP BATTALION
RESERVE FORCE
U. S. FORCESTF 4-18 Infantry, 3RD ARMORED DIVISION TF HEADQUARTERS TAC
TOC
SCOUT PLT
MORTAR PLT
DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT
GENERAL SUPPORT
A CO 4-18 IN
TM B 4-18 IN
C C0 4-18 IN
TM W A/ 4-8 CAV
A CO 4-30 ENG
BN COMBAT TRAINS
Ghazlani ScenarioOn the night of 26 February 1991, during operation Desert Storm, Task Force 4-18 Infantry was ordered to close in with TF 4-8 CAV several kilometers to their right (south) front. As the entire battalion moved forward in the dark it rolled right in front of, and on top of, an Iraqi Armored Task Force in a well prepared reversed slope defense. GHAZLANI TERRAINThe hill slopes at Ghazlani were very gradual. The terrain was deceptively flat. A dug in vehicle could be concealed by dead space, but a vehicle moving might not. For gaming purposes use the following rule: Any spotter on the higher ground will see any vehicle not dug in anywhere. Dug in vehicles are concealed only if in a Dead Space equal to the spotting units distance from the contour line. Any intervening higher ground blocks all LOS (line of sight). IRAQI INITIAL SET UPAll elements (except off-board artillery) placed with-in circles on map. Use map for hidden placement and movement. All positions dug-in/hull down with infantry positions between BMP positions. Iraqis are fully concealed (invisible) until "activated" or within 250m of U.S. Forces (LOS). Each IRAQI Company must conduct "activation" rolls (pass morale) to start their engines and conduct any operations. When activated, vehicles will show up as THERMAL SIGHT "hot-spots" (if within LOS) until further spotted and identified. U.S. INITIAL SET UP:All elements (except off-board artillery) in platoon wedges, company columns, as marked on the map, the Combat Trains are in three long files. VICTORY CONDITIONSU.S. Strategic: No U.S. losses, > 90% Iraqi AFV's lost. (historical) a. Two U.S. Wheeled vehicle or inf. squads count as one AFV loss. IRAQI Squads/trucks do not count for Iraqi losses. Recovery is important, unrecovered AFV's are counted lost for both. b. IRAQI APV's may only exit the board along the eastern road exit. (The road was the IRAQI MSR, and the only navigational aid.) The IRAQI Reserve (controlled by TAWKALNA Division) may only withdraw after > 60% of other IRAQI AFV's are withdrawn or lost. LessonsThe Battle of Ghazlani was a grueling lesson in combined arms warfare, fighting morale, modern firepower and technology. The most intense portion of the fight broke out at 10 meters, and lasted all night. The Iraqi force was completely routed and destroyed by combined air and ground forces. The MLRS, Apache Attack Helicopter, M1A1 TANK, M2 Bradley with TOW Missile, 25mm chain-gun, and above all the THERMAL NIGHT SIGHT never gave the Iraqi's the slightest chance. (and I'm glad!) So how can this possibly be a good wargame scenario? (I say it's not, but some folks just love a challenge!) Three things are unavoidably present in the wargame that the Iraqi's didn't have: 1. Hindsight, 2. Daylight, and 3. Leader morale. Iraqi soldier morale wasn't so bad, there were plenty of brave, but dead, RPG gunners on the battlefield). 1. Hindsight: All the Iraqi's had to do was "Get Away" to win, but no wargamer ever seems to want to try that boring technique! The TF 4-18 Combat Trains and headquarters elements rolled perilously close to the Iraqi front lines TOC (me!) 300m, Trains 600m), destruction of these vulnerable assets wins the battle for the Iraqis. They should be given top targeting priority for direct fire. 2. Daylight: You can't play a wargame in a dark room. (Although, I honestly did know a 'strange' Army Major who bought six welding goggles to simulate night wargame battles. How he read his die rolls I never knew). U.S. Casualties increased when the sun was up, so Iraqi use of illumination helps even the odds. A 120mm or 152mm Illum round would light up the whole battlefield for a full turn! (and the U.S. Air Force A-10's showed them how to do it at regular intervals through-out the night). Effective use of illumination is critical for the Iraqi's, however, U.S. Counter battery fire is devastating. The Iraqi's have to time their indirect assets wisely to engage with direct fire, identify the vulnerable soft skin targets and drop high explosives fast, before US counter battery fire ends their party. 3. Leader Morale: The Iraqi Commander lost his nerve. I'm sure you won't. The Reserve was not committed until 0400 hours (by higher headquarters). By 0400 there were no targets left to engage but their Reserve. American gunners were literally jockeying for position to get a crack at the counter attack. It was a classic example of too little too late. Had the Iraqi reserve appeared while their infantry, artillery, and main line of defense was still engaged and intact, the TF 4-18 blunder into the Iraqi kill zone might have been different. As it was, the first volley fired toward the counter attack was so sudden and devastating, most of those AFV's turned and fled behind a thermal screen of "Roman Candles." The GHAZLANI SCENARIO Victory Conditions reflect the fact that even slight U.S. casualties were unacceptable. Tactically, losses could have delayed the entire 3rd Armored Division. Operationally, a U.S. delay could have made good the Republican Guards' escape toward Basrah. BUT!! There weren't, and they couldn't, so they didn't. (I never thought they would ) Comments welcome. pfp.) MapBack to Veteran Campaigner List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by Pete Panzeri. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |