On April 30--May 2, 1999 the Army of Northern Virginia soundly whipped the Army of the Potomac, reversing the course of history. Historically, the Union won due to superior command coordination. Since my club, Metropolitan Wargamers of New York City, contributed two players to each side, I had a good opportunity for post game debreifing. What lessons might apply to a Waterloo '99?

The Fire and Fury rules used were reasonable simple, and few instances of clear tactical superiority occurred for either side. That is, nobody made obvious mistakes such as getting caught in March Column by a Line, etc. As the system discourages fast and dramatic results, and since there were a dozen players per side, the crucial arena of decision was not at the tactical level as such, but instead at the team coordination of "player size" forces with each other.

The Confederate command structure of Army Commander (1), Corps Commander (3), and /Division Commander (9) was perfect for a three table system, where a player could see only the table where you or your command were currently positioned. Even more important, each of the 3 Corps Commanders were available at almost all times to guide their 3 Divsion Commanders in their local leaders' roles in the Big Plan. The Grand Design of the Commanding General was interpreted to them by this intermediary level of leader. Whenever my personal divisional command (5 brigades and 2 batteries) went through changes of mission, position, or integrity, my Corps Commander was there to explain and advise. This was crucial to our success.

On the other side of the hill, I am not sure to what degree the "Wing Commanders" Reynolds and Hancock were used as such, but my Union counterparts (playing Howard and Sickles) got most of their orders directly from Meade. He seemed to be running all over the field, overloaded with care and simultaneoud situations at various parts of the titanic struggle.

One conclusion after my first large campaign type game with so many players and such a large field is that the most important aspect leading to victory or defeat is the TYPE OF COORDINATION AMONG PLAYER COMMANDS. The corollary to this is that the presence or lack of a third and intermediate level of command between the army commander and the lowest level of player command is crucial. Whether ACW Union Corps, Confederate Division, or Napoleonic Corps of Infantry or Cavalry, the need for a local area commander remains.

What then is the Napoleonic Commander, with only a two tier system, to do?

There is perhaps a link between two historical leadership failures: Robert E. Lee's so-called "hands off" style at Gettysburg, where he didn't effectively brief or direct his Corps Commanders, and Napoleon's "imperial style" of sharing his plans with no one, which at its least important had one corps doing the Shuffle Off To Oblivion--marching back and forth between two points, effectively out of the battle.

How shall the Napoleonic Army solve this problem? Perhaps the Chief of Staff could serve as a Deputy Commander? But in a large battle where the Army Commander cannot be everywhere, and might even suffer personal harm, danger lurks! Not to mention the problems with Nineteenth Century battlefield communications.

As a lowly divisional commander at Gettysburg, I received perhaps five important messages from higher commanders. One came directly from the Army Commander. Three came from the Corps Commander; one of which was considerably delayed. The message being delayed allowed me to make a "wrong" course of action--from the point of view of my superiors. Luckily, it wasn't fatal. And this was with a superior command structure!

If you have been paying attention, you'll notice that we have not accounted for one message. Now that fifth message came from the Enemy Army Commander! When my Confederate good ol' boys captured an enemy courier on the Baltimore Pike, I received warning that a Union corps would soon be advancing from that direction. Almost as important, thought I as I prepared to send this message with a cover memo, was the fact that THE INTENTED RECEIVER DID NOT GET THE MESSAGE. My opposite number across the field would not know about this reinforcement for a while. Now what mischief could I cause knowing that?

Hmmm...

On a battlefield where there are no clearly designated Deputy Commanders or chain of command, and the best of written messages go oft astray, what kind of coordination are you going to have among subordinate commanders? These are people who in real life may not even know each other, let alone have played together. Its pretty scary.

Just another reason, Gentlebeings, to USE THIS LINK--ITS LATER THAN YOU THINK! The lives of millions hang in the balance! So organize your army, and discuss working together as a team today.

AN OLD EMAIL

Subj: Gen Rodes To Gen. Ewell #2: Corps Team Building
Date: 4/28/99 6:34:31 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: C. Elsden

Dear General,

I believe it would be useful at some point on Friday, after the "Commanders Briefing," at Army Level (?) to hold a Corps level discussion among the four of us. Depending upon how certain factors are handled, which we probably won't know until then, certain issues among us may range from totally irrelevent to essential in the game! Since I can't know which are which, I list those which have occurred to me so far for your further consideration as Corps Commander. Let me say that I specifically requested to bi in this Corps, because I think it has a particularly important role to play.

Therefore we may want to make conventions for certain things which any team of men who had experience working with each other in reality would have worked out by now. The issues also include the type of guidance I expect to get from you as practicable (there's that word again), or to work out together along the way.

CORPS ISSUES

1. When attacks are to be mere demonstrations, pressed home, or Pressed to the Utmost.
2. Timing and scale of attacks.
3. Clear responsibility for areas "between" divisional operating boundaries.
4. Degree of support to be given to other divisions, even at the cost of one's own primary mission.
5. How to deal with communicaitons breakdowns/limitations.
6. Seniority of command among the divisional commanders.
7. Conventions should any of us be incapacitated.

Doubtless there are others. Without getting too serious, a short conversation tegether before we are split apart (possibly for hours of real time) would be a good ideal, especially if we are not concentrated together in your "command radius" at start.

With deepest respect to the responsibilities of your position, I remain, sir, Your Obediant Subordinate

R.E. Rodes
Major General of Division, CSA, Gettysburg '99