Operations in Afghanistan

Bombing and Terrain

By John Hill

Two general threads seemed to be emerging about operations in Afghanistan. One is that bombing them back into the Stone Age won't work as they are already there. And two, that the terrain is so hard and the Afghans so fanatical that it is impossible to beat them. While both these threads, have an element of truth, they, like most sweeping generalizations, are not totally true. The basic conclusion is that Afghanistan has already been blown to bits is correct, and that the people are already suffering is also correct, and that massive air strikes or a conventional ground invasion would accomplish little is also basically correct. But none of this means that they are invulnerable to the kinds of pressure we can apply...if we do it smartly. If, however, we are dumb about it, our fate will be little different from those of yore. At this time, let is remember that while the Soviets did withdraw from Afghanistan they did a lot of things right...the Mujh were never really were able to fully counter the Spetsnatz and in many ways, the Russians only big mistake...and it was a biggie...is that they tried to actually occupy the place instead of simply punishing it. For instance, despite quite not a few tactical mistakes, by the end of 1986 they had the Mujh on the ropes. Only substantial U.S. aid, particularly in the form of Stingers, leveled the playing field and rallied the Mujh. But even then, Russians adapted and, at least, held their own -- despite growing casualties -- before they elected to withdraw. At least by one, very crude yardstick, their effort was more successful than our effort in Vietnam. For instance, the Russians killed about a million Afghans for a loss of 15,000 of their own. But we, to kill the same number of NVA/VC, suffered 50,000 deaths. The Russians now have offered us the benefit and experience of "their war", and we would do well to listen to them. The argument that the place is already "in the stone age" underestimates what selective strikes could do against a country with limited resources. Temporarily destroy the Salang Tunnel and Kabul is cut-off from the North. Take out the few remaining power plants and the lights go out...for a while, perhaps a long while. Fuel, and the trucks to transport it, and the roads they go over, are also vulnerabilities. These are pressure points that could be hit in a way that would gradually increase the pain with little risk to US forces. And they level of pain can be inched up or down as required. A review of the Russian experience does suggest that a broadband menu of selective pressure in the form of tightly focused air strikes and constant commando raids, and a few LRRP operations...gradually increased, would be a low risk plan..and if we also put a juicy price on OBL's head...about $100 million...sooner or later, someone would get greedy enough...Afghanistan is full of rogues, who love to change sides...if the price is right... Also, unlike the Mujh of old, the Taliban are thoroughly disliked in this part of the world. For instance, Pakistan and India have both...first time they ever agreed on anything...to offer us bases for retaliatory strikes. And, even our arch enemy, Iran, has indicated a willingness to cooperate, to a point. And finally, the old Tajik mujahedeen in Northeast Afghanistan have offered us bases in Afghanistan. The Taliban have assassinated the great Tajik leader, Ahmad Shah Mossoud -- not killed him in battle, which would have been honorable -- and that will ignite a blood feud, and no one does revenge like an Afghan -- just ask Kipling. True, there will be a post-Massoud power struggle, but it will sort itself out, and then it will be time for revenge. Additionally, the Tajiks, unlike the Pashtuns, are not tribal, and that can be a useful. The only time Afghans unite with each other is when there is an outside invader, otherwise they prefer to fight each other. So play on Afghanistan's natural ethnic schisms. The Tajiks hate the Pashtuns, the Pashtuns hate the Hazarras, and the Uzbecks hate everybody...and so on and so on. Do not be the outside occupier, but work from the outside, while tweaking on their vulnerabilities on the inside. The Taliban, will be like all previous Afghan governments, sooner or later, they go away. If not this year, maybe the next...or the one after that. Yeah, given time, these guys can be dealt with. P.S. "The great weakness of the Afghans, is that we are Afghans" -- Mujahedeen commander Ramatullah Safi. Back to Veteran Campaigner October 2001 Table of Contents Back to Veteran Campaigner List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by Pete Panzeri. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com