by Robert Coakley
The second round of the great conflict between England and France began in 1803, shortly after the purchase of Louisiana. It was a much more serious affair than the earlier one. Both Britain and France adopted policies under which American merchant shipping, whether carrying contraband or not, was subject to search and seizure. The Napoleonic Wars and the consequent depredations on American commerce were less a threat to national security than a blow to national pride. Jefferson responded to the challenge by withdrawing American shipping from the seas. Madison adopted the even riskier policy of economic coercion. Jefferson's Embargo Act of 1807 prohibited trade with all foreign countries. It was replaced by the Non-Intercourse Act of 1808, which prohibited trade only with England and France. The Non-Intercourse Act was, in turn, replaced by an act in May 1810, known as Macon's Bill No. 2, which reopened trade with England and France but provided that, if either of those countries repealed its restrictive measures and the other failed to follow suit, the Non-Intercourse Act would be put into effect against the nation that continued its restrictions. The legislation failed to keep the United States from becoming embroiled in the war and was unsuccessful in forcing England and France to respect neutral trade. Neither Jefferson nor Madison recognized that under the new scheme of economic warfare being waged by both England and France the American measures were in effect provocative acts, likely to bring the United States into the war on one side or the other. The Embargo Act and, to a lesser extent, the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 did cripple American trade, something that neither Britain nor France had succeeded in doing. As a result, the American people, already divided by sectional jealousies and by the French crisis during Adams' administration, were so thoroughly disunited that the government could not count on the loyalty and support of a sizable part of the population. International tension was so great in the months after the embargo went into effect that Congress, while rejecting Jefferson's proposal for recruiting a 24,000-man volunteer force, authorized the recruitment of 6,000 men as a temporary addition to the Army. In the last month of his administration President Jefferson sent more than 2,000 of these men to General Wilkinson to defend "New Orleans and its dependencies" against an expected English invasion. The invasion never materialized, but poor leadership and bureaucratic mismanagement bordering on the criminal combined with the tropical heat to accomplish what no British invasion could have done. Over 1,000 men, half of Wilkinson's army, died in Louisiana. By January 1810 relations with Britain had so deteriorated that President Madison recommended the recruitment of a volunteer force of 20,000. Congress, apparently satisfied with the existing militia system, again refused to vote a volunteer force; not until January 1812 did it increase the Army's strength when it added thirteen additional regiments, totaling about 25,700 men, and authorized the President to call 50,000 militiamen into service. The additional men would soon be needed. On June 18, 1812, Congress declared war against England. At the same time a Senate proposal to declare war against France failed by only two votes. Back to Table of Contents USAMH Issue 4 Back to US Army Military History List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2005 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |