In the wars of the 1690 period, armaments and tactics, though gradually evolving, remained relatively unchanged. The great breakthrough (or if you prefer, breakdown) in warfare awaited the emergence of the patriotism, levied a citizen army which developed in France during the Revolution.

Up until then, fairly small, highly disciplined professional forces, often with a strong leavening of foreign mercenaries, were the rule (foreign nationals made up as much as 50% of the Prussian Army in the mid-eighteenth century, although the foreigners were disbursed among regular regiments or organized into special Freikorps. Throughout this era, when one reads of a French, English, or Prussian Army, the force referred to is not a cohesive entity, by mixture of native sons (often pressed) and subsidized mercenaries.

With rare exceptions, rates of march were excessively slow. Formal, precisely dressed orders of march, burdensome equipment, provisions and artillery trains were all part of the reason, but just as important was a widespread ennui--a feeling among all but the best commanders that there was no point in rushing things. Lines of march were restricted too by the location of major fortresses. In enemy hands these could not be ignored. In friendly hands, they formed a crucial link in the logistical chain with their vast stores of food, ammunition, ordinance, and equipment.

In armies where morals was low or discipline repressive, cautious generals kept as many of their men as possible under their direct surveillance at all times, for wholesale desertion was a constant menace. For the same reason, many brilliant battlefield victories could not be followed up decisively. If you lot your troops pursue the enemy too far, they might join them, or, more likely, vanish into the countryside. On some campaigns the Prussian Army suffered more losses from desertions than from killed, wounded, or captured.

Talk of desertion reminds me of one Popovitch, a friend of a friend of the author, who as a reluctant Hapsburg subject, was drafted during the Great War. His repeated attempts to desert to the enemy (in this case, the Italians) were foiled, not due to the tenacity of the Austrian Provost Guard, but because of the swift and steady retreat of the Italian Army. Poor Popovitch finally despaired of over catching up with the Italians and allowed himself to be overtaken by some Austrian Dragoons.

But to return to the Age of Enlightenment, the success or failure of a commander influenced morale and desertion, as did the lushness or barrenness of the theater of war and the attitude of the local peasantry (only a few brave or stupid souls ever deserted in Russia, although in the 17008 captive Swedish officers were prized by, the aristocratic Russian families as excellent tutors. They also did duty as engineers. Later, when Napoleon's Grand Army collapsed, captive Frenchmen often made fortunes in St. Petersburg or the provinces as dancing masters and French instructors. However, they had to survive the Cossacks before enjoying the fruits of academia in the peace of Russian country mansions.

Sickness, mainly in the form of scurvy, typhus, simple malnutrition, the French (or, to the French, Spanish or English) pox and dysentery were also key factors in the success or failure of a campaign. The source of an army's drinking water could be just as critical to the outcome as the strength of its foe.

THE INFANTRY

Musket, bayonet and shortsword (the latter optional) were the weapons of the infantry. Although the use of formations of pikemen flanking the musketeers persisted in the very early 1700s, the polearms (halbard and spontoon) were soon relegated to ceremonial status, usually for parade ground use by officers and sergeants.

The matchlock, with its sputtering fuse, was quickly replaced by the snaphaunce and flintlock--all of them smoothbores except for the rifled weapons of German jagers and some American marksmen. "Aimable" range was only about 170 feet (about a modern city block) but volleys were exchanged from as far as 500 paces. The complicated process of firing and loading could be executed from two to five times per minute. This high speed was only attainable because troops were not expected to take individual aim, reliance being placed on the solid impact of a well-directed volley. The affect of such a massive, simultaneously fired volley at close quarters could be Immense. Some observers at the Battle of Fontenoy claimed that a disciplined British volley bowled over an entire front rank of the elite Gardes Francaise. Only light infantry bothered to aim.

Firing was done in from two to four ranks, usually three. The first rank knelt, but it was virtually impossible for regular infantry to load and fire in unison from prone position. However, during the French and Indian Wars, Canadian Irregulars and militia were known to have done so in loose formations.

THE CAVALRY

Throughout the eighteenth century some cavalry commanders clung to the old concept of the "caracole" ie., charging at the trot, and, without coming to grips with the eneny, having the front rank fire its pistols, move to the rear, replaced by a second rank and so on. Since the back of a horse is scarcely a steady firing platform, and since the cavalryman was an even worse marksman than the infantryman, the caracole was not a very effective maneuver and could neither withstand a determined Gabor charge nor compete in fire action against trained infantry. Hence the caracole steadily lost popularity. Heavy or "battle" cavalry were used for shock tactics on the battlefield. Hussars and other light types served as scouts, pickets, and foragers on campaign. Dragoons were a catch all, originally mounted infantry, they later became full fledged cavalry, rarely fought on foot.

THE ARTILLERY

Artillery had gradually changed from the vaque culverins, bombards and bastards of an earlier era, to fairly standardized systems for each national force. Field pieces fired anything from three to eighteen pound shot, and siege guns were even more formidable. To give an idea of the transport problems involved, a twenty-four pounder could weigh up to three tons. Sometimes prudent commanders would send their siege trains after them, on a convenient waterway. Otherwise, thousands of horses, mules, or oxen and countless delays along muddy roads were experienced.

Artillery range was considerably farther than musket range, a maximum of about a mile, although in the course of hard fought battles or sieges it was sometimes deployed within 600 feet of the enemy and often in the course of action overrrun.

The larger the piece, the slower it fired. For example, Captain Georg Pausch, who commanded the Hesse-Hanau artillery contingent during General Burgoyne's American campaign, mentions in his journal that a 12 pdr. could fire only a third as fast as a six pounder. He also mentions, (and this in a bit hard to believe) that during a minute firing exercise with a six pounder, his men managed to fire the piece eleven times (it would have been nineteen, notes the indignant Pausch, if he hadn't had to observe the 'useless' English custom of sponging the piece after each discharge). Guns of this type, and the even lighter three pounders which accompanied many infantry battalions, could be hauled into battle by the gunners themselves, using drag-ropes.

On the march, chartered oxen and draft horses were originally employed, along with hired teamsters. They had a tendency to turn tail when the going got tough, and so the use of them gradually fell into abeyance and army drovers came to be the rule by the middle of the century. Mortars and howitzers were also used, but usually in sieges.