The People's Republic of China (PRC) is seen by many as an economic powerhouse with the world's largest standing military that has the potential to translate economic power into the military sphere. As one of the elements of national power, a nation's military potential is an abstract value. It is based not only on its capability to defeat an adversary, but also its indirect ability to coerce and exercise influence. Potential military power is derived from a complicated set of factors including the numbers and types of forces; level of economic development; technological characteristics of weapons and equipment; discipline; morale; training; combat experience; command, control and leadership; geography; industrial capacity; national resources; and the national will to apply power. [1] If this power is not applied, it is of no value. [2] Any consideration of the future military potential of a power like China, therefore, is serious business that requires a cold, sober assessment of the likelihood that, if Beijing's economic success continues, it will be [3] translated into improvements in the military sphere. This monograph will touch on a few of these factors in an attempt to characterize the likely military potential of China in the 21st century. [4] China's standing armed force of some 2.8 million active soldiers in uniform is the largest military force in the world. Approximately 1 million reservists and some 15 million militia members back them up. This manpower alone makes the PRC a very significant military power. With a population of 1.2 billion people, China also has a potential manpower base of another 200 million males fit for military service available at any time. In addition to this wealth of manpower, China is a nuclear power. While some may classify China's strategic nuclear forces as "minimal," Beijing has enough megatonnage, missiles, and bombers to hit the United States, Europe, China's Asian neighbors, and Russia. [5] Notwithstanding the July 1998 de-targeting announcement between the United States and China, that does not change China's capability to hold Los Angeles or other U.S. cities hostage to nuclear threat. [6] China is also an economic power of considerable strength. The PRC's economy quadrupled in the 15 years before 1995. According to the latest World Bank report on its economy, China 2020, China's gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a rate of between 6.6 percent and 8 percent annually between 1978 and 1995. [7] And China has foreign exchange reserves of about $123 billion today, primarily from foreign direct investment in the Chinese economy. [8] There is a continuum of viewpoints regarding China's future. From an alarmist perspective, some analysts predict that China's size and economic power will necessarily lead to a clash between Chinese and American interests in the future. The most alarmist of these writers, Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, are convinced that China is on the way to "Asian hegemony" so that "no country in the region ... will act without taking China's interests into prime consideration." [9] David Shambaugh, in an article in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, presents a different argument. [10] Using a linguistic "deconstruction analysis" of the Chinese term for hegemony (Ba Chuan), Shambaugh analyzes its "archaeology," to paraphrase Michel Foucault. Shambaugh argues that China is not a hegemonic state. He shows a sophisticated understanding of the Chinese language in his argument. However, this linguistic deconstruction of the Chinese term for hegemony means nothing to those countries that are directly threatened by China's military might. Mongolia, India, Vietnam, and the various other claimants to the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Burma understand very well what hegemony means. It is the ability to coerce and exercise influences based on the capability to back policy up with force, and China is a hegemonic power for these states and territories. [11]  Francis A. Lees, in a 1997 book on China, argues that four factors are present that make China a superpower now: "a large, diversified national economy; a major conventional military force; a strategic nuclear arsenal; and a strategic geographic location." [12] Lees is wrong in my view. China is not a superpower. The PLA's conventional military force cannot project itself beyond China's periphery; the economy is fragile; the location is geostrategic in a continental sense, but regionally and in a global sense only if China can project sufficient naval force; and the nuclear arsenal is a minimal deterrent. Lees really gets at the potential for becoming a superpower; his argument that China is a superpower is not accepted by many of those who "watch China." Gerald Segal, a veteran Sinologist, for instance, argues in the April 17, 1998, edition of the New Statesman that China is not an important country. It is a "fragile state," according to Segal, that can't project its power and may not be able to do so for a "decade or two." [13] American military planners and strategists think in longer terms than Segal. They look 25 to 30 years out covering roughly the same time frame as this monograph. [14] Even without a "cold war," the potential for a clash of interests between the United States and another projected "superpower" such as China leads to forecasts, which translate into plans, strategies and requirements for military equipment and manpower. These analyses are part of the national force building process in the United States. Back to Table of Contents China's Military Potential Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com