It would be incorrect to say, of course, that no Americans were interested in military developments in the post-Civil War years. During the Grant administration, largely at the initiative of the Army's Commanding General, William T. Sherman, American officers began a program of visits to Europe. Few of these officers went there with an open, inquisitive mind: their Civil War experience had produced a profound complacency. Typical was the report of General Phil Sheridan, who toured with the Prussian Field Marshall Moltke's headquarters during the Franco-Prussian War and reported back to President Grant that "there is nothing to be learned here professionally." [9] But in 1875, Sherman sent a much more astute observer: a West Point instructor, graduate of the class of 1861, and hero of the battle of Spottsylvania, named Emory Upton. The orders Secretary of War Belknap sent to Upton must have seemed fantastic to the young veteran. He was to travel from West Point to San Francisco, and from there around the world to survey the world's armies. His report, completed in 1877, is a detailed assessment of the armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England. [10] Upton concluded with a number of recommendations which "we should adopt as indispensable to the vigorous successful, and humane prosecution of our future wars." [11] These initiatives included universal military service, a strong regular army, a modern reserve system in lieu of the volunteer system of the Civil War, a "War Academy" to teach officers the art of war, and a general staff. [12] Upton based his conclusions on an analysis of cost, arguing that an efficient military establishment in peacetime, with trained armies and competent staffs, will reduce the wartime need for expensive mobilization and keep casualties to a minimum. [13] Upton based much of his analysis on his analysis of the Wars of German Unification (Figure 1). Figure 1: Upton's Analysis, Illustrating that the Lack of a Strong Regular Army Was in Fact a False Economy. In Upton's words: Twenty thousand regular troops at Bull Run would have routed the insurgents, settled the question of military resistance, and relieved us from the pain and suspense of four years of war. [14] Unfortunately, these initiatives were at variance with American military tradition. Upton conceded that: recognizing, in the fullest degree, that our present geographical isolation happily relieves us from the necessity of maintaining a large standing army, I have sought to present the best system to meet the demands of judicious economy in peace, and to avert unnecessary extravagance, disaster, and bloodshed in time of war. [15] Sherman's comment on Upton's report, penciled on the cover, was that his ideas were sound, but: I doubt if you will convince the powers that be ... The time may not be now, but will come when these [conclusions] will be appreciated ....[16] Significantly, most of Upton's arguments were based upon his analysis of the Prussian victories over the Austrians and the French, but he also warned that: Japan is no longer contented with progress at home [and] is destined to play an important part in the history of the world. [17] Upton was transferred to the Presidio of San Francisco, where he developed what was probably a brain tumor. Tortured by the pain, he took his own life in 1881. The tragedy of Upton's death was that he believed that his life had been in vain and that his life's work would go forever unread. During his life, Upton corresponded with other likeminded military reformers, among whom was Commodore Stephen B. Luce, USN. In the Civil War, Luce had commanded a Federal monitor, a part of a fleet trying to reduce the harbor defenses of Charleston. This was one of the most expensive and frustrating naval operations of the Civil War, because the Charleston defenses were wellconstructed, and even when they were seriously damaged they were still strong enough to keep the Union navy at bay. When Sherman's army later took Charleston with ease from the landward side, Luce began to question the adequacy of the education of U.S. naval officers. Until that time naval officers learned little more than seamanship and gunnery, and nothing about naval strategy. As Luce put it, a naval officer should "not only know how to fight his own ship ... he should have some idea of the principles of strategy." [18] Luce's ideas were in keeping with prevailing American opinion about commerce and the government's responsibility to protect commerce, and unlike Upton, Luce found a supportive audience. He convinced the Navy Department to institute the Naval War College, in Newport RI, with himself installed as its first president. Luce then set out, to find "that master mind who will lay the foundations of [naval] science, and do for it what Jomini has done for the military science." [19] Luce found his man in Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who in 1890, published one of the most influential books of its time, The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Mahan argued that to realize its true greatness, the United States would have to change its continental orientation in favor of a global, maritime outlook. To do this with an acceptable degree of security, the navy would have to transform itself from a coastal defense force, augmented by commerce raiders, into an ocean-going force built around a fleet of capital ships. The size and capabilities of the fleet should be decided based upon the Royal Navy, the world's premier navy. These analyses at the Naval War College were the precursors of American peacetime war planning. Back to Table of Contents Joint U.S. Army-Navy War Planning WWI Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com