After Vietnam there was no presidential pressure to focus the Pentagon's attention on counterinsurgency. Without a strategic rationale, the Army relegated counterinsurgency to its periphery, the flame barely kept burning by a handful of concerned experts, most with Vietnam experience. [31] The 1981 version of basic Army doctrine for low-intensity conflict did not even use the word "counterinsurgency." [32] Admittedly, there were good reasons for this: conventional warfighting capabilities had declined precipitously, and Europe and Southwest Asia posed more pressing threats than Third World insurgency. The Carter policy in the Third World placed greater emphasis on human rights than containment. The leaders of ongoing insurgencies in places such as Nicaragua and Zimbabwe appeared less solidly pro-Soviet than their predecessors. Together, these considerations led President Jimmy Carter to conclude that the cost and risks of American engagement in counterinsurgency such as the strengthening of corrupt, illegitimate, and repressive regimes outweighed the risks of insurgent victory. Luckily, when perceptions of the strategic situation began to change, there was residual expertise within the military and Department of Defense. The flame had been kept alive. The motive for the reconstitution of counterinsurgency capability was the growth of pro-Soviet regimes throughout the Third World, especially the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, gains by communist insurgents in Guatemala, and the near- victory of the Cuban-backed Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador. "Death by a thousand small cuts" again found articulate and influential spokesmen such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick. In a critique of the Carter administration's tolerance of leftist political movements in the Third World, Dr. Kirkpatrick wrote, "violent insurgency headed by Marxist revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to anything but totalitarian tyranny. [33] In rhetoric reminiscent of Kennedy and his top advisors, Secretary Haig argued that Americans should be concerned "about illegal Soviet interventionism in El Salvador, in Africa, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and wherever international law is violated and the rule of force is applied against people who are seeking self- determination and social change." [34] "We cannot," he stated, "ignore Soviet activity in the developing nations because our passivity alters the calculations of other countries. It makes further Soviet expansion or Soviet-backed destabilization appear to be inevitable. It gives the appearance-and it is no more than an appearance-that Marxism in the Soviet mode is the wave of the future." [35] Such statements offered an indication of the administration's intent and a renewed strategic rationale for counterinsurgency. As during the Kennedy administration, high-level attention and the existence of a strategic rationale energized the military. For instance, by the late 1970s counterinsurgency had become a "non- subject" in the military educational system. [36] In the 1980s, it was reintroduced with systematic attempts to integrate the lessons of Vietnam. The Army's Special Warfare Center, the School of the Americas, and the Air Force's Special Operations School expanded their offerings on counterinsurgency. Eventually the Navy added a program on low-intensity conflict at its Postgraduate School sponsored by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The services created "proponency offices" to coordinate thinking and education on low- intensity conflict. [37] The Army and Air Force established a Center for Low- Intensfty Conflict (AAFCLIC) at Langley AFB. Army Special Operations Forces and the foreign area officer program, both major contributors to counterinsurgency support operations, grew. The Senate Armed Services Committee, a particularly strong advocate of organizational change, forced the Department of Defense to name an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low-Intensity Conflict and Special Operations (ASDSOLIC) and create USSOCOM. Recognizing the need for coherent strategy and policy, the Senate panel urged the National Security Council to forma low-intensity conflict board. [38] The Central Intelligence Agency also augmented its covert action capability which includes support to counterinsurgency. [39] The explosion of thinking and debate about low-intensity conflict was even more important than institutional reform. A number of serving and former government officials, retired officers, and analysts at government-related think tanks began to write on low-intensity conflict. [40] Articles on counterinsurgency returned in force to military publications such as Military Review, Parameters, and Marine Corps Gazette after a decade-long hiatus. The Department of Defense and the military services sponsored major studies and workshops. [41] Congress held hearings. [42] As a result, a working consensus on appropriate post-Vietnam counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine eventually emerged. [43] Conceptually, the Reagan policy echoed Kennedy's by stressing the relationship of Third World conflict to the superpower struggle. Secretary of State George Shultz could have been reading from Kennedy administration policy statements when he noted that low-intensity conflict "proliferated, in part, because of our success in deterring nuclear and conventional war ... Low-intensity warfare is [our enemies'] answer to our conventional and nuclear strength--a flanking maneuver in military terms." [44] As in the Kennedy administration, Reagan advisors were divided between hard-liners that stressed the wider geostrategic dimension of low-intensity conflict and the role of outside agitators, especially the Soviet Union and Cuba, and moderates who focused on internal causes of insurgency. The compromise which ensued was exactly the same as during the 1960s. Reagan's 1987 National Security Strategy, for instance, noted that the major causes of low-intensity conflict were "instability and lack of political and economic development in the Third World" which provided "fertile ground..for groups and nations wishing to exploit unrest for their own purposes." [45] The Reagan counterinsurgency strategy blended "carrots" and "sticks," simultaneously promoting democracy, development, dialogue, and defense. [46] However, it was less globally ambitious than the Kennedy policy, with a clear focus on Central America and the Caribbean and, like its pre-Vietnam predecessor, attempted to resist escalation. The 1987 National Security Strategy, for instance, stated that indirect applications of American military power, particularly security assistance, were appropriate for low-intensity conflict. [47] The limits on American involvement in counterinsurgency were made even more explicit when the 1988 National Security Strategy emphasized that U.S. engagement in low-intensity conflict "must be realistic, often discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict's outcome and important U.S. national security interests." [48] For the Army and Air Force, the counterinsurgency experience of the Reagan administration was eventually codified with the 1990 release of FM 100-20/AFM 3-20, Military Operations in Low-intensity Conflict. Success in low-intensity conflict, according to this doctrine, is based on five "imperatives": political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance. [49] The pivotal concept is legitimacy defined in a quintessential Western, rationalistic style. This assumes the people of a country facing insurgency will decide whether the government or the rebels can give them the "best deal" in terms of goods and services, and then support that side. Following this, U.S. activity in counterinsurgency is based on the internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy under which the host government "identifies the genuine grievances of its people and takes political, economic, and social actions to redress them." [50] But while FM 100-20, like the National Security Strategy, noted that the U.S. military role in counterinsurgency would "normally center on security assistance program administration," it did not rule out direct tactical involvement of U.S. forces even though admitting this "will be rare." Similarly, tactical-level doctrine stated, The introduction of US combat forces into an insurgency to conduct counterguerrilla operations is something that is done when all other US and host country responses have been inadequate. US combat forces are never the first units into a country. They are normally the last. [51] The gate to escalation, then, was narrower than in 1965, but not closed entirely. Just as Southeast Asia offered a laboratory for Kennedy's version of counterinsurgency, Central America, especially El Salvador, provided a testbed for the development of post-Vietnam counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. If there was ever a nation "ripe for revolution," it was El Salvador in the late 1970s. Like much of Central America, El Salvador had a weak economy dependent on commodity exports, badly maldistributed land and wealth, a history of authoritarian government and military intervention in politics, widespread corruption, and violent suppression of political opposition. The nation had occasionally attempted to develop an open political system, but without success. Democracy, according to Salvadoran political leader Guillermo M. Ungo, was "a cruel and painful deceit to Salvadorans. " [52] Furthermore, El Salvador's extreme population density made things even worse than in neighboring states like Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. All of the pathologies of Central America were thus distilled in one small country. Aided by substantial shipments of American military equipment left in Vietnam a decade earlier and shipped to El Salvador by way of Nicaragua, the FMLN guerrillas quickly became "one of the most combat-effective insurgent organizations in Central America, if not all Latin America." [53] By late 1980 they controlled large areas of three northern provinces, and in January 1981 launched a "final offensive" designed to topple the Salvadoran government in the same fashion that Somoza had been overthrown 3 years earlier. To support the attacks, the rebels had stockpiled 600 tons of weapons, most from Soviet-bloc sources. [54] With large-scale assistance from the Carter administration- earlier cut off for the rape and murder of four U.S. churchwomen by members of the National Guard-the government thwarted the "final offensive" but could not defeat the rebels or even gain the tactical initiative. Until early 1984, the FMLN operated in large, conventional-style units and continued to exercise partial control over regions of El Salvador." [55] Despite the inauspicious combination of a brutally repressive government, incompetent and corrupt military, and an insurgent movement growing in political and military skill, the Reagan administration decided to "draw the line." El Salvador was to be the indicator of the new administration's more active containment of Third World communism. [56] A State Department special report called the insurgency in El Salvador "a textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers." [57] Secretary of State Haig said, "our problem with El Salvador is external intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation in this hemisphere-nothing more, nothing less ... the rebel activity, its command, control, and direction, now is essentially in the hands of external forces-Cuban, Nicaraguan, and, of course, indirectly, Soviet." [58] Focusing on Latin America was not a new twist in American strategy. President Kennedy's efforts were directed more at Latin America than Southeast Asia, and included the Alliance for Progress and the inter-American military system. [59] This policy fell into disrepair when many Latin American insurgencies petered out by the early 1970s. President Carter further cut security assistance and training programs in the belief that Latin armies were tools of repression. For President Reagan, the communist threat to Latin America changed the strategic calculus. [60] When the administration decided to "draw the line" in El Salvador, some elements in the U.S. military welcomed the chance to try counterinsurgency again, this time tempered by the "lessons" of Vietnam. According to an important report prepared by four Army lieutenant colonels, "For the United States . . . El Salvador represents an experiment, an attempt to reverse the record of American failure in waging small wars, an effort to defeat an insurgency by providing training and material support without committing American troops to combat." [61] A healthy degree of realism and sense of constraint flavored the new approach to counterinsurgency. But U.S. strategy and doctrine still reflected the basic assumption that paved the way for escalation in Vietnam: Americans knew how to defeat Maoist "people's war," but Third World regimes did not. Henry Kissinger's Bipartisan Commission on Central America, for instance, distinguished American-style "enlightened counter-insurgency" which stressed the building of democracy and the encouragement of economic and social development from the iron-fist approach favored by Third World governments. [62] The essence of counterinsurgency support was thus bringing "enlightenment" to American allies. American military advisors were determined that El Salvador would not become "another Vietnam." Armed with "lessons" from Southeast Asia, Americans urged the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) to stress pacification, civil defense, and population security-what was called the "other war' in Vietnam- rather than the destruction of guerrilla units. The military, American experts believed, should operate in small units with strict constraints on the use of firepower. Since the support of the population was the crux of counter-insurgency, military activities should be subordinate to economic, political, and psychological ones designed to augment the legitimacy of the government. Equally important, the post-Vietnam counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine stressed that the United States must not assume control of the conflict. The U.S.' post-Vietnam approach to counterinsurgency still required making fundamental changes in the host nation's basic social, economic, political, and military structures and beliefs, but doing so with a limited American presence. The absolute crux of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, then, was finding ways to encourage or force an allied government and elite to do things they vehemently opposed. Improving the capability of the ESAF was not enough. Salvadoran society had to be reformed, a just legal system developed, right-wing political violence stopped, the military submitted to civilian control, and the peasants given a better life. U.S. policy then, sought to simultaneously strengthen the military and promote democracy. The primary tools were advice and assistance. The aid was only a small portion of U.S. foreign assistance, but staggering considering El Salvador's size. Military aid peaked at $196.6 million in 1984, economic assistance at $462.9 million in 1987. [63] Michael J. Hennelly has calculated that from 1981 to 1992, American assistance to El Salvador was about $1 million per day--this for a country of 5.2 million people. [64] American officials, both civilian and military, were constantly frustrated at the difficulty they faced convincing the Salvadorans to take the steps called for in the American approach to counterinsurgency. It took a 1983 National Campaign Plan--written with substantial assistance from American General Fred F. Woerner--to focus the counter- insurgency effort on winning popular support rather than killing guerrillas. [65] To that point, the Salvadoran military had largely used "iron fist" techniques which indiscriminately eradicated suspected insurgent supporters. The result was gruesome massacres such as the 1981 destruction of the village of El Mozote. [66] In fact, human rights abuses by the military and "death squads" of off-duty military and police posed the greatest obstacle to the winning of popular approval by the government. [67] It also threatened American support on a number of occasions and was the primary tool used by the FMLN in building an extensive international patronage network outside the Soviet bloc. [68] Serious improvement in the human rights situation only came after a direct warning in 1983 from Vice President Bush that continued death squad violence would lead to an aid cutoff. [69] Despite the persistence of human rights abuses and the political skill of the FMLN, steady progress was made by the counterinsurgents throughout the 1980s. By 1985, the ESAF was competent enough that the FMLN reverted to small unit, protracted warfare. Awash in American aid, the ESAF grew from 10,000 soldiers at the beginning of the insurgency to 56,000 in 1987. [70] Elite special units were formed and proved particularly effective. But the most important changes were political. With intense American pressure, the 1984 presidential elections won by Jose Napoleen Duarte were the cleanest in El Salvador's history. By the end of the 1980s, El Salvador was a democracy-albeit a fragile one, the ESAF a reasonably proficient military force, and the FMLN stood little chance of outright victory. Still, most analysts doubted that anything better than stalemate would ensue. Today, however, El Salvador is at least a qualified success. January 1992 peace accords reintegrated the FMLN into El Salvador's political life, and a number of former rebel political and military leaders hold elected office or head political parties. Joaquin Villalobos, one of the preeminent FMLN comandantes, has rejected socialism and now leads a reformist, left-of-center political movement. [71] El Salvador is rapidly rebuilding war damage and the economy is fragile, but growing. The third set of open presidential elections took place in 1994. "In terms of US regional objectives," writes Victor Rosello, "El Salvador presently appears to be an unqualified success." [72] But was it? If anything, the American experience in El Salvador suggests that U.S. doctrine works against a particular type of opponents, but only in conjunction with the appropriate strategic framework. For future counterinsurgency strategy, El Salvador had two important implications. First, El Salvador showed the magnitude of the task when applying the American concept of counterinsurgency. It can work, but the political and economic costs are immense. El Salvador is a small country close to the United States, but the United States spent nearly $6 billion in assistance plus a tremendous amount of political capital, time, and attention. [73] Put simply, the extent of change necessary to prepare a government for effective counterinsurgency is immense. It requires not only changing institutions and procedures, but attitudes and values. The final costs of consolidating counterinsurgency-of making it permanent-are still not clear. The United States has lost interest in El Salvador and is cutting assistance, but that nation's program of reconstruction and reconciliation is not finished. [74] Second, El Salvador showed the serious constraints on American leverage. The major tool was "conditionality" -- the continuation of aid was made contingent on reforms, especially the building of democracy and an end to death squad violence and other human rights abuses. Phrased differently, U.S. policymakers and diplomats had to convince the Salvadoran elite, particularly the ESAF, that American aid was necessary for success, but the aid would only continue if appropriate reforms were made. The Reagan administration was able to pull this off largely by a strategic version of the "good cop/bad cop" method of influence. The administration expressed sympathy with the predicament and difficulties of the elite and the ESAF leadership, but reminded them that Congress--the "bad cop"--would cut off aid without reform. Ironically, the end of the Cold War increased American leverage because threats to cut off aid were suddenly more credible. But, as Benjamin Schwarz points out, if U.S. counterinsurgency strategy "proves most effective when vital interests are not at stake, it will work best in situations that matter least." [75] Back to Table of Contents Counterinsurgency Strategy Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com