National Security Strategy Reports 1987 and 1988 Since the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was approved late in 1986, the 1987 report was prepared in a very limited period of time and reflected the intent to document only current strategic thinking. In its two major sections, one each on foreign policy and defense policy, the document reflected the Reagan administration's strong orientation toward Cabinet government, and a strong emphasis on military instruments of power, almost to the exclusion of the others. Taken as a whole, of course the document portrayed a comprehensive strategic approach toward the Soviet Union. The section on integrating elements of power referred to the "NSC system" as the integrator, rather than documenting current strategies toward regions or subregions. The NSC system in the Reagan administrations had produced by then over 250 classified national security decision directives (NSDD). It was believed that these represented at any point a set of substrategies "effective in promoting the integrated employment of the broad and diverse range of tools available for achieving our national security objectives." [6] Two major changes from the 1987 strategy were introduced in the 1988 report. With twin deficits prominent on the political agenda (federal budget and balance of trade, the first change was to emphasize all the elements of national power in an integrated strategy, particularly the economic element which scarcely had been discussed in the previous report. This logically led to the second adjustment, which was to present separate strategies for each region with an integration of the various instruments of power. Both efforts probably rate an "A" for idea and effort, and no more than a "C" for results as seen on the printed page or implemented by the administration. Behind the printed page, however, I am confident that those who participated in this interagency process were subsequently much more inclined to appreciate and to seek an approach of integrated policy instruments toward the resolution of U.S. security challenges in a region or subregion. The 1990 National Security Strategy Report The 1990 report was prepared in a vortex of global change. The Bush administration began with a detailed interagency review of security strategy in the spring of 1989. This effort-and the natural turbulence of a new administration shaking out its personnel and procedures, notably the Tower nomination-had pushed the preparation of the 1989 report into the early fall. Then, events in Eastern Europe made sections of the report, as well as the underlying policy, obsolete. The original Goldwater-Nichols legislation had implicitly assumed a fairly steady state in the international environment, with the annual report articulating incremental changes to both perceptions of and responses to that environment. The pace of change throughout the last half of 1989 pushed the publication of the next report into March 1990. In content the 1990 report attempted to embrace fully the reality of change in the Soviet Union and, especially, in Eastern Europe. The response to that change as discussed in the report, however, was admittedly cautious. At least one critic described the document as schizophrenic, with the reading of the environment in the front at significant variance with the prescribed response in the back. This demonstrates once again how much easier it is in a rather open, pluralistic process to gain consensus on what is being observed, as opposed to how the nation should respond to that observed change. The process in 1989-90 did show, however, the potential of the statutory requirement for a documented strategy to force public assessments of events and developments that might otherwise have been avoided, either because of their difficulty or their political sensitivity. The 1991 National Security Strategy Report The quickening pace of world change-and a deepening crisis and, ultimately, war in the Middle East-served again to delay the 1991 report. Key decision makers focused on multiple, demanding developments. After August 2, at least, the foreground of their view was filled with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, coalition building and military actions. In the background, and occasionally intruding to the fore, were fundamental changes in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, major treaties on strategic and conventional weaponry, and the final dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. There was little room in anyone's focus, particularly within the NSC staff, to develop, coordinate and publish a comprehensive and definitive Presidential statement of strategy. Although its major elements had been drafted by February, the 1991 report was not published until August. Like its predecessors, events forced the focus of the 1991 report to the U.S.-Soviet relationship as the departure point for any discussion of future American strategy. More than preceding reports, however, this one attempted to broaden the definition of national security. In purely military terms, it proclaimed regional conflict as the organizing focus for American military capabilities, and suggested that new terms of reference for nuclear deterrence would shortly be needed. Politically, it attempted to turn the compass on arms control from east-west to north-south for a much expanded discussion of policy to retard proliferation. Even more than the previous reports, the document attempted to communicate the idea that American economic well-being was included in the definition of national security, even though discussions of specific programs to improve competitiveness or to combat trade and budget deficits were generally lacking. The 1993 National Security Strategy Report The last of the three strategy reports of the Bush administration was published in January 1993, just before the inauguration of President-elect Bill Clinton. A draft had been prepared in early 1992, but several summits and the press of the 1992 campaign precluded its completion. Another contributing factor was the content of that campaign, which focused almost exclusively on the domestic economy, obviating the political usefulness of a new statement of security strategy. Unlike the previous reports in both the Reagan and Bush administrations, this one was intended quite clearly to document the accomplishments of the past rather than to point to the way ahead. The Republicans were leaving the White House after 12 years of stewardship of the nation's foreign and defense policies, including in their minds a remarkably successful conclusion to, and transition out of, the Cold War. As the titles of two of the report's sections attest -- "Security through Strength: Legacy and Mandate," and 'The World as It Can Be, If We Lead and Attempt to Shape It as Only America Can" -- they wanted to document their accomplishments in strategic terms, as well as to put down markers by which the Clinton administration's foreign policy could be judged. In terms of strategic content, however, there was little change between this report and the 1991 version. Both emphasize a steady, deliberate transition from a grand strategy of containment to one of "collective engagement" on a regional basis. Militarily, both contain the same defense strategy of four pillars as developed earlier by the Cheney- Powell team. [7] What differences there are, are found in the 1993 report's heavy emphasis on a broad goal of "democratic peace" and the absolute necessity of American leadership in attaining it, even to a limited degree, in a world of increasing interdependencies. Back to Table of Contents The National Security Strategy Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com