In June 1994, the Clinton administration published its first NSSR containing that administration's strategy of 99 engagement and enlargement." A number of reasons have been offered as to why it was a year and a half into the term before a comprehensive statement of strategy was finished: the President was elected to focus on, and is focusing on, difficult and time-consuming issues of domestic policy; it has taken longer than anticipated to recruit political appointees such that the government "reflects America"; we have announced our strategy through a series of speeches, and will get to the congressional report later; and so forth. In fact, this lack of a published strategy reflects the lack of consensus initially found within the administration, and the difficulty that caused in formulating a new grand strategy. This is not to imply that the administration, or at least parts of it, had not given much thought and discussion to various aspects of an overall security strategy-the report of the Department of Defense's Bottom-Up Review documenting one such effort. [8] But, by one official's count, the NSSR went through 21 drafts between early 1993 and publication in July 1994. The odyssey of the drafts portrays a lack of guidance and attention, shifting priorities among too many goals, a series of bureaucratic battles between the principal protagonists- the Departments of Defense and State, several restarts, and after the first six months, constant intrusions from the realities of foreign affairs beyond the anticipation of the administration. This portrayal is, however, superficial in my judgement. There are more fundamental reasons for the lengthy and arduous process through which the Clinton administration persevered to produce its view of the world and America's role in it. First, it took a long time for the administration to settle on a set of principles from which to design and implement a consistent foreign policy. Second, it remains to be seen how strongly the President believes in, and how consistently he will act on, those principles outlined in the report. The President has, in fact, already acted on a number of them as documented in the report. The Clinton administration has created a national security structure within the Executive Branch that allows each major point of view on national security an institutional power base just short of the President, and with no other office capable of integrating them. The important points of view, particularly relevant to crisis management, but also applicable to formulating strategy for a NSSR, and their organizational bases are: the military options for security and stability in the Department of Defense; bilateral relations and transnational issues with a regional focus in the Department of State and on the White House staff; considerations of economic security, particularly as they influence the domestic economy, in the National Economic Council supported by very strong Treasury and Commerce Departments, and the U.S. Trade Representative; and, issues of environmental security, in the Office of the Vice President. When working as the National Security Council, opinions of cabinet-level representatives of this structure can only be melded together by the President himself, not by the National Security Advisor or the White House Chief of Staff. Foreign policy issues sometimes seem to be dealt with as they arise, and seemingly with much more concern for how they will play at home than their longer term impact abroad. This is not true in every case, and the Clinton administration has had some notable successes: agreement on GATT and NAFTA trade accords; denuclearization in Russia and Ukraine; extension of security assurances, even if somewhat weak, eastward into Central Europe by the Partners for Peace program in NATO; an apparent agreement with North Korea on plutonium production; and the reestablishment of the Aristide government in Haiti are among this administration's successes. But in other important instances-abandonment of the original policy of "assertive multilateralism" after a tactical reversal of several failed policy initiatives in Bosnia; a brief attempt to denuclearize South Asia; and, before finally acting, an extended vacillation over what to do about an illegal regime in Haiti-the process seeks more often a quick resolution and "victory" for the President than it does to define and fulfill the longer term role and interests of the United States in a very disorderly world. Finally, there is the political situation of the President, who won only 43 percent of the popular vote running as a New Democrat in 1992. In addition to dealing with a Republican majority in Congress, he now must now create consensus within the Democratic party, since he is largely opposed in a unified manner by the Republicans except on issues of international trade. After the first six months, and particularly after the congressionally mandated withdrawal from Somalia and the subsequent dismissal of his Secretary of Defense, the President's foreign policy record has become a major issue for his opponents. This was even the more so in June and July 1994 when the President's polls on foreign policy were the worst ever, showing no boost whatsoever for his participation in the G-7 summit and his subsequent European tour. Having now signed and sent to Congress his first formal report of security strategy, it will be interesting to see if the concern of one White House staffer will be valid: "To publish a detailed report of national security strategy now would just provide chum for the sharks." This may not, however, be the case. As published, the Clinton NSSR contains a remarkably different vision of how to provide for America's "security" in the future. First, the conception of security is much more broad than used by earlier administrations. Given the new environment with apparently no military threats to the nation's physical security, the administration has defined security as "protecting our people, our territory, and our way of life." The addition of the last clause underlines the recognition that the strategy must be designed as much, if not more, for exploiting "the opportunities to make the nation more safe and prosperous," as it is for protecting it from a new class of "dangers" to its security. When contrasted to the necessities and burdens of the Cold War, this seizing of the historical opportunity, and that based on improving the lot of America's domestic life as well as promoting its democratic and economic aspects overseas, is a refreshingly positive and attractive approach. Further, there is a simple elegance of using only three national security goals-enhancing our security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy-under which to integrate all of the government's efforts to advance U.S. interests. Thereby, the many ways in which various means contribute to these ends and the interrelationships involved are more readily apparent, as are the trade-offs between them (to the consternation of some who have for decades seen their particular contribution to national security as their undeniable claim on resources!). As conceived and published, the strategy, for instance, makes clear that the contribution of various means to provide for "environmental security" contributes to the first goal -- "enhancing our security" -- in much the same way as does "maintaining a strong defense capability." But, even with this truly post-Cold War conception of our security coupled with a much more sweeping array of policy instruments for its pursuit-from population control, to environmental security, to nonproliferation initiatives--one is left with the impression that some of the more traditional, but vitally effective, means of providing for our national security, e.g., nuclear deterrence, have been inadequately addressed in the strategy. Equally noticeable by their absence in this globalist approach are the priorities necessary to make this strategy operative. While the "engagement' of the United States in the future is "to be selective," dependent on the intensity of the interest involved, there is little discussion of how U.S. leadership -- "Never has American leadership been more essential" -- is to be effective without direct engagement of our national capabilities, and the specific causes or regions in which that must be done are not made clear. In fact, the foreign policy record of the first two years already demonstrates this to be one of the strategy's major shortcomings. In the months and years ahead this issue of the effectiveness of American leadership may well be the linchpin of any strategic formulation for advancing America's interests in the world, including this new one by the Clinton administration. There are several reason for this. First, allies and friends no longer need our assistance with their security, or so they perceive and act. As a result, the leverage that extended deterrence and other strategic arrangements of the Cold War accrued to our leadership has withered. Second, the economic aspects of Clinton's foreign policy may be perceived as intrusive from the perspective of a nation whose markets we want to be opened to our exports. This has already caused several former allies and friends to distance themselves from what they see as economic nationalism, and a leadership that is fostering it. Third, America's problems at home, particularly faltering education, rampant crime and violence, and rising racial divisions have dimmed the message we send to promote the spread of democracy abroad. If these are the result of our form of democracy, as many rising industrial nations believe, we are promoting a form of cultural imperialism that they can do without. Back to Table of Contents The National Security Strategy Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com