At the base and core of the RMA, the substructure that holds its framework in place is information. Information has always been the cornerstone of warfare, the pivot on which decisions and strategies turned, and this is more true now than ever. As the military revolution of the information age, the RMA is itself a function of the incredibly rapid, precise, and broadly shared information that now circulates among modern military units. [23] It is easy to see why information resides at the core of the RMA. [24] Knowledge of the enemy's location provides the basis for military action. Precise location of enemy targets is necessary for precision-guided munitions. Amid the swift pace of modern battle, the rapid exchange of information about the status of the fight and reliable, real-time command and control are indispensable to success. [25] To achieve mastery of this realm, U.S. forces will seek information dominance-acquiring the necessary information for friendly forces while denying it to the enemy. [26] These facts are all well-known to military professionals by now. The phrase "information warfare" abounds in military journals and books on defense planning. What specific implications does it hold for military planning? [27] First and most fundamentally, conducting warfare in the information age will require a doctrine for information warfare. Military planners must have a precise idea of how information fits into operations and how it should be handled and disseminated. [28] In basic terms, this doctrine should provide for the acquisition and sharing of information by friendly forces and denying those things to the enemy. It should establish a plan for "getting inside the enemy's decision loop," as U.S. and coalition forces did so successfully in the Gulf War. Information dominance also represents a far cry from the war of single battles characteristic of Clausewitz's thought; warfare now involves simultaneous operations against a broad spectrum of military and civilian targets. [29] A doctrine for information warfare will have to address a host of issues. One is hierarchy. Removing unnecessary layers of authority by streamlining decision making has been a hallmark of civilian exercises in total quality management, and to some extent is relevant to military command structures as well. Insightful military leaders have spoken for years about the notion of "powering down," having as many decisions as possible made at lower levels to promote efficiency and initiative. [30] At the same time, hierarchy is essential to effective command and control, and to a certain extent better information will allow more decisions to be taken at a higher level-the all-seeing task force commander. And yet centralized command structures are especially vulnerable in an era of precision weapons, a lesson taught again to Iraq in the Gulf War. Such a doctrine must also answer the question of how much and what kind of information, and information technologies, the United States will share with its allies. Coalition warfare seems to be an established trend. At a minimum, effective communication with allied forces will be a must; and yet some in the Defense Department will certainly object to transferring or sharing their most advanced command and control equipment. This effect is an example of a disturbing trend: all four principles outlined in this monograph make it more difficult for the United States to integrate allies into its military efforts precisely at the moment when political incentives demand that it do so to a degree unprecedented since 1945. A doctrine for information warfare will also lead to a new understanding of "intelligence." Traditionally, intelligence, both strategic and tactical, has been partly divorced from the conduct of battle. Facts about enemy strategic intentions, or even the location of a moving enemy tank brigade, were gathered by intelligence units, analyzed, and eventually sent forward to combat units-which often discounted their veracity. Even in the Gulf War, this process often took as long as 48 hours. The future may see the gradual disappearance of a separate and distinct function called military intelligence. Frank Kendall of the Defense Department has argued that new technology "blurs the operational planning and intelligence boundary to the point of invisibility." [31] U.S. forces will need information about enemy movements on a real-time basis. Those facts will no longer be able to be cordoned off in a distinct organization separate from warfighting units. Intelligence officers as such may continue to exist, but they will be more integrated than ever before into actual military operations--an example of the importance of synergy, which will be discussed below. The authors of an information doctrine will confront thorny issues related to democracy and freedom of the press. An information revolution is taking place in the media just as it is in warfare. Television networks may soon have observation satellites of their own, reporters with tiny hand-held cameras able to move around the battlefield, and other intrusive technologies. Future U.S. political leaders will have to decide whether to restrict or shut down such broadcasts, and if so by what criteria. Information warfare also demands new kinds of military organizations. At the extreme, looking at the varied requirements and possibilities of information warfare, Martin Libicki and James Hazlett have proposed the creation of an "information corps." [32] A very different kind of information war doctrine will be required for irregular warfare. Control of information in a guerrilla or low-intensity conflict environment is just as important as in high-intensity war, perhaps even more so. After all, guerrilla warfare is essentially information warfare--a contest of military hide-and-seek and political allegiance. In this sort of war, obtaining information about the enemy and controlling the political debate are essential. But the means by which it is applied will be very different from conventional war. In particular, information war in unconventional conflicts will rely on human intelligence, special forces, and advanced sensors capable of detecting guerrilla groups. It also suggests an expanded role for psychological operations and civil affairs units, perhaps even, as the Tofflers have proposed, the creation of a "rapid reaction contingency broadcasting force." [33] War in an information age carries a number of risks as well, and the architects of a new doctrine must take them into account. [34] For one thing, vast amounts of information can be as crippling as they are liberating. Already U.S. troops in the Gulf War have begun to speak of information overload on the battlefield, the profusion of so many facts and orders that the result was confusion and frustration. Flexibility could be the first casualty in a new, rigid hierarchy of interwoven and automated command. In computer-driven warfare, units might increasingly be viewed as pawns in a game rather than as autonomous fighting forces capable of initiative. Clausewitz's venerable notion of friction suggests the particular danger of this trend. Things go wrong in war. Plans go awry, units fail to complete their assigned missions, commanders become confused. War, as suggested above, like international politics, is a chaotic enterprise. Any doctrine of information that relies on neat, linear control is bound to receive a nasty shock when it confronts the enemy and the fog of battle. This result is especially likely because the sophisticated technologies that support information warfare-satellites, for example, along with computers and downlink stations and other tools-are often very sensitive pieces of equipment that can themselves be disabled by a cunning enemy. As Alvin and Heidi Toffler have pointed out, militaries have no monopoly on computer technologies, and ingenious hackers could destroy U.S. computers with a well-placed electronic virus. [35] The U.S. military must study much more carefully its information vulnerabilities-whether to an anti-satellite weapon, an electromagnetic pulse, or the use of guerrilla warfare tactics by an enemy unwilling to be massacred on a traditional battlefield. [36] Back to Table of Contents Revolution in Military Affairs Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com