This discussion is more than an academic exercise. Whether the intrusiveness and potential precedent set by Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH and RESTORE HOPE or the feeble hesitance surrounding the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the harbingers of the future matters considerably for the international system in the post-cold war world. Essentially, the difference is whether the new international system is fundamentally different or not, and what will be the primary role of military force in that order. Each is a matter of considerable moment and not something into which we should enter without pause. The ad hoc consideration of individual cases may find us, in Kafkaesque terms, not merely peering into the abyss, but finding ourselves in its midst. The decision to use PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH or RESTORE HOPE as precedents represents a direct, frontal assault on the principle of state sovereignty unlike any of the informal compromises that things like economic interdependence represents. If the idea becomes widespread that there is a right and/or obligation to intervene in internal affairs of nation-states to relieve the suffering of individuals or groups, it is hard to imagine non-cynical criteria for deciding where to intervene and not to intervene. A powerful nation such as the United States may not feel assaulted by the precedent (we can physically prevent people from intervening in our affairs), but it is not clear how others may deal with these situations. How, for instance, is Russia to react when the analog to PROVIDE COMFORT is proposed for parts of the Caucasus? In circumstances where we decide to act, it will be in the role of peace enforcer, and we will be promoting, at least implicitly, the rights of individuals and groups over the sovereign rights of states. We already know the answer to the question. The reason that there was no direct U.N. sanction for the actions taken to create the exclusion zones in Kurdistan and south of the 32nd parallel in Iraq is because there is no international consensus favoring such action as an international principle. In fact, to have proposed such action would have revived the veto in the Security Council. The reason is simple enough: both Russia (as heir to the former Soviet seat) and China have situations within their former or present borders that would meet the criteria for parallel activity. In Somalia, the dimensions of human tragedy may simply have overwhelmed geostrategic considerations or created a new geostrategic reality of its own. The second reason all this is important is that the international plate of situations for which peace-enforcement might be undertaken is very full indeed. [60] Multinationalism and potential irredentism are powerful forces throughout the crumbling socialist and Third Worlds. As freedom and independence of expression comingle with an increasingly transparent world, the potential and temptation to become involved around the globe will multiply. The international system, and especially the American people, are neither prepared for nor willing to support widespread application of the PROVIDE COMFORT precedent, nor have American officials shown overt enthusiasm for overthrowing the Westphalian system and diluting American sovereignty in the process. Such situations will occur mainly where American interests are not directly involved and where public support will be nonexistent, particularly when the body bags begin to come home. These situations will be, to reiterate, complex, intractable, and poorly understood by the American public and by our responsible officials. If this sounds a bit like our approach into Vietnam, the analogy is purposeful. Vietnam spawned the Weinberger "doctrine" as a set of criteria that should guide American response to crises and the engagement of military force. The criteria were very conservative and cautionary, which was and is appropriate. At the very base of the criteria was the caution that American force requires the Clausewitzian trinity of unity among the people, the government, and the military. The inaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina-especially because of the unlikelihood of decisive success of any feasible military action-suggests a proper assessment of holding that trinity intact. It should be applied across the board. Is the new order different or not? It is clear that in many ways it is not, but the potential impact of extending the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH or RESTORE HOPE precedents to the future could alter fundamentally that assessment. There is, to repeat, no shortage of Bosnia-like potential situations on the horizon. The conscious choices that Americans and the international community generally make about how these situations are handled will define the new order. There will, thanks to the publicity created by global television, be great temptations to try to alleviate, by the application of military force, numerous situations, most of which cannot be solved by the application of the sword. Back to Table of Contents Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-Enforcement: The US Role in the New International Order Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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