The great danger in this entire area is to think of the five categories of actions detailed in the preceding section as representing something like a continuum, where movement from one form of activity to another represents a quantitative rather than qualitative progression. Moving from peacekeeping to peace building may represent such a progression; the interval between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, on the other hand, makes a fundamental, qualitative distinction. The qualitative differences can be placed into four admittedly overlapping categories, each with distinctive subpoints. The first is environmental and refers to characteristics "on the ground" when actions are being contemplated. The second is contextual, referring to the situation that would confront peacekeepers or peace enforcers were they to be inserted. The third category, based on the first and second, is the mission challenges that face forces inserted. The final category is the compatibility of a mission with current policy and strategy. As we shall see, the differences on each dimension are stark. Environment The environment refers to the conditions that exist at the time that a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement action is contemplated. Two factors, each shockingly obvious but fundamental in their import, stand out by means of contrast when thinking about peacekeeping or peace enforcing operations. First and most obvious is the existence of peace or war. In a peacekeeping situation, peace (or at least the absence of war) has been reestablished-a cease-fire is in place. This means that the task before the peacekeepers is to maintain that peace. By contrast, a peace enforcer contemplates a state of actual ongoing combat; his task is to cause that combat to cease. The contrast is fundamental. Second, and flowing from the first, in a situation requiring peace-enforcement, some-or possibly both or all-of the combatants prefer the continuation of hostilities to their cessation. Were this not the case, it would be true virtually by definition that a cease-fire would exist that only required monitoring-a peacekeeping environment. By contrast, peacekeepers only enter a situation when all parties have agreed to a cease-fire and where, implicitly or explicitly, they have agreed that the absence of hostilities is preferable to the continuation of combat. Both of these environmental influences point to a basic difference in the situation into which peacekeepers and peace enforcers may be introduced. If peace enforcers are required, a state of war exists and some or all prefer that situation to its alternative, a cease-fire. In this situation, outside intervention may well be ineffective. [44] While obvious, this contrast creates very different sets of problems for the potential peacekeeper or peace enforcer. Context The context in which outside force is inserted refers to the attitudes and conditions of the host groups or countries where force may be inserted. At least three related conditions stand out. The first is whether the outside forces are invited or not. In the case of peacekeepers, who operate on "the concept of peaceful interposition of U.N. forces between the contenders," [45] they clearly are. If a cease-fire is in place and its continuation is preferred to the reversion to war (an accepted precondition for accepting a peacekeeping role), then it follows that the peacekeeper becomes involved only if the invitation is universal. By contrast, at least one of the parties in an active combat situation for which peace-enforcement may be contemplated does not want an outsider to come in and cause the fighting from which it is presumably benefitting to end. More often than not, it will be those who are losing-the Muslims in Bosnia, for instance-who want peace to be created, not those who are winning. This leads directly to the second contextual point: peacekeepers are welcome in the country (or between the countries) in which they interposed; peace enforcers almost certainly will not be welcomed by all, and in some cases their mission may be opposed by all. Once again, this is true virtually by definition for peacekeepers; a welcome reception is part and parcel of the invitation they require before agreeing to be introduced. The peace enforcer, by contrast, is being asked to break up a fight that someone is enjoying. Like the policeman or MP asked to break up a barroom brawl, his mission may be for the greater good, but it is not likely to be appreciated by the brawlers. The third condition deals with the receptiveness of the parties to peaceful political settlement of their differences. In the case where a peacekeeping operation is envisaged, such a sentiment is normally present, or at least a continuation of the cease-fire is viewed as desirable. The peacekeepers have as a primary mission, after all, the facilitation of a peace process by keeping the former combatants apart. The situation is altogether different for potential peace enforcers. As noted, the continuing existence of warfare that needs ending is clear evidence that at least one side prefers to continue pursuing military rather than diplomatic solutions to the differences which led to war in the first place; the struggle is political at heart, if conducted militarily. [46] As long as that is the case, the outside peace enforcer is rather more likely to be an irritant rather than a lubricant for the peace process. The contextual elements define the receptivity of the contestants to outside intervention by peacekeepers or peace enforcers. For the peacekeeper, the environment is comparatively benign; the peacekeeper is the invited guest of the participants and is a positive part of the process of reconciliation. The environment facing the peace enforcer, on the other hand, is likely to be intensely hostile. By interposing themselves between combatants who have not eschewed continuing violence, peace enforcers will be an unwelcome addition by some or all combatants. Any peace enforcer who expects the gratitude of those he forces apart is likely in for a rude awakening. Mission Challenges The quality of the environment into which the peacekeeper or peace enforcer is thrust will affect how the mission will be conducted. The peacekeeper exists in the comparatively benign atmosphere of welcomed peace; the peace enforcer is an unwanted addition to a state of war. Those conditions make a difference in how each can operate. The first difference, suggested earlier, is in the neutral or partisan role each adopts. Strict neutrality is one of the hallmarks of the peacekeeper, and peacekeeping missions have always brought in nonpartisan forces to carry on in a manner fair to both sides. To act in any other manner would prejudice their mission and run the risk of being disinvited by the side perceiving unfairness. [47] In all likelihood, peace-enforcement missions would initially think of themselves as neutral as well. Such a presumption could arise from the likely humanitarian underpinning of such a mission ("our purpose is to alleviate human suffering") or from the mistaken impression that peace-enforcement represents a simple step on the continuum of international responses. This kind of sentiment was expressed explicitly in a recent New York Times editorial, which heralded the humanitarian aspect of an effort but failed to appreciate the loss of neutrality the effort would imply. [48] It is the "do something syndrome" impulse in action. However noble peace enforcers may perceive themselves to be, they will almost certainly not be so perceived by those they have come to "save." The purpose of peace enforcers is to alter the existing situation by ending combat and establishing peace. Since peace is not universally desired (if it were, there would be no need for the peace enforcers), this means altering the status quo in a manner that has a negative effect on the interests of one or more parties to the dispute. Those adversely affected can hardly view the peace enforcer's actions as neutral in content. The Americans in Somalia soon learned, for instance, that the "technicals" came to view them as enemies. A second difference has to do with the difficulty of accomplishing the mission. Assuming that a peacekeeping force is inserted into a true peacekeeping situation, its mission is rather simple and straightforward; it is there for a well-defined and generally supported mission. It is only when peacekeepers are mistakenly put into a peace enforcing situation, as was done to UNPROFOR, that the peacekeeper's task becomes untenable. Peace-enforcement is likely to be much more difficult. The underlying internal situations into which peace enforcers might be thrust (e.g. Bosnia) are likely to be analogous to insurgency-counterinsurgency scenarios, and the success of outsiders in those "domestic" disputes is unimpressive at best. [49] Such situations are intensely political, and military force is rarely capable of political conversion, especially when those wielding that force are outsiders. It is arguable that many of the missions for which the peace-enforcement mechanism appears to provide an option fall into the "too hard box," a judgment certainly influencing outside assessments of Bosnia. A third difference has to do with uniqueness and controversy about the mission. Peacekeeping, of course, is a traditional and accepted practice; the role of the "blue berets" has been well established over time. The fact that there are currently about a dozen of them in place is evidence of their legitimacy. Such is hardly the case with peace-enforcement. Part of the difference arises from the fact the even the idea of peace-enforcement is brand new, a product of the post-cold war world. Peace-enforcement was unthinkable in the cold war because most wars pitted American- and Soviet-supported antagonists, thereby stripping any shard of neutrality. We lack direct experience with these kinds of actions. Moreover, to the extent that such actions are taken to pry apart warring factions within nations, they run afoul the valid charges of interference in the sovereign affairs of nations. In the United Nations' experience, the ONUC operation in the Belgian Congo/Zaire, where U.N. peacekeepers became embroiled in thwarting the attempted secession of Katanga Province, may provide the closest available parallel. If so, it is an example that counsels caution. [50] Boutros-Ghali himself suggests a parallel between Somalia and ONUC. [51] The fourth difference deals with the obviously different forces one needs to conduct one or the other kind of operation. For peacekeepers, the model is clear and well defined. The forces can be relatively small, lightly armed, defensive in orientation, essentially passively equipped and supported. Because of these characteristics, they are also relatively inexpensive, which is one reason they are attractive to the perpetually underfinanced United Nations. Peace enforcers will have to be quite different. They will have to be combat troops, since they will be thrust into conditions of war. They will require offensive orientation and equipment to protect themselves in combat and to conduct offensive missions. They will likely have to be bigger in size and will require more logistical support than peacekeepers. As a result, such operations will also be much more expensive, a practical reason they are unlikely to be U.N. operations. These challenges help define the attractiveness of the two contrasting missions. If ease and likelihood of success are major criteria by which attraction is measured, it is clear that peacekeeping is more attractive than peace-enforcement. A final way to look at the contrast, however, requires looking through the lens of each activity in its relationship to existing policy and strategy. Policy and Strategy Compatibility For Americans, both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement represent relatively novel missions. American forces have, of course, some modest experience as peacekeepers (the Sinai mission), and should the Iraqi government seek to reinstitute its violence toward the Kurds in the "security zone" or the Shiites south of the 32nd Parallel, we could quickly gain peace-enforcement experience as well. These proposed missions bump differentially against established policy and strategy. One way to look at the missions is through the lenses of the Weinberger Doctrine and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin S. Powell's criteria for using force. As example, General Powell recently raised the following questions when contemplating force: "Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further, and what might be the consequences?" [52] All are good questions to ask about potential peace-enforcement missions. One might add a question about short-term versus long-term objectives achievement. The Weinberger Doctrine suggests the need for vital interests to be present before any action is contemplated (see below), and that victory and popular support be reasonably assured. Peacekeepers, by and large, are successful, and if winning is not defined in militarily activist terms, unlikely will violate public support. Peace-enforcement, on the other hand, is likely to be unpopular if actions cannot be concluded rapidly (and if the analogy to counterinsurgency holds, they likely cannot) [53] and sacrifices mount. The Powell entreaty that maximum force be applied toward rapid conclusion of hostilities is unlikely to be met in either mission. If the bottom line is long-term success, both missions are questionable.  In addition to this, it is not at all clear that in most of the situations where peacekeeping or peace-enforcement will be appropriate that sufficiently vital American interests will be involved to justify the application of force. In fact, it has been argued that this situation will hardly ever involve American vital interests. [54] The passive, noncombative nature of peacekeeping makes the absence of vital interests somewhat less important, because, in a real sense, forces are not being sent to war but to maintain peace. The absence of vital interests does make a difference in peace-enforcement, because forces will be sent into war to create peace. In that circumstance, the outcome of the situation will have be justified in terms of vital interests (the first criterion of the Weinberger Doctrine). A third policy concern is what international principles will be served by the two kinds of operations and whether the actions are congruent with the principles the United States espouses. As argued, American action in establishing the security zone in Iraq is compatible with the promotion of the rights of individuals and groups, even if this was not the underlying intention. Other peace-enforcement actions, especially in the remnants of the former Soviet Union and in the Third World, are likely to be analogous. If this is the intent, then we should clearly delineate that in policy, because it would represent a fundamental shift. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is a traditional, Westphalian activity congruent with the supremacy of the rights of states. The fourth policy implication has to do with the continuing salience of the United Nations as a primary conflict resolver in American policy. With the veto gridlock broken in the U.N. in 1990 (the last time the veto was used in the Security Council), the U.N. has become the legitimizing agent for international change. Peacekeeping reinforces that legitimation; peace-enforcement undercuts it. There is both a principled and a practical reason why the U.N. cannot be used as the instrument for peace-enforcement except where peace is forced upon two sovereign nation-states at war (which will be the exception). The matter of principle is the U.N. Charter's adherence to the "sovereign equality" of its members found in Article 2, Section 1. [55] To authorize the use of a peace-enforcement mission in, for instance, Bosnia, would force the U.N. to amend or ignore its Charter. To suggest that it do so would compromise and abuse the organization. The second and practical reason is that any such action would almost certainly be vetoed in the Security Council by those states fearing a precedent that could justify peace-enforcement missions in their own countries sometime in the future. The former Soviet Union, represented by Russia, certainly is a candidate for future peace-enforcement, as is the People's Republic of China. Recognizing these difficulties is why PROVIDE COMFORT was not legitimized by the U.N. and why the use of military force in Bosnia (beyond peacekeepers) cannot be. Having said that, the U.N. action in Somalia suggests that attitudes may be changing to embrace "humanitarian intervention." [56] This does not mean that potential peace-enforcement actions cannot or will not be multilateral in nature. They may well be. What it does mean is that the broad international sanction that U.N. blessing provides will be absent from such actions. As we learned in Somalia as well, U.S.-sponsored peace-enforcement may be preferred by the parties involved to U.N. operations, oddly enough on the grounds of neutrality and fairness. This suggests a fifth policy and strategy implication, and that is that this is such a new and unique use of military power that there is little to shape or guide either policy or strategy or to suggest when we should and should not avoid peace-enforcement "opportunities." If, as suggested, there may be a parallel with the U.N. Congo operation, then caution is advised; most observers feel this was the most controversial peacekeeping operation by the world body, and one whose actions bordered on peace-enforcement. It is a case worth serious reconsideration. What this discussion suggests is that peacekeeping, while on the margins of existing policy and strategy, violates little existing orthodoxy. Peace-enforcement, on the other hand, opens up several policy areas and may require significant political and strategic, as well as operational, changes in the way the United States does business. Back to Table of Contents Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-Enforcement: The US Role in the New International Order Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com