If the two situations resemble one another in terms of brutality and offensiveness, the reactions by the international community to them varies dramatically: the second stage of active intervention occurred in Iraq and Somalia; it has not in former Yugoslavia. The reason for the difference most commonly cited is the enormously complicated nature of the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the consequent likely inability of outside intervention to solve the problem. Former Yugoslavia was, after all, one of the most artificial of nation-states, with multiple nationalities speaking three different languages, employing two different alphabets and confessing two sects of Christianity in addition to Islam. The feuds that underlay the conflict go back centuries, even millennia, and much of the animosity in the current situation reflects the still felt wounds of World War II, where large numbers of Croatians supported Germany while Serbs formed the backbone of resistance to Nazi rule. All of these things are true and relevant, and it is also true that outside military force cannot address or solve any of these problems, which are political and not military. The case for nonintervention is thus grounded in the intractibility of the situation. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell argued in a recent Foreign Affairs article, the reason for not involving American troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that "the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue." [27] Bosnia does not pass that test. The terms "Vietnam" and "quagmire" attach like glue to the discussions of potential decisive military actions in the United States. The inaction of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community to a situation clearly more important to them than to the United States provides mute testimony to a similar conclusion. [28] The Clausewitzian entreaty that one must understand the nature of a war before becoming engaged appears particularly relevant. These assessments are both empirically correct and entirely evasive of the real underlying importance of the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the rules of conduct of the new international order. Alleviating the suffering by lifting the sieges is the overwhelming problem from the vantage point of the Bosnians. Whether this is practically attainable (can it be done within the limits of the amounts of force people would devote to it?), permanent or transitory (if wrested apart, would the enemies just resume once the intervenors left?) are relevant questions. Systemically, however, the real question is whether the international response will extend or repudiate the precedent set in Operations PROVIDE COMFORT, SOUTHERN WATCH and RESTORE HOPE about the meaning of sovereignty in the post-cold war world. Will Bosnia and Herzegovina reinforce the Westphalian order or continue its erosion? This issue is clear if rarely addressed directly. The principle of state sovereignty extending from the notion that the sovereign monarch has no one as his or her superior has underlaid the international system for over 300 years. States possess sovereignty over their territory and those who reside in that territory, and no outside force has the right or jurisdiction to interfere in the enforcement of that sovereignty. In practice, of course, state sovereignty is never absolute. Small and weak states, for instance, are infringed upon by stronger neighbors, states voluntarily forfeit bits of their sovereignty to other entities to insure things like orderly delivery of mail across national borders. Economic interpenetration has greatly undercut the practical control of national governments over their economies. The assaults on state sovereignty until recently have largely been practical, not principled or fundamental. The implicit challenge to state sovereignty in Iraq (it is implicit because no government is trumpeting it as a matter of principle) is a direct assault in principle to a state's sovereign right to govern its territory. [29] Implicitly, it asserts the notion of the supremacy of the rights of individuals and groups within countries when they are abused by their governments. Boutros-Ghali embraces this principle and enshrines it, arguing that "the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands," [30] being replaced by the idea of universal sovereignty. Even conservative columnist William Safire joins the parade for "the new sovereignty" (a term he borrows with acknowledgement from former Secretary of State George Shultz). He asks: "When do the world's responsible leaders have a right to intrude on what used to be an impenetrable sovereignty?" [31] The reason for this is abundantly clear. If states hew to the notion that there is an international right to intervene in other countries' affairs when there are perceived or real violations of the rights of groups and individuals, then state governments are also leaving themselves open to be intervened against-to have their own sovereign territory compromised. It is one thing for the United States to condemn Iraqi atrocities against the Kurds and Shiites of that country; it is quite another to extend that principle to, say, the right of South Korea to have intervened in the Los Angeles riots of 1992 to protect the rights of Korean-Americans who bore the brunt of much of the rage evident in that tragedy. It is because of the clear potential precedential nature of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT, SOUTHERN WATCH and RESTORE HOPE that no one in the American government is talking about the intervention in those terms. [32] As Operation DESERT STORM was forming and the military action was being conducted, President Bush argued that this was the first defining act of the "new world order." When Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was extended to the exclusion zones within Iraq, the rhetoric of new orders disappeared; it was not a coincidence. A particularly cruel Bosnian winter may force President Clinton to add implicit or explicit imprimatur to this distinction. No principles have been enunciated to justify Somalia beyond humanitarian concerns. One must be very clear about what is involved here. The action authorized by the United Nations first to remove Iraq from Kuwait [33] (the series of Security Council resolutions culminating in 678 [34] ) and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds (Resolution 688) were Westphalian: DESERT STORM restored the state sovereignty of Kuwait and stopped at that, and the provision of humanitarian aid to the refugee Kurds posed no challenge to Iraqi sovereignty. [35] Only when the operation extended to creating and maintaining the exclusion zones (an action not sanctioned by the United Nations) was the principle of the primacy of individuals and groups implicitly entered into the equation. The situation is parallel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United Nations has acted to condemn Serbian actions (originally through Resolution 770) through the imposition of economic sanctions and the suspension of Yugoslav membership in the world body, and it has sent peacekeepers into Bosnia to try to assure that the humanitarian assistance it has called for (Resolution 771) reaches those for whom it is intended. These actions are, once again, congruent with the Westphalian order. Resolutions 688 and 771 are parallel in this regard. They would extend the challenge to that order represented in Iraq if outside forces intervened and created something akin to an exclusion zone to protect the beleaguered segments of the Bosnian population. RESTORE HOPE, because it is authorized by the U.N., would appear to expand the principle underlying PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH from a unilateral (U.S.) to an international assertion. To take decisive military action to end the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina would create a powerful theoretical and practical statement about the rules of the new international order. Theoretically, it would reinforce the movement away from Westphalia to a much more circumscribed definition of state sovereignty. Given the villainy that exists in large portions of the world, that may be a desirable end. It is not, however, an end that should be countenanced without serious and complete acceptance of the consequences for all nation-states and the pursuit of their interests. At a practical level, the assertion of a duty, right, or obligation to protect individuals and groups from the atrocious behavior of their own governments, particularly in times of internal war, redefines the purposes for which the international community will use force in the future. Specifically, the role of internationally derived force moves from the relatively passive role of peacekeeping to the very arduous task of peace-enforcement. The reaction to the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests an implicit reluctance to adopt such a role. The action in Somalia embraces that role. As The New York Times columnist Lawrence L. Friedman recently argued: "if halting starvation or upholding human rights are now legitimate criteria for American intervention abroad, as compelling as protecting traditional strategic interests, where does President-elect Clinton draw the new red line?" [36] It is vitally important that such a determination, one way or the other, be made explicitly. Back to Table of Contents Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-Enforcement: The US Role in the New International Order Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com