Russia and the Baltic

Conclusions

by Stephen Blank

If Russia and the Baltic are to be integrated in European security systems as democratic, multinational polities, now is the time to move forward. Delay will only prolong the acrimony between them and help push Russia over the edge into a situation where either civil war, total collapse, or the iron hand are its only alternatives. The political contest between Yeltsin and his enemies is fast approaching either an impasse or a moment of truth, i.e. a popular referendum, with a most uncertain outcome.

A bipartisan, U.S.-led initiative, if offered soon, could probably win support in Europe and discussions among the interested parties could then move forward in timely fashion.

That would be the most effective way to ensure that the Baltic region and the littoral states of the Baltic Sea do not again threaten the peace of Europe. Surely that outcome would be preferable to the current drift and tension that accompany any period of security vacuum. There were ample warnings about the likelihood of any breakup of Yugoslavia and the consequences thereof, and they were ignored. That current tragedy was not a bolt from the blue. Like most wars, it reflected the failure of statesmanship and policy. Today in the Baltic a comparable test awaits the architects of European security. Neither the peoples of the region nor history will forgive them for failing a second time when the omens of failure and the opportunities to avert it were so plainly visible.

Only the United States, acting through NATO, can lead this multilateral effort. The Baltic states and Russia both want the United States in Europe and a strong NATO. The Baltic states want to restrain Russia and strengthen NATO, the only visible security system that enjoys authority in their eyes. Russia wants the United States there to counter Germany, to provide aid for its reforms, and to maintain its great power status. The United States can, therefore, take the initiative in crafting a solution that meets many, if not all, of both sides' needs, and which is in its interest as well.

The West's failure in Yugoslavia has stimulated anxieties about the future of Eastern Europe, discredited the existing security institutions and processes, and intensified East European demands for protection against future contingencies. East European states want NATO to be the main agent of that protection with the United States continuing its leading role. Abdicating that role in the Baltic when we have already indicated via the National Guard and CSCE commitments that the area is important to our own and our allies' security will call into doubt the United States' leadership, the viability of NATO and other institutions as providers of security, and prospects for Russia's democratization and Europeanization. In that case, the challenge of reshaping Baltic, and then Eastern European security regimes will fall to other, probably hostile political actors. Should other, unfriendly forces design the Baltic's future security regime, they will do so without and against the United States. But more importantly, they will do so without regard for the Baltic and Russian people, and the peace and security of Europe.


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