Russia and the Baltic

Towards a Baltic Security System

by Stephen Blank

For the Baltic states and Kaliningrad to be secure, all foreign forces must leave the former and Kaliningrad's defense should be regulated by an international agreement. Baltic states' security and Russian access to Kaliningrad must also be guaranteed by a negotiated accord for everyone to feel secure.

The solution must rule out threats of war or Russian efforts to compromise Baltic independence and security, as the Russian Right wishes to do. Similarly the issues of human rights, economic relations, property compensation, and borders must be dealt with on their own merits, and not linked to military threats as is now the case. As Swedish Prime Minister Bildt has stated, it is necessary to separate human rights from threats of aggression, and not make ethnic policies in one state a pretext for aggression, as in Bosnia. [46]

The conclusion of a negotiated accord would rebut Russian conservatives' claim that the very existence of a Russian state is "a basic factor in the defense of the Russian- speaking populace which dwells beyond the boundaries of Russia. [47]

The attempt to use the Russian state as a source of inspiration for Russian minorities abroad is a favorite tactic of the right wing and the MOD, and it reflects their belief that Baltic truculence in the talks is solely due to the 'deficiencies of Russian statehood,' i.e. the weakness of the state's defense of Russians abroad and of its armed forces. [48]

An accord would commit Russia to a status quo that prevents foreign intervention on behalf of minorities in the Baltic states. It also would diminish prospects for ethnic conflict inside those states initiated by minorities hoping to involve their compatriots on the other side of the border. For these reasons the Baltic States are continuing to internationalize the question of troop withdrawals by citing the CSCE communique and appealing to the U.N. They know that by showing Europe that the troops' presence is a security issue, they will continue to gain Western support enabling them to resist Russian pressure. [49]

Indeed, these remarks by Russian conservatives and officers paradoxically demonstrate that Russia cannot now impose the MFAs' negotiating posture on the Baltic states, especially given the West's support for them. They also serve to convince Western states of the rightness of Baltic claims that Russia's troops do, indeed, menace European security and require a collective reply. [50]

Consequently, as Estonian President Lennart Meri commented,

The West has to use two completely different languages with Russia--a friendly language with the democratic forces, who must be given a hope that Russia will gain much from having three friendly neutral nations on its border, and a tough language that shows that international aid will be directly tied to how Russia treats the Baltics. It is likely the West will have to use both languages to the same people . [51]

The approach we have in mind speaks those two languages to which Meri referred. It also may be called Finlandization of the area. It is based on the model of postwar Finnish-Soviet relations deriving from their 1948 treaty and subsequent evolution of that bilateral relationship. This accord prevented Finland from becoming a base for Western armed forces and compelled it to be neutral unless it was attacked. This approach does not compromise the Baltic states'security because while they would be effectively unable to be hostile bases against Russia, they would have opportunities that were denied to Finland because they would be participating in a European system based on the treaty or treaties described below. Moreover, Finland was not without its own resources during the cold war as recent analyses have demonstrated and as NATO officials well understand. [52]

Our approach builds towards a security community throughout the Baltic and Eastern Europe. While it hedges against Russian imperialist inclinations, it also invites Russia to share the benefits of that order. It also builds on the fact that regional security of the Baltic is increasingly perceived to be integral to European security. The plan's outline is:

  • Russian troops should withdraw without Baltic compensation or with housing funds pledged, as George Kennan suggested, by the United States or a Western consortium. This departure should take place at the earliest possible agreed upon date. In return the European security institutions should guarantee both Baltic neutralization if Russia is threatened and defense against Russian aggression. The Baltic states should also reach an accord with Russia that permits early warning, air defense and over the horizon systems on their lands.

  • Access to Kaliningrad and its neutralization along similar lines must be guaranteed.

  • 'Economic warfare' against the states party to the treaty and against Kaliningrad, e.g. power outages, energy boycotts, and so forth, must be banned.

  • Europe should begin discussing demilitarizing the Baltic Sea as part of a CFE 11 treaty. Confidence Building Measures, mutual inspections, restrictions on SLCMs and Anti-Ship missiles, and perhaps naval guarantees for all the littoral states after the Baltic states and Russia agree to eliminate blockades and other casus belli could figure in this program.

  • All aid to Russia must be conditional, based upon its withdrawal from, and progress in its talks with, the Baltic states.

  • Nationality and border issues affecting minorities of any of the states involved should be addressed to and in the CSCE without prejudice. Fact-finding missions and binding arbitration might perhaps be invoked here. That outcome may prevent a reversion to the unfortunate Versailles Treaty Precedents of 1919-39 and prevent the legitimate international concern for human rights from becoming a means of breaking up states or restoring the Russian empire. [53]

    In this context, it might be worthwhile to explore the earlier Russo-Latvian idea of a CSCE (or U.N.) High Commissioner for nationality affairs who would conduct such fact-finding and binding arbitration as might be called for. [54]

  • Outstanding economic issues that affect bilateral or regional relationships should be noted between or among the parties. Where they cannot reach agreement, international tribunals, e.g. the World Court or other acceptable international organizations should be called upon to adjudicate the issues at hand.

    These points would exclude foreign forces and introduce confidence-building measures, and even possibly arms control regulations into the area. They would prevent the Baltic states from being a threat to Russia, offer Russia real security guarantees and incentives: naval disarmament, financial aid, reduced military outlays, inclusion in Europe, and critical security guarantees concerning the Baltic region and Russians abroad. This package would create more of a 'balance of interests' regionally and to some degree in Eastern Europe. Since the Baltic states would enjoy the right to self-defense and European guarantees against attack and economic warfare, they would be in a better, though comparable, position to Finland after it was defeated by the USSR in 1944 and tied to it after the treaty of 1948.

    More importantly, this solution is also in Russia's interests. It should be clear to Russia now that in every case since 1939, when Russia exerted strong pressure on Baltic states, that pressure fostered greater Baltic integration with the West and regional cooperation against Russian interests. This pressure remains counterproductive with regard to the key states of Sweden, Poland, and Finland, not to mention the EC and NATO allies.

    Conversely, the Baltic states must accept that Russia's economic, political, and defense interests in the Baltic Sea are fully legitimate, especially in view of the character of cruise missiles and aero-space platforms that characterize modern warfare. No Russian state could or would accept exclusion from the Baltic coast and long-term vulnerability as the result of exclusion from the European order.

    However, a solution on the order suggested here would alleviate those concerns and might, as former Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedayev suggested, satisfy Russian needs if based on the Fenno-Soviet treaty of 1948 .55 And as time passes without incident, it is conceivable that treaty rectifications could be made to the benefit of the Baltic states as Russian security within a general European system grows.

    At the same time, the Scandinavian states, the littoral states, and NATO (especially the United States), must actively uphold this system and its linked economic, political, and defense provisions. Regional cooperation and integration into Europe as well as diplomacy that speaks the two languages Estonian President Meri's mentioned above are essential to create and sustain this system.

    The Freedom Support Act and bilateral U.S.-Russian dialogues have already begun to'speak' those two 'languages.' Undoubtedly, such an accord as we have outlined would allow the troops to withdraw with dignity, mitigate ethnic tension within the Baltic states, and provide for resolution of disputed borders and economic issues.

    But most importantly this accord would deprive the enemies of reform of some of their most potent issues. It would demonstrate that integration with the West ensures security for Russia and the Russian diasporas, and provides for economic development. Those gains alone would negate the hard-line threat assessments that dominate current military writing.

    This accord would also check the MOD's proclivities to take the lead in security policy, and fence it in by a system that balances real guarantees of security with demonstrable threats if Russia resorts to force. This accord would also provide avenues for de-linking Russian diaspora, economic, and border issues from those of military security. This, in turn, would reduce the pressure on Yeltsin on the Baltic and diaspora issues and allow him to reassert his and civilian control over these issues and security policy in general. [56]

    Certainly NATO would be happy to achieve a resolution along these lines. General Vigleik Eide of Norway, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, pointedly told Estonian officers that Estonia must resolve the citizenship issue in a way that reduces chances for conflict. But Estonia alone must do it and its sovereignty must be respected and protected. He also reminded that Finland offers a good example of how a small state could create a reliable defense system. [57]

    Since the accords would allow Baltic self-defense forces and not bar Western states from military cooperation and training, the Baltic states could, with Western aid, maximize their defense potential within this framework. [58]

    The proposals suggested here would move the entire region and East Europe closer to a legitimate and integrated system that adds to everyone's security. Alternative proposals are possible. But it must be made clear to the Russian Right that the West will not stand by and let them destroy Russian democracy and European stability in the name of a revived Russian empire. It is unlikely that they enjoy popular support for their military and imperial designs, especially given the visible domestic costs.

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