by Stephen Blank
The potential danger involved in an unresolved situation in
the Baltic and from the ascendancy of hard-liners in Russia lies in
the temptation for Russia to reassert control over the region on the
grounds of defense of its security interests and/or of its nationals
abroad. Already there are incidents of ethnic attacks on Russian
troops in Latvia and Estonia plus signs of an ethnic mobilization of
armed bands on both sides.
[24]
The Nordic states' and Poland's anxieties also illustrate
those potential dangers. Indeed, the Baltic security system and the
future of Russian politics are linked and a solution that finds a
modus vivendi between Baltic and Russian interests will go along
way to lessen the challenges to Russian economic and
institutional reform. A Western approach that deals with the troops
in the Baltic and allays Russian security fears about those states
and Kaliningrad Oblast is needed. Certainly, such an approach will
diminish the temptation and ability of the military and other
right-wing nationalist forces to usurp authority in security
policy generally, not only in the Baltic.
The Baltic states view their Russian citizens as a
potential fifth column due to past experience and Russians'
former colonialist disdain for the native languages and
national movements. The Baltic states' language and
citizenship laws are comparable to other European ones, and
even International Affairs conceded in May 1992 that there
were no observable signs of anti-Russian discrimination in
Latvia. [25]
While committed to a nationalist solution in their
homelands, their leaders generally profess an equal
commitment to legal and peaceable integration of non-
indigenous Russians into those states.
[26]
Since the spring of 1992, tensions that had seemed to
be easing in 1991 have escalated due to the propaganda war
on both sides with shrill voices of enmity tending to be
loudest, as is generally the case. Although some U.S.
commentators have focused exclusively on the Russian
chauvinists, the fact is that there are now more than enough
rabble rousers on both sides to stoke the fires of hatred.
[27]
The real problem is negotiating a mutually acceptable
security system in the region and rescuing it from further
strife. The prospect of major Baltic economic reform that will
penalize the Russians who profited disproportionately from
the Soviet ethnic division of labor, and will turn the local
economies away from Russia to the West, also causes
resentment and/or fears. But here only tolerance and foreign
assistance can help. These states, like Russia, must de-
Sovietize their economies to move forward.
Given their fear of a potential fifth column linked to
invasion (the mirror image of Russian threat assessments),
Baltic elites almost unanimously express their open desire
for security integration with the West, and even membership
in NATO. [28]
They view the presence of Russian troops also as an
economic threat perpetuating a climate of uncertainty and
ethnic unrest and inhibiting foreign investment and reform at
home. [29]
Overall defense and economic integration with
Scandinavia and more broadly with the West is their
preferred answer to these threats. What they would like to
see is sufficient Western
presence to 'neutralize' Russia's military presence in the
Baltic. By this presence they appear to mean security
guarantees and substantial institutional cooperation with the
West, especially in defense, but also in economics. The U.S.
National Guard program and European provision of spare
munitions and training to their armies exemplify such
presence and cooperation.
[30]
They fear that Russia will inevitably readopt an
aggressive posture and well remember that it was the British
Navy and then Germany that guaranteed their security
against a Russian threat after 1919. They argue that the same
condition exists today, and that only NATO can prevent a new
threat similar to Serbian aggression in Bosnia from arising
again. They also fear that the West will abandon them to a
revived Russia when that revival takes place.
[31]
Turning to the broader Baltic Sea region, we find that
this political impasse has galvanized the Scandinavian states
and NATO to express their displeasure with Russian policy.
Germany supports a "Europa das Mitte" including the Baltic
states, and their ultimate inclusion in the EC. Swedish
support for them and refusal to accept Russia's linkage of
troop withdrawals with citizenship legislation also indicate
that there is an awareness of the strength of the Western
position and an interest in using it in the Baltic to strengthen
security. [32]
So, too, does Swedish military support and the U.S.
decision to send the National Guard teams to help train
Lithuania's armed forces. As Finnish Prime Minister Koivisto,
stated after the Helsinki meeting,
The most important thing for us, bearing in mind our
immediate environs, is that an authoritative international forum
approved a statement which in itself provides a framework for
the status of the Russian troops and their withdrawal. Yeltsin
has also made statements which have supported the CSCE
stance . [33]
Indeed, both Finland and Sweden are rethinking
regional security, and not only because of their interest in
joining the EC and the need to come to terms with its
commitment to a future integrated defense policy. Clearly
they feel an increased sense of insecurity in the region.
Swedish officials are discussing a joint surveillance regime
in the Baltic Sea that overtly derives from fears of Russian
intentions. [34]
Unprecedented Finnish arms purchases from the United
States of the F-18 fighter gives the United States a 'front
seat' in Finland and involves it in Finnish and regional
security. [35]
All these trends, especially the strong support for the
Baltic states at Helsinki and in the CSCE since then, coupled
with warnings to Russia about the consequences of
threatening them, suggest growing cooperation among
littoral states, including Poland, and an emerging consensus
that Russian troops in those states threaten European
security. [36]
Scandinavia's and Europe's response to Russia's
suspension of troop withdrawals underscores the need for
Western guarantees to uphold the Baltic states' sovereignty
and integrity, and Russia's legitimate interests. Western
guarantees also provide a counter to Russian threats and
can offer a collective solution to the issues of security for all
the littoral states. It is essential that Western leaders and
elites realize the leverage they possess. Vice President
Rutskoi of Russia recently observed that his solution to the
Moldova conflict would be to send two airborne divisions
into Chisinau and hang President Snegur. What deterred him
from doing so was that he could not predict the West's
response. [37]
Another example of Western leverage is in
economics. Russia charges that it cannot withdraw troops
from the Baltic because it lacks the means to build housing
for them inside Russia. In reply, financial solutions to this
problem that rely on Western economic aid have come from
various sources and the Baltic states are discussing the
issue with Scandinavian states.
[38]
Poland has also made its fears about Russian
concentrations of troops in Kaliningrad known to the West,
the Baltic states, and Russia.
[39]
Russia assuredly is aware of regional trends and has
shown concern about the prospect of being shut out from
regional cooperation in economics, ecological cleanups, and
security. That concern and European cooperation in the
Baltic provide leverage for the United States and the West to
take the lead to resolve the present uncertainty. Inasmuch as
the Baltic is now firmly ensconced in the CSCE security
agenda and U.S. aid to Russia is tied to fulfillment of
withdrawal by the Freedom Support Act of 1992, the necessary legal-political precedents
for broader action exist.
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