The potential danger involved in an unresolved situation in the Baltic and from the ascendancy of hard-liners in Russia lies in the temptation for Russia to reassert control over the region on the grounds of defense of its security interests and/or of its nationals abroad. Already there are incidents of ethnic attacks on Russian troops in Latvia and Estonia plus signs of an ethnic mobilization of armed bands on both sides. [24] The Nordic states' and Poland's anxieties also illustrate those potential dangers. Indeed, the Baltic security system and the future of Russian politics are linked and a solution that finds a modus vivendi between Baltic and Russian interests will go along way to lessen the challenges to Russian economic and institutional reform. A Western approach that deals with the troops in the Baltic and allays Russian security fears about those states and Kaliningrad Oblast is needed. Certainly, such an approach will diminish the temptation and ability of the military and other right-wing nationalist forces to usurp authority in security policy generally, not only in the Baltic. The Baltic states view their Russian citizens as a potential fifth column due to past experience and Russians' former colonialist disdain for the native languages and national movements. The Baltic states' language and citizenship laws are comparable to other European ones, and even International Affairs conceded in May 1992 that there were no observable signs of anti-Russian discrimination in Latvia. [25] While committed to a nationalist solution in their homelands, their leaders generally profess an equal commitment to legal and peaceable integration of non- indigenous Russians into those states. [26] Since the spring of 1992, tensions that had seemed to be easing in 1991 have escalated due to the propaganda war on both sides with shrill voices of enmity tending to be loudest, as is generally the case. Although some U.S. commentators have focused exclusively on the Russian chauvinists, the fact is that there are now more than enough rabble rousers on both sides to stoke the fires of hatred. [27] The real problem is negotiating a mutually acceptable security system in the region and rescuing it from further strife. The prospect of major Baltic economic reform that will penalize the Russians who profited disproportionately from the Soviet ethnic division of labor, and will turn the local economies away from Russia to the West, also causes resentment and/or fears. But here only tolerance and foreign assistance can help. These states, like Russia, must de- Sovietize their economies to move forward. Given their fear of a potential fifth column linked to invasion (the mirror image of Russian threat assessments), Baltic elites almost unanimously express their open desire for security integration with the West, and even membership in NATO. [28] They view the presence of Russian troops also as an economic threat perpetuating a climate of uncertainty and ethnic unrest and inhibiting foreign investment and reform at home. [29] Overall defense and economic integration with Scandinavia and more broadly with the West is their preferred answer to these threats. What they would like to see is sufficient Western presence to 'neutralize' Russia's military presence in the Baltic. By this presence they appear to mean security guarantees and substantial institutional cooperation with the West, especially in defense, but also in economics. The U.S. National Guard program and European provision of spare munitions and training to their armies exemplify such presence and cooperation. [30] They fear that Russia will inevitably readopt an aggressive posture and well remember that it was the British Navy and then Germany that guaranteed their security against a Russian threat after 1919. They argue that the same condition exists today, and that only NATO can prevent a new threat similar to Serbian aggression in Bosnia from arising again. They also fear that the West will abandon them to a revived Russia when that revival takes place. [31] Turning to the broader Baltic Sea region, we find that this political impasse has galvanized the Scandinavian states and NATO to express their displeasure with Russian policy. Germany supports a "Europa das Mitte" including the Baltic states, and their ultimate inclusion in the EC. Swedish support for them and refusal to accept Russia's linkage of troop withdrawals with citizenship legislation also indicate that there is an awareness of the strength of the Western position and an interest in using it in the Baltic to strengthen security. [32] So, too, does Swedish military support and the U.S. decision to send the National Guard teams to help train Lithuania's armed forces. As Finnish Prime Minister Koivisto, stated after the Helsinki meeting, The most important thing for us, bearing in mind our immediate environs, is that an authoritative international forum approved a statement which in itself provides a framework for the status of the Russian troops and their withdrawal. Yeltsin has also made statements which have supported the CSCE stance . [33] Indeed, both Finland and Sweden are rethinking regional security, and not only because of their interest in joining the EC and the need to come to terms with its commitment to a future integrated defense policy. Clearly they feel an increased sense of insecurity in the region. Swedish officials are discussing a joint surveillance regime in the Baltic Sea that overtly derives from fears of Russian intentions. [34] Unprecedented Finnish arms purchases from the United States of the F-18 fighter gives the United States a 'front seat' in Finland and involves it in Finnish and regional security. [35] All these trends, especially the strong support for the Baltic states at Helsinki and in the CSCE since then, coupled with warnings to Russia about the consequences of threatening them, suggest growing cooperation among littoral states, including Poland, and an emerging consensus that Russian troops in those states threaten European security. [36] Scandinavia's and Europe's response to Russia's suspension of troop withdrawals underscores the need for Western guarantees to uphold the Baltic states' sovereignty and integrity, and Russia's legitimate interests. Western guarantees also provide a counter to Russian threats and can offer a collective solution to the issues of security for all the littoral states. It is essential that Western leaders and elites realize the leverage they possess. Vice President Rutskoi of Russia recently observed that his solution to the Moldova conflict would be to send two airborne divisions into Chisinau and hang President Snegur. What deterred him from doing so was that he could not predict the West's response. [37] Another example of Western leverage is in economics. Russia charges that it cannot withdraw troops from the Baltic because it lacks the means to build housing for them inside Russia. In reply, financial solutions to this problem that rely on Western economic aid have come from various sources and the Baltic states are discussing the issue with Scandinavian states. [38] Poland has also made its fears about Russian concentrations of troops in Kaliningrad known to the West, the Baltic states, and Russia. [39] Russia assuredly is aware of regional trends and has shown concern about the prospect of being shut out from regional cooperation in economics, ecological cleanups, and security. That concern and European cooperation in the Baltic provide leverage for the United States and the West to take the lead to resolve the present uncertainty. Inasmuch as the Baltic is now firmly ensconced in the CSCE security agenda and U.S. aid to Russia is tied to fulfillment of withdrawal by the Freedom Support Act of 1992, the necessary legal-political precedents for broader action exist. Back to Table of Contents Russia and the Baltic Is There a Threat to European Security? Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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